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ABSTRACT
This thesis considers the understudied issue of genetic engineering as it has been
deployed in the literature of the late 20th century. With reference to the concept of the
enlightened gender hybridity of Cyborg theory and an eye to ecocritical implications, I read four
texts: Joan Slonczewski’s 1986 science fiction novel A Door Into Ocean, Octavia Butler’s
science fiction trilogy Lilith’s Brood – originally released between 1987 and 1989 as
Xenogenesis – Simon Mawer’s 1997 literary novel Mendel’s Dwarf, and the first two books in
Margaret Atwood’s speculative fiction MaddAddam series: 2003’s Oryx and Crake and 2009’s
The Year Of the Flood. I argue that the inclusion of genetic engineering has changed as the
technology moves from science fiction to science fact, moving from the fantastic to the
mundane.
Throughout its recent literary history, genetic engineering has played a role in
complicating questions of sexuality, paternity, and the division between nature and culture. It has
also come to represent a nexus of potential cultural change, one which stands to fulfill the
dramatic hybridity Haraway rhapsodized in her “Cyborg Manifesto” while also containing the
potential to disrupt the ecocritical conversation by destroying what we used to understand as
nature. Despite their four different takes on the issue, each of the texts I read offers a complex
vision of utopian hopes and apocalyptic fears. They agree that, for better or for worse, genetic
engineering is forever changing both our world and ourselves.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Their technology is pre-stone age . . . [or] Perhaps they are post-metal age.
– Joan Slonczewski, A Door Into Ocean (89)

Even in Snowman’s boyhood there were luminous green rabbits, though they weren’t this big
and they hadn’t yet slipped their cages and bred with the wild population, and become a
nuisance.
– Margaret Atwood, Oryx and Crake (86)

The landscapes of Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam novels are inscribed with signs of
scientific hubris and capitalistic decadence. Atwood’s near-future Earth is marked by
environmental catastrophe, populated with grotesque hybrid animals, and overrun by a deadly
hemorrhagic virus – the JUVE. The alien world of Joan Slonczewski’s novel A Door Into Ocean,
in contrast, is inscribed with signs of scientific humility and pluralistic balance. Her story mostly
takes place on an ocean-moon, one marked by environmental harmony, populated by an
assiduously non-violent all-female society, and threatened by an occupying capitalistic military
force. Atwood’s story has strong elements of dystopia; Slonczewski’s is clearly utopian.
Published in 2003 and 2009, Atwood’s two MaddAddam novels – Oryx and Crake and The Year
Of The Flood – are literary products from one of Canada’s most respected living authors.
Published in 1986, Slonczewski’s A Door Into Ocean won the Joseph W. Campbell Memorial
Award for Best Science Fiction Novel. These two texts are quite different, and yet they form the
core of my thesis project because, for all their differences, they each make significant use of the
1

concept of genetic engineering. Atwood’s world is littered with the byproducts of a genetic
engineering industry run rampant and it is ultimately destroyed by the virulent JUVE, itself a
genetically engineered catastrophe. Slonczewski’s utopian society lives harmoniously in its
water world where everything from the living raft tree habitations to reproduction is fully
integrated into the practice of “lifeshaping” – what we would call genetic engineering.
I’ve chosen these two texts because they function as convenient bookends for this thesis.
Genetic engineering has, in the space of thirty or so years, moved from the realm of cutting edge
science (and main-stream science fiction) to a fact of life in our mundane world (and our selfconsciously literary productions). In this time genetics has emerged as a formidable tool for
everyone from biologists to criminal detectives. The cost of mapping one’s genome is fast
approaching a marketable price point (Markoff). 1 In this time genetic engineering has moved
from the realm of pure science fiction into all sorts of novels. Slonczewski’s novel is explicitly
science fiction, set in a distant future of interplanetary travel and incredible genetic engineering,
while Atwood describes her novels as “speculative fiction” (“Aliens” 513), distinct from science
fiction in that she claims not to have created anything but rather worked with things that science
has already created, or begun to create. Perhaps more importantly, while both novels may share
an interest in the future lives of their scientifically effected characters, Slonczewski’s novel is
marketed as science fiction, while Atwood’s novels can be found under the “Literature” section
of your local bookstore.

1

This long-standing price point goal is believed to be around $1,000, although the entrepreneurs working on this also
note that the abundance of computing technology at most people’s fingertips as another cause for hope that genetic
sequencing will soon become a mundane reality for most Americans. More information available at NYtimes.com:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/technology/cost-of-gene-sequencing-falls-raising-hopes-for-medicaladvances.html
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The central argument of this thesis is that, as genetic engineering moves from the realm
of speculation ever closer to reality, the idea of genetic engineering has become (and is still
becoming) an ever more accessible metaphor for authors. In calling genetic engineering a
“literary praxis” I am making use of the specific overtones of the word “praxis.” These are
capture well in one of the Oxford English Dictionary’s definitions: “b. Conscious, willed action,
esp. (in Marxist and neo-Marxist thought) that through which theory or philosophy is
transformed into practical social activity; the synthesis of theory and practice seen as a basis for
or condition of political and economic change. Also: an instance of this; the application of a
theory or philosophy to a practical political, social, etc., activity or programme” (“praxis, n.”). It
is the tension between theory and practical application which most draws me to this term. 2
So I use the phrase literary praxis for a couple of reasons. First, for the verbal symmetry
between genetic praxis and literary praxis. Although probably not what Marxist thinkers have in
mind when using the term, genetic engineering operates more as a praxis than merely a practice
or technology. It would be impossible without the theory of genetic inheritance which traces its
origins to Gregor Mendel’s seminal 1866 study; it would also be impossible without
understanding the physical form of those structures which enable Mendelian inheritance, which
were discovered by James D. Watson and Francis Crick in 1953; it would be impossible without
the computing technology which decodes and interprets the billions of genetic “letters”; it would
be impossible without the sophisticated biological and medical knowledge which allows
scientists (and others) to operate at the level of genetic information. So whenever any bit of
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I should give honorable mention to Neal Stephenson, who uses the term regularly in his wonderful sf novels, and
first got the word stuck in my head; I should also thank Dr. Campbell for turning me on to Neal Stephenson.
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genetic engineering is performed, this process is not just the practice of genetic engineering, but
an embodiment of all those layers of theory. Hence, I refer to genetic engineering as praxis.
Second, I use the term praxis to draw an analogy between literary uses of the concept of
genetic engineering, and the use of genetic engineering itself. Specifically, I am looking at the
way that the concept of genetic engineering shapes a text in certain, theoretically significant
ways. Genetic engineering, as it is used in the texts I study in this thesis, operates as a
mechanism for believably inscribing some theoretical idea into the world of the text. The literary
form of genetic engineering functions as literary praxis for realizing the potentials imagined in
Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto”; it is literary praxis which conflates nature and culture,
self and Other, 3 and confuses our traditional notions of identity – which is to say, a posthuman
praxis. Genetic engineering is deployed as a means of imaging a more perfect world, or as a
means of dissecting our thoroughly imperfect one. It fits nicely into that “especially dense
transfer point for relations of power” (Foucault 103) which Foucault recognized in the issue of
sexuality. It defamiliarizes reproduction, deconstructs gender, and explodes the natural world.
Put another way, genetic engineering has become a tremendously useful metaphor, in the
sense laid out by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in Metaphors We Live By:
The concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. They
also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details. Our
concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how
we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in
defining our everyday realities. If we are largely metaphorical, then the way we
3

Throughout this thesis, I will capitalize “Other” to denote the Constitutive Other, which always opposes the Same.
In this thesis, the Same will generally refer to the self, or one’s own understanding of their identity.
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think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of
metaphor. (3)
They go on to suggest that metaphors are systematic – “Because the metaphorical concept is
systematic, the language we use to talk about that aspect of the concept is systematic” (7) –
which implies that “the very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept
in terms of another (e.g., comprehending an aspect of arguing in terms of battle) will necessarily
hide other aspects of the concept” (10). The point of all this is that our way of being in the world
(our praxis) is profoundly shaped by those Metaphors We Live By (or, in academic terms, our
pet theories). If we acknowledge that the world as it was in 1986, or as it was in 2003, or as it is
even today, is stacked against women, against the poor, against the environment, and if we
wanted to change that somehow, a good place to look would be our metaphors: our (often
unacknowledged) way of understanding the world and our place in it which shapes everything
we do. And a good way to start effecting change is to find and disseminate new metaphors:
When people who are talking don’t share the same culture, knowledge, values,
and assumptions, mutual understanding can be especially difficult. Such
understanding is possible through the negotiation of meaning. To negotiate
meaning with someone, you have to become aware of and respect the differences
in your backgrounds and when these differences are important. (Lakoff and
Johnson, 231, emphasis original)
This negotiation of meaning offers the possibility of achieving not just an understanding between
different groups (genders, species, politics, etc.), but also forming new kinds of understanding.
Or as Lakoff and Johnson put it: “New metaphors are capable of creating new understandings
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and, therefore, new realities” (235). 4 So I am suggesting, and will show in the following
chapters, that genetic engineering functions as a new metaphorical system, one which has been
evolving as the technology itself has evolved. Originally deployed as a sort of high-concept
science fiction trope, genetic engineering has become almost mundane. But, regardless of its
deployment, the literary use of genetic engineering seems to be constrained (or drawn) to a
certain set of issues: gender, reproduction, nature, and the ethics of imposing free-will on
previously uncontrolled, spontaneous systems.
Hence my choice of bookends: Slonczewski, who depicts genetic engineering as an
undeniably positive force oriented against the forces of a much more destructive (and familiar)
world, Valedon; and Atwood, for whom genetic engineering is an unrelentingly negative force,
not oriented against the (masculine) world of mineral science and commerce, but rather aligned
with them in an accelerating rush towards apocalypse. In A Door Into Ocean, genetic
engineering is central to the existence of the utopian world Slonczewski develops. In Atwood’s
novels, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) litter the landscape, and a particularly virulent
genetically engineered virus precipitates the collapse of society and leads to the death of nearly
everyone. That is, in Atwood’s novel, genetic engineering is a catastrophic technology, with a
destructive potential on a level with nuclear weapons.
These novels dramatize the range of reactions that genetic engineering elicits. It is
notable that these are the earliest and most recent novels in this study – A Door Into Ocean came
out in 1986 and Atwood’s Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood were released in 2003 and
4

At a recent conference, I was asked about this concept in another context, and I explained it with the help of a TV
character from the show Community. Jeff suggests that Britta doesn’t know what an analogy is, to which she replies,
“Wait, I know what it is! It's a like a thought... with another thought's hat on!” Metaphors, in this pop cultural case,
would be the hat. Change the hat, and you change thought.
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2009, respectively. The other two works I study in this thesis – the collection Lilith’s Brood by
Octavia Butler and the 1997 novel Mendel’s Dwarf by Simon Mawer – fall chronologically
somewhat in between A Door Into Ocean and Atwood’s novels.
Lilith’s Brood was originally released as three separate novels – Dawn (1987), Adulthood
Rites (1988), and Imago (1989) – which were collected as the Xenogenesis trilogy. In Butler’s
story, the apocalyptic-level event is caused by nuclear weapons, and salvation comes at the hands
of genetically promiscuous aliens. This salvation has, however, its own apocalyptic overtones as
the aliens restrict human reproduction, and modify all children born of the recused humans. This
effectively means humans will give birth to a new species, thus entailing the extinction of
humanity in its current form. Simon Mawer’s novel is told on a somewhat more constrained
scale. Dr Benedict Lambert, an achondroplastic dwarf, a modern-day geneticist, and an indirect
descendant of the founder of genetics Gregor Mendel, serves as the protagonist and narrative
voice. He strives to identify the genes responsible for his condition. His success allows him to
choose whether his offspring will share his dwarfism, potentially rendering achondroplasia a
thing of the past. While on the face this may seem to be an entirely positive outcome, in Mawer’s
treatment it is considerably more ambivalent. The ability to choose one’s offspring based on
genetic characteristics aligns quite closely with the monstrous, racist eugenics movement of the
late 19th-early 20th century era. It also forces the reader to face the reality of Lambert’s condition:
he inhabits a non-normative body, which modern political correctness would deem acceptable,
but he also now inhabits a body that, he suggests, no one would want to pass on.
A central issue in all of these novels is the way we define ourselves. Genetics allows for
the establishment of objective criteria for what is human and what is not. However, genetics has
7

also revealed just how little fundamental difference there is between humans and other animals.
It highlights just how little difference there is between different “races” of humans, how little
difference there is between a normative, healthy adult and a “deformed” achondroplastic dwarf.
And with genetic engineering, it is allowing for human control of biological organisms of a far
greater scale than ever before. The traditional boundaries between humans and animals, natural
and synthetic, male and female, all are collapsing in the wake of genetic engineering.
This boundary collapse is very closely related to the posthuman discourse. Myra Seaman
offers a good description of the origins of posthumanism, and thus the origins of humanism
itself: “The human long presumed by traditional Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment
humanism is a subject (generally assumed male) who is at the center of his world (that is, the
world); is defined by his supreme, utterly rational intelligence; does not depend (unlike his
predecessor) upon a divine authority to make his way through the world but instead manipulates
it in accord with his own wishes; and is a historically independent agent whose thought and
action produce history” (247). This construction of the self as human (or the human as Self) lies
at the heart of our contemporary way of understanding the world; the human functions as a
category against which Other categories (like “animal” or “nature” or “primitive”) can be
formed. Of course such a subject never truly existed; it was merely the theoretical product of
Enlightenment, but it was a useful construct: in many ways this idea was central to the
development of both democracy and science. By establishing the sovereignty of individuals
rather than just monarchs, it was possible to imagine a system where every person had a say in
the system. As Myra Seaman notes, this system was of course flawed in that it granted full
“person-hood” only to men, and even then only men of a certain class, culture, and race. But it
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nevertheless paved the way for a broadening of our understanding of the rights of liberty and has
led to the emancipation of peasants from their monarchs, races from their oppressors, and women
from men, at least in a legal sense.
The development of the human liberal subject also paved the way for (or perhaps,
emerged from) a regime of objective scientific rationality. This new way of knowing was equally
rooted both in a supposedly objective stance – memorably described as self-effacement by
George Levine in Dying to Know – and in a rationality that finds its highest form in math. Dr.
Lambert notes this in a quip in Mendel’s Dwarf, (apocryphally) quoting the eminent physicist
Ernest Rutherford: “Science is physics; or it is stamp collecting” (222). The first kind of science
is mostly built on a rigorous rationality, which is to say, math. Mendel’s great contribution to
biology, the reason his study of descent in peas and flowers eventually gave birth to the new field
of genomics, is that he applied math to his observations, noting the discrete ratios which
apparently governed heredity. The second kind of science rests on an assumption that there are
clear and meaningful distinctions between different objects of scientific interest. “Stamp
collecting” is only meaningful if the specimens are distinguishable.
A similar transition has been occurring with respect to how we construct our own
identities. In the classic liberal human mode (the mode of enlightenment thinkers like John
Locke and Thomas Hobbes) one’s identity is defined by some series of fixed features, like class,
race, and gender. This model begins to break down in the twentieth century leading to the
concept of a “posthuman.” N. Katherine Hayles discusses this in her book How We Became
Posthuman. This book explores the rise of cybernetics – as a technological construct as well as
an ideological one – and the related collapse of the liberal human subject. As Hayles shows in
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her history of the scientific debates which led to the development of cybernetics and information
theory, posthumanism is born from a fusion of the two perspectives, a fusion which may
ultimately lead to the collapse of “stamp collecting” science altogether. How We Became
Posthuman describes the historic Macy Conferences on cybernetics and the debate which
surrounded the eventual disembodiment of information. The Second World War saw the birth of
information as a science and technology. After the war, information become defined as
disembodied and abstract, a definition codified by the Macy Conferences. Hayles studies these
conferences for evidence of the birth of information theory, and locates in that moment the
destabilization of the liberal humanist self. She tracks the changes in how scientists and
researchers theorized information and the implications for the modern understanding of the
human subject. She characterizes this shift as one from a (Lacanian) presence/absence dichotomy
to a new pattern/randomness distinction; from a privileging of possession to a privileging of
access: “The effect of these transformations is to create highly heterogeneous and fissured space
in which discursive formations based on pattern and randomness jostle and compete with
formations based on presence and absence” (Hayles 28). By tracing the history of the scientific
debates leading to cybernetics, Hayles also traces the recent history of anxiety over the loss of an
easily definable subject.
In other words, Hayles looks at the way that information theory posits a form of
consciousness (or humanness) which is already disembodied – already posthuman. This theory
has become instantiated via the widespread adoption of computer technology. Briefly, as we
spread our awareness out over vast physical distances via informational networks – through the
internet, mediated by computers and constantly connected smart phones, often in the form of
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Facebook socialization – we run up against the difficulty of defining the boundaries of the
human subject. This difficulty is already inherent in the concept of cybernetics, and as this
concept becomes ever closer to reality, this difficulty seeps into facets of life normally insulated
from philosophical debates. As a way of explaining our new, conflicted posthuman condition,
Hayles describes the rise of cybernetics theory, noting: “The result of this breathtaking enterprise
was nothing less than a new way of looking at human beings. Henceforth, humans were to be
seen primarily as information-processing entities who are essentially similar to intelligent
machines” (7, emphasis original). The emphasis on “essentially” is especially appropriate. In her
engagement with the post-modern theories underwriting posthumanism, Hayles emphasizes early
and often the way that such cybernetic posthumanism is in fact just another form of essentialism.
As she goes on to note: “the cybernetic machine was designed so that it did not threaten
the autonomous, self-regulating subject of liberal humanism. . . . On the contrary, it was to
extend that self into the realm of the machine” (Hayles 86). But this idealistic conception of man
merged with machine—or rather, interpolated by information—overlooks the important question
of context. Can one still be the subject of liberal humanism when disembodied? The conflict
between these two conceptions of information is the core theoretical issue in Hayles’s history of
information. As she persuasively argues, the disembodiment of information was neither
necessary nor inevitable. Rather, a decision was made to decontextualize information, to theorize
information as both abstract and unchanged by its immediate environment. This move was not
unopposed, but it was the result of the Macy conferences, and it became the baseline for
understanding information. In later years this move was questioned as roboticists (in particular)
began to grapple with the difficulty of realizing abstract concepts in physical forms – of
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developing a cybernetic praxis. By stripping information of its context, the Macy conference set
information free and paved the way for the jargon-y world of cloud computing and internet
databases, but it also created, and obscured, the problem of context: the importance of body or
embodiment.
An analogous development occurred with the rise of genetics. Once nature is reduced to a
string of DNA, the essential characteristic of a given animal becomes its genetic code rather than
any particular embodied feature. This code is in base 4 rather than base 2 – that is, there are 4
possible nitrogenous bases (G, C, T and A), while only 2 possible binary numbers (0 and 1) – but
the principle holds: what is essential about a particular organism is no longer any particular
manifested trait, but the code underlying all such traits. This leads to a peculiar sort of boundary
destruction, since it allows for all organisms to be placed in objective, testable categories—thus
ratifying and apparently objectively settling the boundaries. These manifold categories are,
however, based on a common genetic denominator, thus obscuring if not erasing what were once
considered essential differences, those differences which once gave rise to such categories in the
first place.

Norbert Weiner, “the father of cybernetics,” confronted a number of troubling

questions as the cybernetic program progressed, such as “[w]here should the cybernetic
dissolution of boundaries stop? At what point does the anxiety provoked by dissolution
overcome the ecstasy?” (Hayles 85). These same questions can be adapted to the discussion of
genetic engineering, and function as guiding questions for the authors of my four texts: What is
lost by genetic engineering? What do we give up when we live in an environment entirely of our
own creation? Are the gains worth the loss? Do we have a choice?
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The reason cybernetics and genetics provoke so much anxiety is that they expose the
weakness of our old system without offering a good replacement. Where a clear distinction
between humans and animals was once obvious, it has recently become obscure. Indeed,
Mendelian inheritance disproved the Darwinian orthodoxy that inheritance was gradual and
continuous by showing traits to be discreetly, mathematically, and probabilistically determined;
the apparent universality of the very DNA which drives the genetic drift had made the
supposedly hard and fast (discrete) distinctions between human and non-human seem like so
much orthodoxy. Thus the animal kingdom (the word itself encodes an assumption of hierarchy)
is less an orderly tree than a continuous system.
This continuousness plays well into a postmodern sort of boundary collapse. The old
(modern-era) divisions between race (white v. non-white), gender (man v. woman), and even life
itself (human v. animal) must needs be rewritten. This collapse of old systems – dichotomous,
heterosexist, racist, and patriarchal as they tend to be – can be seen as a positive development, as
offering the potential to construct a new world free from old problems. In her famous Cyborg
Manifesto, Donna Haraway teaches us that “[c]yborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze
of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves” (154). At stake in
her famous manifesto is the future of women in a system defined so long by gender dichotomy.
In this sense the cyborg and its inherent hybridity collapses old dualisms, and from the rubble of
that old order a new one can rise. Rather than a world shackled to a codified and unjust system of
identity, “a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not
afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial
identities and contradictory standpoints” (154). This, Haraway suggests, is how we escape a past
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dominated by gender dichotomy. But the cyborg Haraway describes is “a cybernetic organism, a
hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction”
(149). Her theory applies to genetics about as well as Hayles’s posthumanism, which is to say,
well so long as we include a few caveats.
Genetics, and more specifically genetic engineering, can be read through a cyborg or
posthuman lens because it gives rise to similar hopes and anxieties. But it fits neither model
perfectly because genetic engineering is fundamentally biological and embodied. Both theories
deal with the hybridity that emerges when people and their machines are conflated. Genetic
engineering raises many of the same questions as the cybernetic machine or the artificial
intelligence, only more so. One can intuitively distinguish Man (in the humanist sense) from
Machine, even if a rigorous distinction is difficult—i.e., I can easily say that my glasses are
separate from me, they are not-me, even though they modify something I would not consider
separate from me, my vision. But if I wear my glasses whenever I am awake (and thus whenever
I’m making use of my vision), then the alteration provided by the glasses becomes as much a
part of my vision as my eyes; does my casual distinction between glasses and self really hold?
The issue gets more complex as we branch out into ever smaller machines, such as the
nanomachines in Neal Stephenson’s The Diamond Age, or as devices function as surrogates for
missing but normative pieces of anatomy, such as prosthetic limbs, or as we experience ever
more of our social life in digitally mediated environments, such as Massively Multiplayer Online
Role Playing Games and Facebook. But in all these cases there is an essential difference: these
devices are mineral in origin. Haraway’s cyborg is a hybrid of “machine and organism,” but
what if the machine is an organism? Similarly, the posthumanism that Hayles speaks out against
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envisions the human mind as essentially computational, essentially informational, and hence,
fundamentally disembodied. Hayles argues for a return to considerations of embodiment and
context. But what about when the information is itself inherently embodied—when it is
fundamentally meaningless without the messy context of biological life? A DNA sequence can
be stored on a computer, but is nothing more than a string of numbers unless embedded into an
organism—it provides a map which RNA can express in the form of proteins, and it is the
summation of these proteins over time that leads to a biological organism.
In A Door Into Ocean, Slonczewski offers an ecofeminist utopia on Shora, where genetic
engineering has led to a literal sort of conflation between women and nature that the term
“ecofeminism” suggests. It is a world where the inhabitants, known as Sharers, are perpetually at
peace (even when there is major disagreement), a world populated entirely by women, and a
people in harmony with their environment. The conflict emerges from these people’s contact
with another human society, one structured hierarchically and rooted in mineral science.
Atwood’s novels present a different vision of the future, one considerably less optimistic.
Hybridity, at the core of Haraway’s manifesto and central to the cybernetic collapse of an easily
definable human subject, is rendered grotesque. For Atwood, hybridization has led to a collapse
of nature, and her world embodies anxieties similar to the ones identified by Hayles. In Lilith’s
Brood, Octavia Butler describes an alien species, the Oankali, who compulsively hybridize with
foreign species. Over the course of the work’s three sections, humanity and Oankali meet, join,
mate, and eventually coalesce into a new, superior, hybrid species—even if humanity ultimately
has little say in the matter, leading Jessie Stickgold-Sarah to call the work a pessimistic utopia.
Mawer’s Mendel’s Dwarf offers yet another take on genetic engineering, this one set on
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contemporary Earth. The knowledge of genetics is a mixed blessing for Dr. Lambert, since as an
achondroplastic dwarf he has been marked by a random genetic trait that modern genetics has
allowed him to understand. With that information, he develops the ability to identify, at the
embryonic stage, which of his potential offspring have achondroplasia and which do not. From
there he engages in a bit of rudimentary genetic engineering by selecting which fertilized
embryos will be used in an in vitro procedure. The line between making a merciful decision and
the cruel eugenics of the recent past is dreadfully thin, a fact which Dr. Lambert sees all too
clearly. The irony is, of course, that such knowledge does nothing to change his physically and
socially diminished stature; nor, ultimately, does it play much of a role in the novel’s closing
tragedy.
In all four works, the shifting of simple boundaries between human and nature is central.
Whether this shift results in a utopian society, an ambivalent future, a cruel present, or a
dystopian apocalypse, it is all uncharted territory. In all cases, the shift is not one of the liberal
human subject per se, but of the boundaries we use to define our identities. Like the boundaries
between man and woman, white and non-white, civilized and savage, genetic engineering
renders the boundary between nature and humanity unstable –more importantly, it destabilizes
the boundary between what is “natural” and what is “cultural,” the final, most fundamental space
against which our old constructions of self were defined. Nature, in this sense, has ceased to be
easily definable, and as a result has become a contested space for defining the future.
The possibilities of genetic engineering range from creating a bold new world to
desecrating the old cruel world; from solving all our problems to simply re-inscribing problems
of old onto a new, apocalyptic landscape. Haraway notes: “It is certainly true that postmodernist
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strategies, like my cyborg myth, subvert myriad organic wholes (for example, the poem, the
primitive culture, the biological organism). In short, the certainty of what counts as nature – a
source of insight and promise of innocence – is undermined, probably fatally” (152-53). This
tends to be a central source of tension in these novels. Will the collapse of human and nature
bring humans closer to a natural innocence – as Slonczewski suggests – or will it fatally corrupt
nature – as Atwood attests?
The trend across time for these stories is one from optimism to dread. In part, this reflects
the anxieties born from the mainstreaming of genetic engineering. When Slonczewski was
writing, genetics was a well-established branch of knowledge, but it was still largely “stamp
collecting” sort of science, that is, mostly concerned with gathering knowledge, but with little
ability to manipulate the world with this knowledge. Atwood, in contrast, deals with anxieties
profoundly rooted in contemporary developments. Crake, the eponymous villain of the series,
works on his genetically engineered post-humans (the “Crakers”) in a way that is largely an
extension of what contemporary bio-medical technology already enables.
For instance, while in vitro fertilization requires a womb (and hence, a woman), this
technology diminishes the “femininity” of giving birth: “Currently scientific achievements allow
women to become mothers through in-vitro fertilization, to control when and where motherhood
occurs, to know the sex of their child in advance; in other words, it is possible to give birth to a
new life without involving emotions, empathy, and sociability” (Botta 251). A lack of emotion,
empathy, and sociability is not an essential component of such mediated reproduction, merely a
potential. But it is a powerful potential. In essence, it allows for maternity (and paternity) to be
profoundly rewritten. Whether this is interpreted as a move for the better (as in A Door Into
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Ocean) or worse (as in Oryx and Crake), or some murky ethical ground in-between (as in Lilith’s
Brood and Mendel’s Dwarf) depends largely on the story being told.
In Oryx and Crake, the power of genetic engineering and biological/reproductive
technology has eliminated the need for biological parentage altogether, but most especially the
need for a mother. In Butler’s Lilith’s Brood, the issue is reversed: rather than collapsing the
power (and responsibility) of reproduction down to one man (with, of course, the help of a vast
scientific apparatus), Butler’s characters only reproduce in pods of five –a pair of humans, a pair
of Oankali, and one third-gendered ooloi. This parental proliferation, and many human’s
resistance to it, highlights the arbitrariness of our modern reproductive coalitions while
nonetheless acknowledging how central such “natural” groupings are to our sense of our
humanity. In Slonczewski’s novel, reproduction occurs between women only, but it is portrayed
as an almost purer form of what we have now. In Mawer’s novel, in vitro is explicitly used, and
its moral dimension is directly interrogated, as Dr. Lambert makes use of his status as scientist to
substitute his own semen for another man’s (subverting paternity), then segregate the fertilized
eggs into normative and achondroplastic-gene carriers, and finally select which to give to the
mother (subverting the “natural” random selection). In all cases, there is a breakdown of gender
roles as predicted in Haraway’s “postmodernist strategies,” embodied by the various characters’
abilities to create children without the use of sexual dichotomy. Whether the collapse of sexual
reproduction leads to a balanced utopia or completes the marginalization of women depends on
who’s writing, and when.
If the issue of genesis in these novels represents a collapse of the distinction between man
and woman in reproductive terms, it also embodies a collapse between human and nature. The
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Crakers are created through genetic manipulation of human embryos with additive
“enhancements” such as the ability to live off nothing but free-growing vegetation and enhanced
resistance to disease and intense sunlight. The children produced by the ooloi are hybrids of
human and Oankali, incorporating advantageous traits from both. The Sharers reproduce via
heavily mediated “fusion of ova, a process requiring lifeshaper assistance and the consent of the
Gathering” (Slonczewski 89). Only in Mendel’s Dwarf does reproduction follow along natural
lines, but even there the element of selection challenges the natural models of reproduction.
But as our knowledge and skill increases, we are increasingly mediating the biosystems
of our environments. These novels raise the question: What is nature in an environment entirely
(or at least, potentially) of our own making? The novels provide two contrasting approaches to
this question, approaches which can be categorized in line with distinctions outlined by Jayne
Glover: instrumentalism and intentionalism. The scientific enterprise documented in Mendel’s
Dwarf, conducted by Crake in Oryx and Crake and by the Valans in A Door Into Ocean, all
follow along the lines of instrumentalism, which arises from a “selfhood conceived as that of the
individual who stands apart from an alien other and denies his own relation to and dependency
on this other” (Plumwood 142, quoted in Glover 51). This cold science contrasts with the
intentionalist approach of the God’s Gardeners in Atwood’s The Year of the Flood and the
Sharers in A Door Into Ocean, an approach which “allows an ethical response encompassing
respect for, and mutuality with, others” (Glover 51). Genetic praxis does offer some
complications to this division, however. The division between self and Other is never completely
erased in Slonczewski’s novel, for instance – the uber-enlightened Sharers still debate about the
humanity of the antagonistic Valans, a debate with potentially destructive results. Rather, what is
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embraced in the intentionalist approaches is a renegotiated self/Other understanding, built from
an enlightening genetic knowledge. Neither is the division ever completely clean – even the
uber-instrumentalist, Crake, ultimately implicates himself in his science, apparently choosing
death over living in the world of his own creation. The instrumentalist approach simply reflects a
different negotiation of the changed self/Other divide.
Put another way, we can think of “instrumentalist” approaches as signifying a science
which is valuable for its predictive models. This prediction is the first step in being able to
manipulate “nature” or, more broadly, the Other in any human v. Other system (such as human v.
nature). In short, science is an instrument to be used to achieve some ends. Because there is a
presumed separation between the agents and what they manipulate, such manipulations can be
engaged in without much concern for the inherent ethics of such a change. Butler turns this
around ironically by casting her salvific Oankali as initially instrumentalist towards humans.
Although her aliens are ultimately unable to cause physical pain without experiencing the pain
themselves, they lack an understanding of the human psyche, while at the same time they
intuitively understand humans as fatally hierarchal. They are compelled to “fix” humanity, and in
their quest to do so often violate what we would recognize as the free will of these humans. Even
at the end of the final piece of Lilith’s Brood, recalcitrant humans are brought into the fold
mostly because the pheromones of the human-born human/Oankali hybrid ooloi seduce any
natural humans who smell it.
Intentionalism, by contrast, approaches science as more of a descriptive force, one which
recognizes the self as implicitly contained in the Other. Science is not, in this construction, a tool
for manipulation so much as a way of expanding knowledge. While the Sharers in Slonczewski’s
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novel have the ability to manipulate the genome of any biological creature they encounter, they
do not use this ability lightly. Instead, they live symbiotic lives within biological constructs
which function as houses, transports, food sources, propulsion, et cetera. Octavia Butler’s
Oankali likewise have a fundamentally intentionalist relationship with their technology, which is
also fundamentally biological. However, their compulsion to “fix” humans, to cure them of their
reliance on mineral technology and their destructive hierarchies, is stronger than any objections
the humans can muster.
Danette DiMarco, speaking of Atwood, draws a useful connection between
instrumentalism and cybernetic-like deconstruction: “Oryx and Crake, with its focus on homo
faber and instrumentalism grounded in personal profit, has repeatedly revealed the oppressive
and degenerative nature of man-made barricades, divisions, separations, and enclosures” (192).
Instrumentalists like Crake use science as a tool to manipulate nature for personal (often
profitable) ends. As Glover notes: “Crake, like the other scientists, has worked so long with an
instrumentalist approach towards nature that he is able to convince himself that animals created
in a laboratory are the same as those naturally occurring in nature and that there are no ethical
questions surrounding the creation of new species” (53). Of course both of these interpretations
are limited, somewhat, in their lack of historical perspective. From the time the first organisms
evolved barriers to separate them from a hostile environment there has been an essential
boundary between self and Other. The distinction between created and naturally occurring
animals is not as clear as Glover suggests. The art of breeding has a long and storied history.
Farmers regularly cull crops and artificially manipulate the course of a plant-strain’s evolution.
By becoming the force of selection, humans have been genetically modifying animals for
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centuries. From the dawn of human history, we have been selectively breeding animals (dogs
seem to have been the very first) for our own gain, heedless of the ethical consequences of
bending nature to our will. The difference between that and genetic engineering is one of speed
and control. When seen at the level of DNA coding there is no essential difference between
natural and artificial animals. The distinction has already collapsed. What remains is how we (as
a species, as members of a discourse community) choose to use this science. Genetic
engineering in the real world merely accelerates this process, takes it to another level. But,
practically speaking, it represents no new development, simply a new way of seeing old
developments.
It is important to note that both instrumentalists and intentionalists face the same sort of
boundary confusion when their science enters the realms of genetic engineering. For
intentionalists, it represents a sort of Haraway-esque hybridity, a fundamental conflation of the
self with nature. For instrumentalists, it represents a Hayles-ean sort of abstraction, where the
ethical boundaries of science become obscured. That is, when the subject of science is
fundamentally similar to the objects of our study (and manipulation) then we (humanity, nature,
etc.) become valid spaces for unfettered scientific exploration.
Although it is tempting to say such genetic manipulation clearly represents an unnatural
act, these texts as a whole call this into question. Take, for instance, the luminous green rabbits
spoken of in the first epigraph. Atwood obliquely refers to biopunk artist Eduardo Kac’s
transgenic project, Alba, completed in 2000. 5 By splicing the genes for phosphorescence from a
jellyfish into a rabbit, Kac and a team of scientists intentionally created what was perhaps the

5

Announcement documented at http://www.ekac.org/gfpbunny.html.
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world’s first true chimera. Although envisioned as an artistic project, the birth of Alba raises
serious questions about the boundaries between human and nature, between science and nature,
and between what is natural and what is unnatural. In Atwood’s world, the glowing green
rabbits, for instance, have escaped their cages and interbred with native populations. The
progeny of such bunny unions are clearly not in the realm of human control, but neither are they
separate from a history of human intervention. Also, while a rabbit and a jellyfish may not be
able to naturally reproduce, the genetic information in Kac’s glowing bunny was entirely drawn
from nature; science just stitched it together. Atwood even notes this: “As Crake used to say:
Think of an adaptation, any adaptation, and some animal somewhere will have thought of it
first” (Oryx 164, italics in original). These events, both real-life genetic engineering and
Atwood’s fictional take on it, call into question the boundary between nature and science.
In a sense, there are no “natural” spaces in the worlds of any of these stories, no spaces
which are untouched by human/sentient activity. In A Door Into Ocean, the settlements on Shora
are alive, but their form and function is determined in large part by their symbiotic relationship
with the Sharers. In Lilith’s Brood, the Earth’s biosphere is essentially annihilated by nuclear
winter; it is selectively reconstructed by the Oankali, and even then much of the action takes
place in the Oankali’s biological spaceship and earthbound colonies. In Oryx and Crake, there
are allusions to elements like the sea level (suggesting a recent and rapid rise) and the intensity
of the sun (suggesting a loss of protective ozone) which suggest environmental catastrophe
predating Crake’s apocalyptic genetically engineered virus (c.f. Oryx 37, 63). Even Mawer’s
world in Mendel’s Dwarf is marked by humanity, as much of the action takes place in cities and
labs. As Wolter suggests:
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[W]e no longer depend on nature’s force, but have become the force. By burning
fossil energy, the global climate had been changed forever and with it the
relationship between the planet and its inhabitants. From the global change in our
climate and the fact that in future the strength of tornadoes, hurricanes, and the
heat in summer are not acts of nature but the result of man’s actions, it has to be
inferred that the primal relationship between the nature of our planet and its
inhabitants has been destroyed. (264)
Wolter draws direct, causal links between climate events (like tsunamis, tornado/hurricane
strength, and summer heat) and the use of fossil fuels; that is, she suggests these events can no
longer be considered natural because they have been so markedly shaped by human activity. Of
course the matter is a little more complex: “global warming” 6 reflects a rise in average global—
not local—temperature. What this means for more localized systems (e.g., summer temperature
in Florida, number and strength of hurricanes, etc.) is far from clear. Chaos theory grew out of
climatology for a reason (Gleik). We have little data to predict the climate in a warmer world—
for better or for worse.
It is worth noting that climate change is a fact of Earth’s history, even at current rates (the
last ice age came on fast, for example). So while the proximate cause of climate change is
humanity’s use of fossil fuels, and can thus be considered unnatural, the reaction of both local
and global climates still follows the same physical laws as before, and can thus be seen as
natural. Indeed, one of the great anxieties about climate change is that it will alter the world in
such a way that humanity can no longer exert any sort of control—even the soft control
6

As formulated by UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Report can be accessed via the IPCC website:
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm
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represented by prediction. Similarly, genetically engineered chimeras represent a case of human
intervention without a guarantee of human control. We can engineer a rabbit to glow in the dark,
but we cannot guarantee the rabbit will stay in its cage, cannot guarantee that it will live and die
when and as we see fit. There is a limit to human control. In other words, humans lack the
capacity to fully control nature, even by unnatural means. 7
In the case of genetic engineering, issues of control seem to be central to the definition of
nature. Given this issue, what, in the end, constitutes a natural space? Henri Lefebvre offers a
useful definition. In The Production of Space, Lefebvre describes the way nature has long been
defined (he would say produced) by culture as the space where culture is not. That is, “to say
‘natural’ is to say spontaneous” (70). Lefebvre’s definition still indicates a primacy of humanity
in defining nature: the “spontaneous” 8 aspect suggests the distinction is positioned less against
the human subject as against human agency. In this sense, Lefebvre’s definition of “natural”
sidesteps the issue of human subjectivity in defining what is natural—we can be embodied or
not; his concern is intent. This definition works well for describing nature in these novels; or
rather, it helps center the issue of the unnatural in the novels. The luminescent rabbit, both in
reality and in Oryx and Crake, is unnatural because it was created—could only be created—by
conscious intervention. That definition is uncontested. The definitional difficulty appears when
considering everything that comes after the creation of the rabbit.
7

As Dr. Patrick Murphy pointed out in the defense for this thesis, glowing rabbits would never thrive in nature – no
rabbit population would select for visibility. This speaks to another aspect of the question of “natural” vs. “cultural”:
such an alteration is doubly artificial since human intervention is required not simply for the creation, but also the
continued existence of glowing rabbits. They could only exist in a human world on human terms.
8
The operative definition of “spontaneous” for Lefebvre can be found in the Oxford English Dictionary: “Occurring
without apparent external cause; having a self-contained cause or origin.” Other, more circular definitions include
“Arising or proceeding entirely from natural impulse, without any external stimulus or constraint” and “Acting
voluntarily and from natural prompting.” The Natural is that which is spontaneous (which arises from the natural,
which…).
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After Kac and his team successfully inserted the phosphorescence-inducing genes, Alba
gestated, developed, and generally existed as any un-modified rabbit would. The luminous
rabbits in Atwood’s novels go one better by successfully mixing with local populations and
entering the natural (spontaneous/uncontrolled) ecosystem. If unnatural is non-spontaneous, or
that which happens because of human intervention, chimeras (in reality or in these novels) are
unnatural only so long as intent is involved. If human (or alien) involvement ends at genesis, the
chimera would, by Lefebvre’s definition, become natural. Thus the previously separate states of
‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ shift over time. The case of genetic engineering, again, does not
necessarily point to any vastly new development in a world of domesticated animals, irrigation,
terraced hillsides where rice is grown in vast quantities; rather, it indicates a new level of control
and an accelerated pace of change. The old boundaries were no more solid before genetics than
they are now, but whereas before their shifting occurred over decades and centuries, now they
can occur over years, months, or even days.
Boundaries work best when they are fixed and immutable. The ability of humans to alter
nature in a permanent way makes nature, in some sense, liminal. Clear demarcations between
‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ break down when formerly unnatural objects take on natural
characteristics. This is suggested by Bouson – “Crake’s words reflect the ‘postmodern’ scientific
mindset that openly flouts the ‘laws’ of nature posited by modern science and works to collapse
boundaries among species” (145) – and Wolter: “Whereas nature was hitherto a force larger than
and independent of humankind, this is now no longer the case. As we now influence and change
natural phenomena, our concept of self, of theology and philosophy will change fundamentally”
(264). Traditional boundaries between different species, and between human and nature, were at
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least partly contingent on an obvious and apparently innate distinction. This distinction has
collapsed. The implication at the heart of my thesis is that genetic engineering is not so much one
science/technology effecting a radical alteration of the world (although the potential is there), but
rather that it is underwriting a potentially massive shift in the way we see ourselves. Ultimately
this shift renders the self monstrous, or perhaps even alien. It is not clear which fate is worse: the
truly alien is entirely unknowable, and in many ways less frightening than that more familiar
monster. Is it worse to live as monstrous but recognizably human, or to become unknowably
alien? The second, while less frightening in a literary sense, is also represents a sort of suicide.
This tension is embodied in the texts I analyze in this thesis. Each author balances
utopian elements against some apocalyptic overtones. Or, to put it another way, each of the texts
plays with the inherent ambiguity of the word “utopia,” both in the sense of term, both the outopia (meaning no + place) and eu-topia (meaning good + place). Genetic engineering comes
with many possibilities for beneficial use, but it also comes at the potential cost of those things
which make us recognizably human. Or, as Lefebvre claims, nature is “being murdered by antinature – by abstraction, by signs and images, by discourse, as also by labour and its products”
(71). In extending human control into previously natural areas, we destroy what once defined
those areas as natural – and by extension, what defined us. The dissolution of clear boundaries
between the embodied human and the information-entity of the mind is tied by Hayles to the rise
of cybernetics theory. By positing the fundamental element of identity (or functionality) as
information, cybernetics quietly uproots centuries of embodiment as the center of humanism. By
applying this sense of information-over-matter to biology, genetic engineering (and related
fields) does the same thing for nature. Atwood seems to be taking a more scientific (and less

27

Marxist) approach to reach Lefebvre’s conclusion: nature is no longer allowed to be
spontaneous, its old mysteries have been demystified, and it is now part of the same body of
knowledge that defines human spaces (i.e., science).
Pandora’s Box has been opened, as Atwood suggests: “We've always been good at letting
cats out of bags and genies out of bottles, we just haven't been very good at putting them back in
again” (“Aliens”). Even if humans and computers never merge, cybernetics’ way of
conceptualizing human identity has exposed the old boundaries as permeable and weak. Even if
Alba’s descendants never escape into the wild and populate our forests with glowing rabbits, her
very existence exposes the boundary between humans and nature as illusory, at best. The
question now is how we choose to react to this change. Will we follow in the models suggested
by Haraway, Slonczewski, and (to an extent) Butler, and embrace the potential for positive
restructuring? Or will we fail, and follow the paths feared by Hayles, Mawer, and Atwood?
Literature is useful for these sorts of questions because it is not bound to the
(occasionally unfortunate) finality of real life, but instead functions as a space for multiplicity,
exploration, and deep thought. In the following chapters, this thesis will explore each of the
novels discussed here in far greater depth, with an eye towards divining what our relationship to
sex, gender, nature, the environment, science, and even ourselves will be in the brave new world
of genetic genius. What people will be in’t? Will they look like us? Will we even want to know
them? Of course we cannot truly know until we get there—the future is not yet written. But
perhaps these four works can offer us a glimpse. One thing is certain: we are now living in a
post-natural world.
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CHAPTER 2: A DOOR INTO OCEAN: MENACING THE ECOFEMINIST
UTOPIA
A Door Into Ocean, by the biologist-cum-novelist Joan Slonczewski, un-ironically
portrays an ecofeminist utopia. Published in 1986, Slonczewski’s second novel takes place
primarily on a utopian moon called Shora. This moon is completely covered with water, and
populated entirely by females who live in harmony with their oceanic environment and whose
society has lasted for untold generations. In keeping with the tradition of utopia, these women,
known as “Sharers,” live in a world where there is no war, physical pain is conquered upon
maturity, and the only forms of conflict are elaborate forms of passive exclusion, codified in the
practice of “Unspeaking.” The structural basis for the entire utopian society is a form of
linguistic reciprocity which permeates all aspects of Sharer society – one cannot speak in the
native Sharer language without implicitly acknowledging both the self and the Other (the subject
and the object) as being inextricably tied together. This utopian vision is in line with Haraway’s
Cyborg Manifesto, as it offers a possible way out of a world-system built on binary oppositions.
In her own guide to the novel, Slonczewski suggests the plot is constructed around a series of
binary oppositions, and the “Sharer language plays a crucial role in deconstructing all the
polarities above” (“Guide”). Slonczewski cleverly delivers a vision of a society without violence
and exploitation, yet beneath this utopian interpretation there lies a deeply integrated deployment
of genetic engineering. This concept forms a necessary precondition for the rest of the story, and
functions in an explicitly positive, but implicitly negative way: positively, it allows for a purely
female society to reproduce, and is the key to the otherwise passive Sharers’ great strength; but,
negatively, it seems to have come at the cost of eliminating men from the society. That
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Slonczewski builds her utopia on top of an advanced form of genetic engineering says much for
her optimistic appraisal of genetic engineering in general.
I agree with Sheryl Vint’s appraisal that “this novel establishes Slonczewski's concern
with how the ways we conceive of identity constrains and enables various sorts of politics”
(“Theorizing the Global”), although I think it is important not to understate the role of the
biological vs. mechanical dichotomy which undergirds the utopian society. Slonczewski does lay
out the potential destructive power of advanced life-sciences, and she does make clear that this
destructive potential is kept in check by the social structure more than anything inherent in the
technology. 9 But her utopia is nonetheless premised on a rejection of mechanical/inorganic
science, and this is tied to the Sharers’ apparent historical rejection of men, even keeping in mind
what Peter Fitting notes, that “[t]he novel makes a clear distinction between values and
plumbing” (41). Although Slonczewski goes out of her way not to implicate all men everywhere
in the negative elements of society – the occupying forces have plenty of women in their forces,
and a man does become fully integrated in the Sharer society, to name just two examples – the
anti-utopian elements are all implicitly or explicitly masculine: the occupying general is a man,
the power which threatens the utopia is called the Patriarch, and (most importantly) the
benevolent, ideal society is one made up entirely of women. This ideal society is inseparable
from the life-sciences which serve as the technical foundation of their community: “the emphasis
on female values has led to imaginary communities which pay special attention to the ‘life’
sciences like medicine and biology, which are opposed to men's skill with war technology”
(Fitting 41).
9

Edward Higgins explores this dynamic in depth in a chapter called “Quaker Ethos as Science Praxis in Joan L.
Slonczewski’s A Door Into Ocean.”
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So it is fitting that Slonczewski sets her novel a few decades after the capitalistic,
militaristic, masculine society which rules the planet Valedon has found its way onto Shora.
Trade has formed and the most valuable commodities at the beginning of the novel are rocks and
gems, which Valans – the people from Valedon – trade for Sharer textiles and medicines, two
commodities with tremendous value back on Valedon. While the Valan traders bring mineral
wealth and resources with them to the moon of Shora which are valuable commodities for the
Sharers, they also bring other less desirable objects: specifically, precious gems and rocks. Many
of the Sharers are profoundly disturbed by the minerals because they lack any sort of life; since
the moon is entirely covered with water, the Sharers never see minerals, and only interact with
living organisms. But some small minority of Sharers become obsessed with the stones, to the
extent that they isolate themselves from the rest of their society in a condition they call “stone
sickness.” One particularly central Sharer, called Merwen, travels to Valedon to better
understand the Valans. She decides to bring back a young Valan peasant man named Spinel who
willingly goes off on what he sees as an adventure to the exotic ocean-moon of Shora. Once
there, he learns the Sharer language, becomes fully enculturated, and ends up falling in love with
a Sharer woman.
The principle conflict in the story revolves around the Sharer attempts to end the stone
trade. This issue is front and center when an envoy called the Malachite – a representative from
the centralized Patriarchal power-center – appears for his once-a-decade visit. 10 He represents a
power which is a remnant of a previous civilization of humans, known to the characters in this
10

The Malachite is a robot, and so is fundamentally sexless, but the Valan characters nevertheless explicitly think of
the Patriarch and thus its envoy the Malachite as male: “‘The Patriarch is a worldmother, like Shora. He will build
understanding.’ Of course Sharers would hear ‘She,’ but Berenice could not think of the Patriarch as anything but
male. ‘His messenger is a malefreak who knows Valans and shares care of them’” (93).
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story as “Primes.” These humans had tremendous scientific prowess and originally populated the
galaxy. Details are murky, but it is suggested that they set up the Patriarch before largely
disappearing, probably as a result of the robot/computer Patriarch’s attempt to control all human
civilizations. The Malachite is a robot – a fact which horrifies the Sharers, because they associate
all minerals (and thus all mineral-derived technologies) with a sort of permanent death. The
Malachite has the military power to command by fiat – he resolves a Valan dispute by leveling
the city of what he judges to be the offending faction – and after visiting the Sharers for a short
time, orders a resolution to the trade dispute apparently in the Sharers’ favor. He also, however,
orders the Valans to occupy Shora and discover what they can about the Sharers’ genetic
engineering. It is soon revealed that the Sharers are a lost community descended from Primes
without the interferences of the Patriarch, and thus possessors of technology which exceeds even
the Patriarch’s.
This occupation proceeds as many foreign occupations do: with misunderstandings,
needless suffering, and death. The Sharers practice their non-violent resistance, much to the
consternation of the military. Throughout the story, a debate rages within the Sharer society as to
whether the Valans, “death-hasteners” that they are, qualify as humans (and are thus to be treated
as Sharers treat each other—that is, without force) or not (opening the door to radical, genetically
engineered solutions, like a deadly virus). Merwen’s agenda in bringing Spinel to her world is to
see if Valans (particularly the Valan men, whom the all-female Sharers call “male-freaks”) can
become the ethical beings which Sharers recognize as fellow humans. The resolution sees the
Valan military occupation defeated by a non-violent resistance which successfully exposed the
senselessness of the occupation. The Sharers ultimately accept the Valans as humans, although
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they view most Valans more as children than as equals. This positive resolution offers the
strongest evidence that Slonczewski is working within the utopian genre.
It also suggests that, for Slonczewski, the answer to “what is lost by genetic
engineering?” is almost entirely positive: violence (towards people, towards nature), poverty,
pain, pollution, and exploitation. Also lost, perhaps not so incidentally, are men. Genetic
engineering allows for Slonczewski to imagine a world where men have had no influence for
thousands of generations, and as a result the world is much fairer, equitable, and non-violent.
Her society functions almost as a feminist reimagining of Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis utopia.
Perhaps the original natural philosopher—prototype for the modern scientist—Sir Francis Bacon
is one of the first theorizers and proponents of empiricism and the scientific method. His utopia,
New Atlantis, lays out an idealized society centered on the “Solomon House,” a place which
(with respect to study of the natural world) closely resembles the modern research university. For
the inhabitants of his utopian city “Bensalem,” the college is the very eye of this kingdom. The
purpose of the college is to conduct research in a clearly recognizable precursor to the scientific
method. Bacon sums up the purpose of the college: “The end of our foundation is the knowledge
of causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the
effecting of all things possible” (35). The similarity between Bacon’s utopia and the modern
research university is, perhaps, no surprise, since Bacon largely originated the ethic of
empiricism and in doing so founded modern research. It is notable that, while the society in New
Atlantis is more than simply a large college, the utopian elements are largely tied to descriptions
of the college. Bacon’s research method, whatever its real-world application, is a well ordered
system, and his ideal college is ordered accordingly. So his utopia is a society where an
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educational institute much like today’s modern university sits at the (literal and figurative) center
of society. The purpose of this institute is to pursue greater knowledge to improve the lives of its
own citizens.
As utopias go, Bacon’s is probably one of the most successful ever imagined, as it
describes much of our current higher education academy structure – although it must be said that
our world is far from utopian. But, for all our society’s problems (and Slonczewski is dealing
with many of them), we do nevertheless live an average of twice as long as people did when
Bacon was writing, and we do have much more leisure more broadly available than was possible
in his time. Slonczewski puts a biologist’s spin on the whole thing: at the figurative center of her
world is the practice (or, perhaps more accurately, the praxis) of genetic engineering, called
“lifeshaping.” This technology enables the entire society to function: it is explicitly needed for
reproduction, implicitly responsible for the remarkable biological habitations and superior
aquatic mobility of the Sharers. This utopia is not necessarily recognized as such in the
beginning, perhaps because it is so feminine-centric: “Male (and some female) travelers typically
suffer from the dis-ease wrought by matriarchal utopias” (Murphy 268). Indeed, the lack of any
central power, the lack of violent resistance, the lack of a trading culture all serve to confuse the
foreign Valans. As much as anything, Slonczewski’s story is about the dissemination of the
utopia to a broader culture. 11
It is worth noting that the Sharers have, throughout the whole story, the theoretical
capability to use their genetic engineering prowess to wipe out the colonizing occupiers. When
11

Although I will focus on the genetic engineering component of Slonczewski’s story, I will note that genetic
engineering is far from the central concern of A Door Into Ocean – that would be the non-violent, Quaker-esque,
reciprocal culture which drives the Sharer culture. Rather, genetic engineering functions as an important element of
the premise, and since Slonczewski is first and foremost an accomplished microbiologist, I feel a focus on the
implications of genetic engineering in her novel is entirely appropriate.
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the Malachite assures the Valan occupiers that “There is no threat to you, at present” (207) we
realize that it is not speaking about the Sharer’s technological capability so much as their cultural
willingness to militarize their technology. The utopian strains, then, are more a function of the
style of society as they are a function of the technology itself. This style – the reciprocal,
balanced approach of the Sharers – is emphasized by the Sharer’s language, their studious nonviolence, and their close relationship with their immediate environment; specifically, with the
living “raft-trees” which the Sharers nurture and manipulate.
Thus the feminist/utopian strain to Slonczewski’s story is also bound up in an ecocritical
conversation. The Sharers live a low-impact, environmentally sensitive life – a lifestyle which is
thrown into sharp relief by the aggressive actions of the Valans. For instance, the Sharers ride out
the seasonal catastrophe of “seaswallowers” – a biannual event where massive sea-creatures
migrate from one pole of the moon to the other, eating everything in their path. The Valans, in
contrast, dump chemicals into the water to help ward the leviathans off. At the most extreme
moment of Valan intervention, Valan General Realgar dumps so many chemicals into the waters
around the Sharer “raft-trees” that the seaswallowers skip the Sharer inhabitations entirely.
Although General Realgar intended this as something of a humanitarian demonstration of Valan
powers, for the Sharers the gesture is anathema, because the seaswallowers play an important
role in culling the other sea-life. Months after the missed “cleansing” Sharer raft-trees are nearly
overrun with the abundance of other life: the balance on Shora is thrown off by the Valans’
arrogant chemical intervention.
Although the Sharers have the capability to control much of their environment, they have
evolved a relationship with genetic engineering which is in balance with the uncontrolled
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ecosystem of Shora. In part this may be related to the fact that, as Susan Stratton suggests,
“Slonczewski is biologist as well as feminist, and her utopian world emphasizes the intricacy of
the ecology of which her women are part. . . . Slonczewski seems to derive both feminist and
ecological aspects of her novel from a more general interest in ethical relationships based in
peaceful coexistence with others and resistance to dominance behaviors” (“Intersubjectivity”).
Sheryl Vint concurs, suggesting, “Their ecofeminist technology is based on ways of working
with the natural capacities of other species and a sense of themselves as part of a larger web of
life. They do not use pesticides or herbicides but instead nurture the ecosystem to balance
population and food supply” (“Animal Studies” 447). She connects this to “[t]he Sharer way of
life [which] is entirely rooted in their refusal of the self/Other boundary; they literally cannot
conceive of the possibility of doing harm to another without also harming self, a political and
philosophical stance that emerges from how they have chosen to organize their communal
relationship with other species on the planet” (“Theorizing the Global”). Laural Bollinger makes
similar observations with regards to the microbial life in A Door Into Ocean, which is as
integrated into the Sharer lifestyle as their massive raft-tree habitations: “Slonczewski constructs
the Sharers as wholly committed to eco-sustainability, both at the macro and micro level . . . The
novel contrasts the Sharer's eco-sustainable choices with the less environmentally-sensitive
Valans, who use machines and chemicals where Sharers use indigenous cephalopods and
microbes. The degree to which characters accept the purpling effect of the breathmicrobes—and
thus reject contagion models of understanding infection—comes also to signify the characters'
acceptance of Sharer ways” (384-85). None of these studies, however, makes note of the
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curiously perfect fit between Sharers and their environment in the light of the Sharers known
bioengineering prowess.
Certainly the Sharers’ willingness to make use of the local life suggests a complex
symbiosis which exceeds simple stewardship. The balance is, however, suspiciously resilient. As
Slonczewski notes on her Guide, the various fauna on Shora is edible by the Valans and, for that
matter, by the Sharers themselves, since both are human:
An aspect of evolution not discussed in A Door into Ocean is that of biochemical
compatibility between Earth creatures and those of an alien biosphere. In A Door
into Ocean, Spinel from Valedon can immediately eat and enjoy the plants and
animals of Shora, many of which largely resemble Earth organisms. Apparently
they all contain DNA and the same twenty amino acids that make up our proteins,
the building blocks of terrestrial life. This can only be explained if the Sharers
have systematically replaced most, if not all, of the pre-existing ecosystem of
Shora with Earth-evolved organisms--in other words, in their own way they must
have terraformed Shora, just as Valedon was terraformed. (“Guide”)
The possibility that the flora and fauna of Shora have been engineered into a sustainable balance
is never discussed in the novel, and it is missing from the exegetical works as well. 12 The
implications of terraforming complicate any ecocritical reading. Maintaining an environment of
one’s own design has much more in common with city buildings and modern housing than with
real-world green movements or natural stewardship. Certainly the Sharers are more in tune with
12

To be clear, this chapter focuses specifically on Slonczewski’s novel A Door Into Ocean and related exegetical
works – that is, the one novel and related critical explanations and interpretations of Slonczewski’s oeuvre. She has
other novels set in the same universe which deal with similar issues in different ways, but they are beyond the scope
of this chapter and thesis.
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their environment than the Valans are (with the environment on either Shora or Valedon); but if
they or their ancestors created the environment in the first place – either from scratch, bringing
the life with them to an otherwise dead moon, or through manipulation of the already-present life
form – then the parallel between Sharer stewardship and a similar relationship on our world
would be tenuous at best.
We do not know whether the species on Shora are all introduced or if they were modified
to be compatible with the human needs. The potential for genetic praxis to enable simulacra of
natural environments which are nevertheless products of conscious ingenuity (i.e., environments
which appear unmediated but are in fact heavily mediated) seems to be an implicit consequence
of genetic engineering, at least in literary treatments. Octavia Butler’s alien geneticists travel on
living ships—more complex versions of the raft-trees. They seed the Earth with habitations
which will, eventually, consume all the natural resources of the Earth and launch themselves into
space, explicitly linking the creation of wholly mediated biological spaces (created and
controlled via genetic engineering) with the complete destruction of Earth. Atwood has
overtones of this destructive link as well in the corporate Compounds which house the
geneticists. These Compounds simulate the safe environments which have all but disappeared
from her world in the face of climate change, forging the same metaphorical link between living
space, genetics, and environmental destruction. For Slonczewski, this issue is not broached in A
Door Into Ocean. 13 Rather, it is a condition of her utopia, and whatever the ethics of its creation,

13

This is dealt with more in the sequels, and discussed at length by Christa Grewe-Volpp in an article entitled
“Lifeshaping a New Planet” which explores what happens in the sequel The Children Star. In Ms. Grewe-Volpp’s
discussion, she notes that in Slonczewski’s later books the Sharers and Valans spread out to planets which need to
be colonized and terraformed, a process which becomes especially tricky when these planets have hostile (to human)
biospheres and xeno-organisims. But if Slonczewski looks into this issue in her later books, she still does little to
explore the ethics of the Sharer’s origins in A Door Into Ocean.
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it does seem to suggest an idyllic lifestyle with its own dangers (i.e., excitement, relief of
boredom, life) but in a way that is eminently conducive to a more enlightened way of being.
There are internal conflicts, of course, even in Slonczewski’s best of all possible worlds.
On Shora, individuals and even whole communities can become alienated when Unspeaking
drags on for too long; the biannual catastrophes in the form of seaswallowers pose an existential
threat to the living rafts which are the Sharers’ homes; and the occasional psychopath does
appear. These negative aspects of the utopia appear in the story mostly through Merwen, the
central Sharer in the story. For instance, she is best known as a skilled “wordshaper” because she
ended a decades-long Unspeaking between two large communities. Near the middle of the story,
she helps the survivors of a raft-tree that is consumed by a seaswallower. And she is haunted by
what she considers to be her greatest failure: her inability to help a fellow Sharer (whom I
suspect is meant to be a psychopath) who had murdered someone. Instead of talking the
psychopath back into the community, Merwen almost gets herself killed. But these occasional
tragedies serve mostly to affirm the fundamental humanity of the Sharers – though they are not
without their struggles, they have better ways of dealing with them. Unspeaking is preferable to
violence and “death hastening,” since it leaves open the possibility of reconciliation; you can’t
reconcile with a corpse. The seaswallowers are an integral piece of the ocean’s lifecycle, keeping
the populations of other creatures and plants in check, and generally keeping the Sharers’ on
their toes. Even the psychopaths have a place in the society, although that place is one of
exclusion.
In a sense, the reason the Sharer society is so utopian is that they embody the cyborg
ideal. The figure at the heart of Haraway’s famous Cyborg Manifesto is “a hybrid of machine
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and organism” – hence the term cyborg, which is a portmanteau of “cybernetic” and “organism.”
Thus, the Cyborg is explicitly marked by its relationship with machinery. This is why I say the
Sharers embody the cyborg ideal only “in a sense”; for the first half of A Door into Ocean, at
least, they are largely identified against Valan norms – norms of dress and nudity, cultural
hierarchy, propensity to solve problems violently, and (importantly) what the Valans would
consider “technology.” These norms are reinforced as norms for the reader by their familiarity:
our society hides its nudity, we live in a world of hierarchies, violence exists all around us, and
our machinery is, like the Valans’, based on sophisticated manipulation of mineral-based objects.
Heightening this relationship even further is the fact that the largely familiar world of Valedon is
contrasted against the profoundly unfamiliar world of Shora. So when the Valans condemn
Sharer society as “pre-stone age,” the reader is likely to agree. This lack of recognizable
technology, and thus a class of objects we’d recognize as “machine,” would seem to render the
Sharers unlikely candidates for embodying a Cyborg ideal. But this is merely an artifact of the
different modes of technology (and the science which drives it) with which Haraway and
Slonczewski work – one in the energy-and-particle-physics-derived world of computers, the
other in a biology-derived world of genetic engineering.
Slonczewski was first published in 1986, the year after Donna Haraway originally
published her famous Cyborg Manifesto. Because Slonczewski struggled, at first, to find a
publisher – “An early version of Ocean was rejected by two publishers, one of whom derided it
as a ‘fairy tale’” (“Guide”) – and because she had to write the novel before it was sent off to
publishers, of course, it is unlikely that A Door Into Ocean was directly influenced by Haraway
or Cyborg theory. However, A Door Into Ocean nevertheless engages with many of the same
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issues that Haraway identifies as “troubling dualisms”: “self/Other, mind/body, culture/nature,
male/female, civilized/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/ made,
active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, total/partial, God/man” (165). Self and Others are
linguistically tied together – the Sharer language has no verbs for possession or even, really,
identity; their verbs can only connote “sharing,” thus “obey” can only be interpreted as “share
will” (249). Mind and body are transcended through the “white state” trance which allows
Sharers to escape pain and experience their life atemporally. Culture and nature are united
through the practice of “lifeshaping” or what we would call genetic engineering. The distinction
between male and female is rendered irrelevant by the all female society. Civilized and primitive
are united in the apparently primitive but actually civilized Sharers (and confounded by the
apparently civilized but comparatively primitive Valans). Reality and appearance are challenged
by the apparent simplicity of Shora, although this particular dualism is one of the few which is
not explicitly challenged. Whole and part are conflated in the biosphere of Shora, which the
Sharers view as a unified system of which they are merely a piece. Agent and resource are united
in the biological resources the Sharers cultivate. Maker and made are united in genetic
engineering as well; the Sharers are all produced by genetic engineering, and some of them grow
up to become those genetic engineers called “lifeshapers” (cf. 33, 89). The active/passive binary
is exploded by the active passivity of the white trance, by Unspeaking, and by their tremendously
effective passive resistance.
So while I do not mean to suggest that the Sharers are ideal Cyborgs in the exact sense
developed by Haraway, they do embody a possible solution to the issues that Haraway raised;
and, more importantly, the form of Slonczewski’s solution is very similar to Haraway’s. She
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even sets up a similar list of binaries which are addressed through the course of the novel: “In
literary terms, A Door into Ocean sets up a series of interlinked polarities or binary oppositions,
all of which relate to traditional notions of female/male. Each of these oppositions is
deconstructed or resolved through the course of the story.” (Slonczewski, “Guide”). My specific
interest in this correlation between Haraway’s cyborg theory and Slonczewski’s novel is the way
that they seem to have independently developed the same general solution to the most pressing
issues of 1980s feminism; the major difference being that Haraway sees (inorganic) computers as
the likely technological vector of disruption, while the micro-biologist Slonczewski posits
genetic manipulation as the likely vector.
For the world of A Door Into Ocean genetic engineering functions as a sort of ubertechnology, comparable to computer technology in a host of other sf novels. The Sharers appear
primitive to the Valans – Spinel is somewhat horrified, for instance, by the lack of clothing, the
exoticness of the food, and off-putting organic quality of the living quarters. Valan traders avoid
the biannual seaswallower attacks with chemical deterrents, while the Sharers appear to
passively suffer from these regular disasters. Decisions are made by general acclimation, and
Sharers seem largely incapable of truly grasping the rules of trade. Relatively valueless stones
are coveted by certain members of Shora, and are considered repulsive to the rest. But, in fact,
these “primitive” aspects are merely artifacts of a much more sophisticated technology. The only
minerals on Shora are at the heavy center of the moon – the center to which all dead things sink,
somewhat explaining the Sharers’ association of minerals with death.
The association is, however, quite a bit deeper: all people on Shora live in a society
where everything is, in principle at least, biological: the walls of habitations are growths of algae
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and fungi, the “boats” are living organisms, the food is all collected from the surrounding water,
the medical care is all handled with genetic manipulation. So the entire world, for a Sharer, is
alive with dynamic potential. Minerals are largely static, even though present in organic material,
and their technical potential is unlocked only through a very different sort of manipulation. For
the genetic engineering savants on Shora, minerals and other synthetic technologies are
completely alien. The obsession of some Sharers with stones comes from the same source as the
more common Sharer sense of repulsion: the presence of something which is simply not alive
completely contradicts their understanding of the universe.
At first, the Sharers technology is not recognized for what it is. Valan scientists and
traders think that the Sharers use living matter because that is what is available – that is, they
view the lack of mineral-based technology as evidence of a lack of sophistication. This mistaken
assumption resonates pretty clearly with the history of earthly colonization, as unfamiliar
traditions are misunderstood, or imperfectly understood, and the fundamental human complexity
is assumed to be missing. This assumption is challenged by the Malachite, the mineral based
(and thus, to the Sharers, monstrous) representative of the colonial power, who recognizes the
genetic engineering as a forbidden technology from a time long past.
Slonczewski’s deployment of genetic engineering is rather complicated by these dual
assessments. On the one hand, the clearly superior society – nonviolent, equitable, well-fed, etc.
– is just as clearly associated with genetic engineering. This science/body of knowledge allows
their idealistic society to exist in the first place, and ultimately helps to ensure its victory in the
battle against the oppression of the machines. And, in this association, the genetic engineering is
placed in a separate category from other, mineral based technologies. The minerals that the
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Valans mine, manipulate, and trade, are clearly associated with destructive, divisive, oppressive,
capitalistic and militaristic forces. Conversely, genetic engineering is recognized as a technology
in its own right, as sophisticated (and potentially dangerous) as the mineral-based technologies of
the distant Empire, and clearly superior to what the material society on Valan can do. It is
elevated to a place on par with the most advanced Empire technology (embodied in the
Malachite and his tremendously powerful spaceship), and oriented in opposition to this
technology (and the society it enables/determines). Ultimately, the geneticists win the day, first
in A Door Into Ocean, with the withdrawal of the Valan forces, and later when their passive,
genetically enlightened way succeeds even more conclusively, by enabling the new federation of
the Free-Fold in the sequel Daughter of Elysium. So genetic engineering is both a lifestyle that
transcends technology, and a technology that transcends lifestyle.
By describing a society which is fundamentally mediated by a form of technology – even
a form that bears many similarities to unmediated nature – Joan Slonczewski creates what we
could call a race of posthumans. These characters are not integrated with a computer based
technology, but they do in some sense exceed the boundary of the liberal human subject. One
way Slonczewski helps to break down the traditional boundaries of the human subject is through
her choice to make the entire Sharer society biologically female. In their own eyes, there is no
gendered marker for the body – one of the key characteristics of a human subject is thus rendered
moot. Gender in A Door Into Ocean is at once central to the story’s utopian vision and almost
sublimated beneath the text. The “femaleness” of the Sharers is only apparent to foreigners like
Spinel and the Valans (and, we must note, the readers as well). In part this mono-sex culture
functions as a sort of ultimate realization of a contemporary progressive humanism, which has
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moved from defining rights individualistically but only to men, and putatively wealthy white
ones at that, to a broader definition which enfranchises other races and eventually other genders
as well. The feminist movement which preceded Slonczewski’s book did much to ensure that
“women” as a category were included among those who are “endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights.” By envisioning a society constructed entirely of women,
Slonczewski offers a vision of a world where the feminist project has fully succeeded.
But, of course, there are some complex political ramifications to Slonczewski’s decision
to essentially exclude men from her vision of utopia. Such a move goes beyond a mere vision of
gender equality by fully reversing the issue of gendered humanism altogether. That is to say, the
original humanistic vision of which implicitly excluded women has been transformed into a
fantastical feminist vision which implicitly excludes men. That Slonczewski couches this move
in a veil of inevitability – how could the Sharers even know to include men when there are no
men? – is especially interesting. It suggests a pessimistic approach to the feminist cause, that the
only way to fully enfranchise women is to fully exclude men. This radical position can be read
two ways: a feminist-minded reader may cheer at the thought of such an achievement, while a
male reader may feel left out or even excluded. To one who is both, the experience is rather
conflicted. The Sharer society, the community of noble savages, only came about because men
were not part of the equation. To the extent that the Sharers represent a utopian vision of a
possible future, it offers a difficult answer, at best.
It is important, however, to note the historical context in which Slonczewski was writing.
It is a familiar axiom in science fiction circles that science fiction is never about the future, it is
always about the present. Thus, the society Slonczewski develops in A Door Into Ocean need not
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be understood simply as aspirational, as an ideal towards which we should strive. It was written
during the Reagan administration and a general resurgence of American conservatism, also a
time when the so called second-wave feminist movement was fracturing. Against this backdrop,
the feminist vision Slonczewski offers is relieved of some of the fraught symbolism inherent in
an all-female society. So while a man reading A Door into Ocean may feel somewhat excluded,
the gender exclusivity of the Sharers is merely a premise. The reintroduction of a gender
dichotomy, via Spinel and the Valans, ultimately does little to reinstate the gender dichotomy for
the Sharers. Men, like Spinel, are called “male-freaks” but the epithet refers more to their status
as an outsider with a notably different appearance than any essential bias about sex or gender. So
while the gender dichotomy is clearly in play, and equating femininity with utopian non-violence
certainly carried political implications, for the characters within the novel such issues are not
particularly salient.
Rather, the Sharers can be said to represent, in the historical sense, a fully realized
feminist ideal which is then menaced by the intrusion of a more familiar, dichotomous, violent,
gendered society. I say menaced because the threat is both deliberate and surmountable. The
Valans do not represent an existential threat to the Sharers, because the Sharers have the means
(if not the will) to wipe out the entire Valan civilization. But the Valan presence on Shora is
disruptive nonetheless, and it does result in significant causalities for the Sharers. From a
historical perspective, we can say that the issue which Slonczewski grapples with most directly is
one of an existential threat to the feminist movement – from within and from without.
Ultimately the greatest threat to the Sharers comes less from the Valan occupiers (or the
Valan torture, weapons, aggression, etc.) but rather from the potentially violent strains within
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Sharer culture itself. There are factions which call for the eradication of Valans. Such a move
would represent an abandonment of the characteristics which makes Shora utopian in the first
place. This is an especially vivid threat since the calls for violence are hardly unprovoked, and
indeed, the Malachite apparently attempts to incite just such an event. So, to draw the argument
beyond the plot: the truest danger comes from the fracturing of the female movement, from the
possible abandonment of their ideals in the face of (a masculine) aggression. If the Sharers
constructed a virus to eliminate or, at least, coerce the Valans off their planet and out of their
lives, they would cease to be Sharers; to do so would be to “share death” on a massive scale, and
such a move is figured tantamount to suicide. But what options have the Valans left?
The parallel discussion within the feminist community would not, of course, broach the
issue of genocide (gyno-cide?); that extreme option is mostly a function of the story-logic (how
else could the peaceful Sharers forcibly remove the militarily superior Valans?). But this extreme
nevertheless suggests the sorts of “solutions” which were possible options for feminist-minded
individuals. The terminology used by the Sharers suggest a fairly direct parallel: while speaking
of what we would recognize as biological warfare, the Sharers use the term “closing the door” in
their debate over how to handle the Valans. The image of a closing door does suggest the drastic
solution of cutting men out from the picture entirely, an extreme implementation of Adrienne
Rich’s lesbian continuum. 14 There is a tradition in feminist sf of imagining worlds without any
men; this tradition may soften the unmarked decision to write men out of the original utopia.
14

I hasten to add: Slonczewski specifically claims that her characters which suggest men are somehow lesser are
soon shown to be wrong, and Spinel’s story (his inclusion, his relationship with Lystra, his embrace of Sharer
culture where even the female Valan Nisi falls short) bears this contention out. Slonczewski has not written a story
about how awful men are, nor does she argue that men are the problem and need to be eliminated. None of this
changes the premise, though, and her deployment of genetic engineering situates the story in a world which implies
the willful exclusion of males, thus suggesting that someone in her universe’s history did once successfully make
these very arguments.
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However, Slonczewski does introduce the idea that maleness is frankly undesirable so long as
there are reproductive alternatives. That she is participating in an sf feminist tradition (e.g.,
Joanna Russ’s Female Man and “When it Changed”) does little to soften this suggestion: unlike
the virus in “When it Changed” or alternate dimensions which account for men’s disappearance
in other sf stories, her men were apparently bred out. There is a sense of deliberate and
premeditated extinction.
What does this have to do with genetic engineering? For one, the genetic engineers on
Shora have bred out males from their society, allowing for the creation of the society against
which Slonczewski stages her whole story. Genetic engineering is critical to the premise of the
novel, but it also offers a sense of a way forward. The people of Shora are incapable of
reproducing though intercourse: for one, the Sharers are all female; for another, their sexual
organs are incapable of intercourse even when a man is available. The only way for this monosex society to perpetuate is through genetic engineering. Children are constructed via fusion of
two eggs: “Their sexuality is described obliquely as based on their sensitive hands and extra-long
fingers. They reproduce by the ‘fusion of ova,’ a process that requires extensive management by
the lifeshapers. The reason such intervention is needed is that eggs and sperm have different
patterns of ‘imprinting,’ chemical modification of the chromosomes. In order to combine two
eggs, one of them would have to be entirely remodeled to provide the imprinting patterns of
sperm” (Slonczewski “Guide”).
The fusion obviates the need for any sort of sexuality, at least as it is connected to
reproduction. The decoupling of sexuality and reproduction is one of the most significant literary
potentials for genetic engineering, and it manifests in different ways in the other novels this
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thesis considers. Butler, for instance, has her aliens initially prevent all human reproduction that
is conducted without Oankali intervention – and the Oankali intervention comes in the form of
two other partners (a male and female Oankali) and an overseeing ooloi Oankali. In this way
Butler’s use of genetics both severs reproduction from sexuality, and makes reproduction
numerically more sexual (as well as significantly more bizarre). For Mawer in Mendel’s Dwarf,
the decoupling allows for a classic case of cuckoldry and sexual violence, but without the two
being directly linked, heightening the impact of each. For Atwood, the decoupling is coded onto
her world as vast sexual dysfunction or, perhaps, by shifting sexuality out of the realm of
reproduction and into the realm of commerce. Either way, child prostitution and other (slightly
less abhorrent) forms of sexual exploitation rule, all while the scientific-industrial complex
directly takes over matters of life and death, ultimately unifying in the figure of Crake who
‘births’ a race of posthumans before killing almost everyone.
An implication of this asexual method of reproduction is that it eliminates the need for
intercourse, for sperm in any original form, and thus the need for a gendered sexual division.
Slonczewski suggests that the Sharers did once have men, but that they were eventually bred out:
“‘the Sharer race cannot interbreed with ours naturally.’ ‘For anatomical reasons only.’ After
generations of breeding without males, Sharer anatomy no longer enabled heterosexual
coupling” (89). Interestingly, the decoupling of intercourse and reproduction is merely a formal
one. Spinel’s relationship with Lystra offers a rather direct insight into this dynamic:
“But couldn’t we try it the other way just once?”
Lystra considered for a bit. “Usha says it will make me sick.”
Spinel frowned. “Mothers and mothersisters always say that.”
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“It’s true enough. It would cause toxic shock to my internal organs.”
“Your ancestors did it, all right.”
“So I’ve heard. And a billion years before that our ancestors were all onecelled and budded off like yeast.”
“Well, how does Usha know? She never tried it.”
“Traders used to try with us, a long time ago. Nisi calls it ‘rape.’”
“Well I’m not trying to ‘rape’ you.” He was highly indignant. “I love you.”
(162)
So the Sharers still have plenty of sex, and while they are unable to have heterosexual
intercourse for physical reasons – in a divergence Slonczewski relates to the “kind of anatomical
incompatibility [which] is common, for example, in widely divergent breeds of dogs” (“Guide”),
emphasizing the related genetic humanity of the two peoples despite their apparent
incompatibility – Spinel is still able to develop a robust sexual relationship with the Sharer
Lystra. He simply, in the words of Ms. Slonczewksi, “has to become reconciled to her own
Sharer ways of lovemaking, giving up the need to ‘put it inside’” (“Guide”). And while there is
no necessary connection between sex and reproduction, children are only born to mated pairs of
Sharers. As much as anything, the necessity of genetic intervention functions as a sort of fool
proof birth-control, regardless of gender.
The detail about the lack of men is slipped into the story but not developed. The history
of this event is never really explained: we do not know, for instance, if men were eliminated by
conscious choice, or if the change was simply the inevitable result of Sharer technology. What is
clear is that the lack of men is explicitly tied to genetic engineering: “Sharer anatomy no longer
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enabled heterosexual coupling. Sharer women ‘conceived’ by fusion of ova, a process requiring
lifeshaper assistance and the consent of the Gathering” (89). And the evolution into a femaleonly society is not treated as entirely neutral: “Could it be that the persistence of malefreaks has
kept the Valan race in a primitive state? Only lesser races produce males” (80). These remarks
establish both the genetic factor in Sharer sex and the implied superiority of a mono-sex culture,
but they do so relatively early in the story, long before the Sharers have been fully revealed to be
as technologically advanced as they are ethically advanced. This serves to implant the idea of
female superiority (and male inferiority) before such issues would seem problematic – that is,
when the Sharers are still in the position of noble savage, and thus their beliefs can be dismissed
as simple quirks of their culture, long before the Sharers and their culture is shown to be truly
superior.
Explicitly linking genetic engineering to the all-female Sharer culture has some profound
implications: genetic engineering, and by extension Slonczewski’s own specialty biological
science, is rendered as an explicitly feminine praxis and body of knowledge. This stands in stark
contrast to the approach seen in Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam books, where genetics is
generally portrayed as Crake’s realm, and thus implicitly as a masculine area. It also contrasts
with the profoundly alien approach in Butler’s Lilith’s Brood series. The implication in A Door
Into Ocean is that genetic engineering, if advanced enough, inevitably leads (or at least, led) to
the eradication of an entire sex. Slonczewski leaves many important questions unanswered: Why
did the Sharers stop producing men? Was it a conscious decision? Was it a trend which was
never reversed? Was it simply convenient? Was it the result of some dogma? In short, what was
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it about males which was, for whatever reason, unworthy of reproduction? Or, alternatively,
what is it about females which is imminently worthy of reproduction?
That the male sex is the more aggressive, violent, hierarchical one is no accident. Indeed,
Slonczewski reveals the culture, history, and technology of the Sharers very carefully throughout
A Door Into Ocean, in a way which both heightens the contrast between Valan and Sharer (and
thus, the technologies, cultures, and ethics they represent). In doing so, she constructs and
idealized form of femininity and implicitly constructs a flawed version of masculinity as well.
Because they are mostly introduced through the perspective of the Valan man Spinel, the Sharers
start out looking primitive and irrational. They are only slowly revealed to be culturally,
ethically, and technologically superior to the Valans; this slow reveal makes the revelation of
Sharer technology seem almost majestic, as though it is a cure for all the ills brought on by Valan
technology, even though it was developed long before the Valan technology.
Slonczewski plays on the trope of the noble savage before reversing the roles and
revealing that the “savage” was, in fact, the truly cultured party. By the time it is clear to the
readers and the Valans that the Sharers possess fantastically superior technology the Valan have
been thoroughly discredited. The opposition between the (explicitly feminine) Sharers and the
(implicitly masculine) Valans constructs the respective genders, and places the drive to hierarchy
firmly in the camp of the masculine Valans. This is particularly notable because such a drive is at
the center of Octavia Butler’s Lilith’s Brood. In Butler’s treatment, while males are likewise
considered “unstable” and generally more difficult than females, this hierarchal drive is not
gendered but rather a (even the) definitive human characteristic. For Slonczewski, the drive to
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hierarchy is anti-utopian; and the technology of genetic engineering is the way to surmount this
drive.
The absence of men in Sharer society, the impossibility of “normal” male/female
reproduction, necessitates a technology like genetic engineering. The entire Sharer culture is
built around an implicit reciprocity, encoded into their language and present in all parts of their
culture. In fact, this is the origin of their name – the “Sharers” are linguistically incapable of
forming possessive sentences. As Slonczewski describes in her study guide on the book, “Valan
language, like ours, distinguishes between subject and object. Valans try to force Sharers to
recognize the Valan invaders as the subjects turning Sharers into objects. Sharer language sees
no distinction. Every subject and object are interchangeable; they “share” the action. Thus
Sharers can prevent Valan control by failing to “share” their demands (that is, failing to obey
orders.)” (Slonczewski “Guide”). From the perspective which Slonczewski develops in her own
exegetical work on A Door Into Ocean, the linguistic indistinguishability of subject and object
lies at the center of the Sharer’s cultural “Otherness” and the key to their utopian society. She
seems to be suggesting that the insistence on seeing the world in binaries, as a series of “self”
and “Others” is at the root of the many problems her fantastic society deconstructs. By losing the
distinction between subject and object and implicit connection is forged between all things. This
perspective is perhaps a curious one for a scientist like Slonczewski to adopt, given science’s
drive to categorize the natural world and systematize that knowledge into a malleable,
predictable form. If there is no distinction between subject and object, traditional lines of
causality become blurred.
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This reciprocity extends to Slonczewski’s depiction of genetic engineering as well.
Called “lifeshaping,” the Sharers have the ability to manipulate biological life with great
adeptness. The specifics of their techniques are left shrouded in mystery, but their capabilities are
soon understood (to some extent, at least) by the Valan scientist and budding Sharer sympathizer
Dr. Siderite. The science is notably capable of tremendous destruction, as Dr. Siderite points out:
“Suppose that the Sharers take our threat seriously. They could spread an infection which would
lie dormant within us for years, only to mushroom into a disease and wipe us out—unless
Sharers are still around to halt it. Or the latency period could be generations; then we’ll live, but
our children and children’s children will share their extinction” (349). But the Sharers are also
quite reluctant to turn it in such a direction. So while genetic engineering is very much allied
with the forces of good in A Door Into Ocean, it is not represented as an unambiguously positive
force in and of itself. Rather, it is a force directed positively by the Sharer society. Although it is
possible for the Sharers to construct diseases with the technology, to do so would violate the core
principles of reciprocity and non-violence.
I say “core principles” but in reality the two are one and the same. Sharers are not barred
from violence, culturally or physiologically. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, one of Merwen’s
early experiences (and great failures) as a “wordshaper” was an attempt to reason with a
psychopathic Sharer who had been exiled for murdering someone. Merwen fails to achieve any
sort of understanding with this Sharer, and is nearly choked to death herself for her troubles. So
not only are Sharers capable of violence, we are even shown examples of their violence. But, it
must be noted, this character, Virien, explicitly rejects Sharer culture – “I hasten death because it
suits me, that’s all. I like it. . . . Shora, you’re so anxious to be a martyr, and all the while you
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loathe me like the rest of them” (166-67) – and is likewise rejected by the Sharer culture. Also,
as a society, the Sharers do seriously consider and in some cases argue for eradication of the
Valans on their planet. But they are ultimately barred by the structure of their language, ethics,
and society. Because reciprocity is built into the very core of Sharer culture, they cannot separate
themselves from violent acts enough to commit them without concurrently experiencing them.
Thus, Sharer violence against another is the same as violence again the self. Hence, an ethic of
non-violence pervades, because self-violence is so unpleasant.
But the distinction between capability and willingness is small. It may be unthinkable to
wipe out a tribe of fellow Sharers, but it is not unthinkable to wipe out an unreasoning existential
threat. Merwen visits Valedon at the beginning of the book on a fact-finding mission to
determine whether the Valans were human or not. This is a large part of her motivation in
bringing Spinel back with her: to show that even a Valan male-freak can learn to become a
Sharer, and thus, a human. As the conflict wears on this distinction becomes critical, since
calling Valans human protects them from the sorts of biological havoc that Sharers might bring
to bear on a non-human threat. Central to their definition of human is the ability to “name
oneself” and thus achieve a level of self-recognition that can be reasoned with, that it would be
sinful to destroy. The relationship with Animal Studies is notable, because this gives an explicit
example of how the Sharers delineate between “human” and non-human, thus highlighting how
we make similar delineations. Interestingly, though, Slonczewski does not extend this argument
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to include the actual animal perspectives. Rather, she implicitly excludes them because they lack
the ability to name themselves. 15
The implications for genetic engineering here are complicated: on the one hand, genetic
engineering has led to a society as balanced and peaceful as the Sharers, which speaks to its
potential for good; on the other, even in the hands of the Sharers genetic engineering can be quite
scary. For instance, the Sharers all have a distinct blue tint to their skin which is the result of
“breath-microbes,” oxygenated bacteria that rest on the skin and allows their “host” to stay
underwater much longer than on lungpower alone. These bacteria are harmless – in fact they are
decidedly beneficial – but to the Valans they also represent an alien threat. The Valan visitors to
Shora take antibiotics to ward off the microbes. Spinel reacts with abject horror when his skin
first starts changing color:
To Spinel, at that instant, it meant one thing: he was metamorphosing into a
moon-creature.
The shock exploded through him. He screamed and lost his hold; the sky tilted
over, a bottomless ocean. Somehow instinct brought him safely to the raft, but he
was still screaming when he got there. Sharers reached out to him with livid limbs
and flippers, grotesque signs of what he would become. Spinel thrust them away
and ran, without knowing where. Somehow he craved shelter, a cocoon to hide
away from them. (97)

15

They do acknowledge a mutuality with the other species on Shora, but have no ethical qualms about “lifeshaping”
solutions to problems posed by non-human life; the main hesitation they seem to feel when it comes to manipulating
other species is whether it will muck up the balance of Shora as a whole—which is to say, whether it will muck up
life for the Sharers on Shora. There is a tension in the novel between acknowledged mutuality and hierarchical
superiority which plays out explicitly with regards to the Valans, but could be extended to animals as well.
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The breath-microbes initially function as a visual sign of Sharer difference, and Spinel’s horror
at his own changing skin can be read as a horror of the self becoming unfamiliar. While he
eventually comes to accept the bluing of his skin, Spinel’s reaction is an important clue as to how
we might react in the same situation.
Later, once things have heated upon Shora in the wake of the Malachite’s devious
conflict-mongering, the horror of the blue-skin transforms: from a generalized fear of the Other
manifesting in/on the self, it becomes an explicit metonym for genetic engineering as a whole.
Playing their part in the growing tensions, some Sharers engineer strands of the bacteria which
are resistant to the Valans antibacterial regimens. The consequences of this are conflicted. On the
one hand, the Valans are no longer able to maintain their original skin tone, and thus become
visually similar to the Sharers. This was likely the point for the Sharers who engineered the
strain: an attempt to force the Valans to recognize their mutual humanity, at least if there was any
there for them to recognize. On the other hand, casually overcoming the Valans only defense
against the bacteria (and doing it again and again as the Valans try to adapt) serves as a powerful
sign of the sophistication of Sharer technology. Thus the blue-skin also serves as a (likely
unintentional) threat, a notice that the Sharers can defeat whatever biological safeguards the
Valans think they have set up. The only real difference between the oxygenating bacteria and a
deadly bioweapon is the Sharers’ intention.
Many of the Valans react with the same sort of hysteria that first struck Spinel, in no
small part because they perceived the implied threat much more than the implied unity. The
gambit does pay some dividends, however, since it clues the Valan scientific minds into just how
sophisticated the Sharer technology really is. It also induces a bit of literary analysis on the part
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of the Valan leadership. As I mentioned earlier, the Malachite, speaking of the potential threat
posed by the Sharers, says “[t]here is no threat to you, at present” (207), which the Valans
reasonably interpret as an analysis of Sharer technologies. What they realize after the drugresistant bacteria (and newly resurgent clicker-bugs, and the failure of their own anti-swarm
chemicals, and a variety of other small but meaningful defeats) is that the Sharers are entirely
capable of wiping them out. That they had not done so was a sign of restraint, an artifact of their
pacifist nature.
Slonczewski performs a fairly complicated feat by showing genetic engineering to be
potentially terrible, but nevertheless aligning it with the pacifist Sharers. The implications of this
for a larger discourse on the place of genetic engineering in our world are not clear. Genetic
engineering is possibly a terrible force, or, in the right hands, a utopian one. It is notable that
genetic engineering is only clearly introduced later in the text. For the first half or so of the novel
– up to the arrival of the Malachite – the Sharers technology is shrouded in mystery. It should be
fairly clear to the modern reader that the Sharers are making use of something similar to genetic
engineering with their “lifeshaping,” but the direct connection is eventually made, and so it is
clear that there is nothing about Sharer genetic engineering which is inherently less fraught with
ethical dangers than our own budding genetic engineering technologies.
I say this is complicated because, for all their pacifist ideals, the Sharer society could not
have come into being without some genetic engineering, yet there is nothing in the technology
which would necessitate a pacifist ideology. At the same time, Slonczewski diametrically
opposes her genetic utopia against the destructive force of nuclear powered civilizations and
highly advanced mechanical robots, suggesting that there is some essential difference between
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the inorganic technologies and the organic technology of the Sharers. Instead, I agree with
Sherryl Vint when she proclaims: “Crucially, in my view, Slonczewski's posthumanism is one
that acknowledges the importance of the body to subjectivity and recognizes that the body is not
a single and stable entity but is instead something that is shaped by cultural forces, that changes
with time, and that is experienced differently according to how one's particular morphological
features are positioned within cultural discourses” (“Theorizing the Global”). The cultural
shaping is made explicit – i.e., it is embodied – in the Sharers thanks to their genetic engineering.
The cultural heritage and the technological praxis, the “Quaker ethic” which manifests as
“scientific praxis” as Edward Higgins put it, are inextricably linked.
One reason that the Sharers do not weaponize their technology is suggested by Realgar,
the Valan general in charge of the occupation (and ultimately in charge of the Valan retreat). Dr.
Siderite asks him, “Now, what sort of people are likely to develop methods of confrontation
which exclude violence?” to which General Realgar ultimately responds: “A people whose
weapons are too deadly to be used” (349). This interpretation suggests two things: one, that
genetic engineering may in fact lead to the sort of idealized society in which conflict is uniformly
handled non-violently; two, that along the way, it might destroy us all. The premise of
Slonczewski’s utopia seems to suggest that both of these eventualities actually occurred: the
embodiment of scientific achievement by the vector of genetic engineering led the way to an
ideal society, a utopia, but in the process potentially did much violence to men and to the
environment. Constructing an ideal society seems to implicitly involve destroying those things
which do not fit.
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The Sharers may only be alive ten-thousand years after the original, hyper-advanced
humans colonizers, the Primes, who “lived as gods . . . Though they died as gods, as well” (208)
because they developed a culture which allowed them to live with their technology and not selfdestruct. Slonczewski (or at least, her characters Dr. Siderite and General Realgar) seems to be
implying that the peaceful nature of the Sharers is inevitable if only for evolutionary reasons: if
they didn’t figure this out, they’d have killed themselves off millennia ago. Here again the
context of Slonczewski’s writing comes into play: there is a clear parallel with the aptly named
MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) approach to foreign policy which reigned from the mid1950s until the collapse of the Soviet Union. And so the ultimate verdict on genetic engineering
technologies is split: they enable a utopian society, but they are no less dangerous than nuclear
technologies. And while the Sharers seem to have settled on a stable social model, there are
suggestions of less-than-utopian elements in their past. It is these less than utopian strains which
seem to be the literary focus of genetic engineering going forward. Slonczewski’s take seems to
be a conditionally optimistic one: genetic engineering will save the world; it just may have to
destroy the world first.
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CHAPTER 3: LILITH’S BROOD: THE AMBIVALENT CYBORG
Octavia Butler is a well-known master of the science fiction genre. Her series Lilith’s
Brood is a collection of three novels, Dawn, Adulthood Rites, and Imago, published in 1987,
1988, and 1989, respectively. Originally collected and released as the Xenogenesis trilogy, this
collection and the new name came with the 2000 rerelease. 16 For the purposes of this essay,
Dawn, Adulthood Rites, and Imago will be referred to as separate books, though they are now
only available as a single volume, and my pagination is taken from the collected series. In this
chapter, I look at the series as a whole to show how Butler deploys the idea of genetic
engineering as a literal and grotesquely alien force. I’ve subtitled the chapter “The Ambivalent
Cyborg” because Butler ultimately seems to be deploying the metaphor of genetic engineering
for much the same reason as Slonczewki: as a means of achieving the sort of enlightened
hybridity Donna Haraway encapsulated in her “Cyborg Manifesto,” but to be doing so in a more
self-consciously critical way. She premises the series on a nuclear war (which would destroy
humanity) and thus positions her genetic engineers – the alien Oankali – as saviors. But the
Oankali’s goals are, in the long run, even more destructive than nuclear winter. For the Oankali,
planetary life is only temporary, so it has a planned (and destructive) end. Genetic engineering
thus fills an ambiguous role for Butler: savior and destroyer. Whereas Slonczweski seems to
16

The series is called “a minor masterpiece” by the Huston Post, quoted on the back cover. I agree, although I’m not
convinced of the “minor” part. As a whole, this series tackles issues of race, gender, biology, and free will while still
telling a damn fine SF story. The aliens are original, the science is reasonable, and the philosophy is heady. The only
real problem with this collection is the new cover. Whereas the original novels and the original Xenogenesis
collection were marketed as sci-fi (clearly seen from their covers) the re-release appears to be positioned more as
feminine, romantic, and African-American literature. The cover shows the top of an apparently nude woman of
African descent, with her hands covering her breasts and some towel-like white fabric over her. I (a young white
man) found this book to be awkward to read in public. Once, a waitress who had read the series for a college class
actually asked me why I was reading an “urban romance novel” at 3:00 at a Ruby Tuesdays. She was surprised to
realize that she had read the book herself, and just as confused as I was as to why it had been marketed this way.
Apparently, Octavia Butler’s novels make more economic sense as urban romance novels than as science fiction.
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favor the salvific potential, and Atwood the destructive potential, Butler seems profoundly
conflicted. This conflict leads one scholar to label the series a “pessimistic utopia” (StickgoldSarah). Ultimately, I would call the series more of an optimistic apocalypse, since no superior
society ever manifests in the novels. Rather, humanity's self-destructive tendencies are pervasive,
but turn out mostly alright, thanks to the intervention of genetic engineering. The Ambivalent
Cyborg achieves a higher sort of being, but does so at the cost of what makes us human: our
contradiction; our free will.
The movement from human to cyborg unfolds chronologically in Lilith’s Brood. The first
book, Dawn, is written from the perspective of the eponymous survivor, Lilith Iyapo, while the
second and third books are mostly written from the perspective of members of her eponymous
Brood. Her narrative begins in a blank room where abductee Lilith wakes up without any sense
of where she is, or why. We soon discover that Lilith’s life is marred by tragedy: first, her
husband and child are killed in a car accident. Then, this personal tragedy is matched on a global
scale by a nuclear war. Published in 1987, this apocalypse likely refers to the long standing
nuclear tensions between the US and USSR, but it is not given much thought in the book. The
minimal focus on the initial disaster proves beneficial to the series: since the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991, full on nuclear conflict seems a less likely source of apocalypse than
rampant consumerism (as in Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash) or environmental catastrophe (as in
Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam books, among many other). The nature of the disaster is
secondary; in a talk titled “Octavia Butler’s Xenogenesis Trilogy: A Biologist’s Response,” Joan
Slonczewski calls it “a fate that seemed all too plausible in the eighties, when the book was
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written” and notes that it “remains a distinct possibility if the effects of humanity on our
environment are not reversed.”
Structurally speaking, apocalypse is as close to a universal premise as we are likely to
find; the method can vary but the end is the same, and for Butler the end is what matters. The
nuclear apocalypse serves as a sly preface for the series. What is important is that humanity has
destroyed itself. The premise accomplishes two things: first, it lends extra plausibility to the story
told by the Oankali—the alien—that humanity is biologically destined to self-destruction, that
there is a profound human flaw. As an Oankali tells Lilith: “Your people could not have fulfilled
that destiny [leaving the Earth and living in space].Their own bodies handicapped them. . . . You
have a mismatched pair of genetic characteristics. Either alone would have been useful, would
have aided the survival of your species. But the two together are lethal” (38). Second, it frames
everything the Oankali do, especially in Dawn, in the paradigm of rescue.
For the purposes of this study, the rescue offered by the Oankali is not necessarily one
from annihilation – the apocalyptic tone heightens the dramatic tension, but it is strongly implied
that the Oankali would have made contact and initiated “trade” even if humans had managed not
to destroy themselves. Rather, I read this text in line with scholars like Jessie Stickgold-Sarah
who argue that the series participates in a three decade long “sustained conversation with
questions of heredity and genetics, deploying unsettling visions of biological determinism,
especially in regard to race and sex” (414). Here Butler makes use of genetic engineering to
constructs a world which is at once freed from the burdens of modern political, racial, and
economic strife. This vision in nevertheless unsettling because this utopian world is only
available to those who give up on traditional notions of individual free will. The Oankali are at
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once monstrous and miraculous, and can be read as embodied metaphors for the technology of
genetic engineering itself. This tension is what leads Stickgold-Sarah to label Butler’s trilogy a
“pessimistic utopia,” offering as it does “Butler’s ‘favorite question,’ about how much the body
determines the self” (417). In Lilith’s Brood, with respect to its deployment of genetic
engineering, the question can also be reversed: how much does the self determine the body?
These questions speak to the central literary tension surrounding the issue of genetic
engineering which I hope to explicate. The age old debate of nature versus nurture is plenty
complicated already, and as genetics helps to statistically isolate elements of DNA (nature)
which seem to be implicated in predispositions to certain behaviors (nurture), the debate
becomes even more complex. Add to this the potential for our “nurture” to include manipulation
of elements which were previously locked in the realm of nature and the debate circles around to
eat itself, like a genetic Ouroboros. I consider this a literary tension because the knowledge and
technologies (or, more simply, the praxis) need not actually exist to destabilize the debate. The
tabula rasa conception of the uneducated, uncultured, or undeveloped mind loses its explanatory
power when that tablet is subject to external manipulation. Where nature can be directly altered
by the conscious intervention of (supposedly) rational beings, thus establishing a new (natural)
baseline (from which further alterations can be made, on ad infinitum) a new series of metaphors
is needed. Perhaps a concept of a sort of tabula muto is called for. Butler tackles this issue
directly in Lilith’s Brood, and for her the question is explicitly tied up with notions of freedom
and identity.
Her conclusions are profoundly ambivalent. The three novels seem to roughly describe
the metamorphosis of humanity from its original state, through an intermediate stage, and finally
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emerging as a completed hybrid or, to use Haraway’s terminology, the shift from human to
cyborg; although contra-Haraway, this cyborg is decidedly alien. Also contra-Haraway, the
cyborg figure in these novels is biologically hybridized. The trilogy is loosely structured around
the life cycle of an insect, a structuring particularly indicated by the title of the final novel,
Imago. In biology, Imago describes an insect in its final stage of metamorphosis, its fully adult
form. In her study of identity in Butler’s trilogy, Cathy Peppers comments on this name choice:
That Butler chose to title the ultimate volume of her trilogy Imago—which means
the ‘perfect stage’ of an animal at the end of its evolution—suggests that she is
indeed telling a story of evolution in which the “most fit” will survive. But there
is an irony to this title, and to its teleological implications as well. This
evolutionary use of the term “imago” was coined in Linnaeus’ taxonomy for
insects to name the final and perfect form after metamorphosis (56).
There is a further irony in the name of her second novel, Adulthood Rites. The novels are
presented chronologically, so the placement of the “rites of adulthood” prior to the “imago,” the
actual achievement of the “perfect stage” or fully grown adult state, is pregnant with
implications. This heightens the teleological overtones that Peppers notes. For one, does the final
novel describe the perfection of humanity, or merely the end of humanity? Peppers asks, “In
terms of the trilogy as a whole, what metamorphosis will humanity, and the paleoanthropological
origin story, undergo before reaching ‘perfection’? And what will happen to those ‘innate’ and
‘interesting’ qualities of human nature, aggression, xenophobia, male dominance?” (56). The
implication, of course, is that the relentless drive of genetic manipulation will become a
relentless pursuit of biological perfection. And in this drive, those things which make us humans
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the best and the worst creatures we can possibly be – in short, what makes us human – must be
eradicated. Like Joan Slonczewski in A Door Into Ocean, Butler utilizes genetic engineering to
construct a utopia; unlike Slonczewski, she seems conflicted about the consequences.
Collectively, the novels tell the story of humanity’s salvation and destruction at the hands
of their alien rescuers, the Oankali. The aliens are deeply attracted to humans and what they call
the “human contradiction”: “Your bodies are fatally flawed. The ooloi perceives this at once. At
first it was very hard for them to touch you. Then you became an obsession for them. Now it’s
hard for them to let you alone” (38). The Oankali race is divided into three genders: male,
female, and ooloi. The ooloi serve as genetic engineers who, in the mating ritual, are responsible
for properly mixing the genetic material of their bonded male and female Oankali spouses. The
ooloi thus have an interesting place in the reproductive cycle: they do not contribute genetic
material to future generations the way the other genders do, but they are nevertheless centrally
responsible for the creation of offspring. In a particularly alien turn, Oankali males and females
generally mate with their siblings. The biological prohibition of such couplings is mitigated by
the ooloi, who generally bond/mate with an unrelated pair of Oankali, and who prevent any
negative recessive traits from surfacing – the most significant biological repercussion of incest.
This incestuous tendency is oddly reminiscent of the way early (and contemporary) geneticists
induce reproduction within the same lineages for many generations; for instance, Mawer makes
clear in his passages on Mendel that Mendel’s inheritance experiments were done by carefully
pollinating different lines with their “parent” strains. This allowed him to control which traits
appeared in which lines. Dog breeders, too, have been doing this for centuries. So it is as if the
coupling habits of Oankali were specifically designed to facilitate genetic manipulation.
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Perhaps, as Joan Slonczewski notes, the system is too well controlled: “Paradoxically,
because the Oankali are such successful genetic engineers, they tend to engineer themselves into
an evolutionary dead end; losing all genetic diversity, they lose the ability to adapt to change.
The only way they can recover genetic diversity is to interbreed with an entirely new species,
which contributes new genetic strengths—and weaknesses” (“Biologist’s Response”). So the
ooloi mediation is doubly important, not only for its facilitation of reproduction, but also because
central to the Oankali psychology, and undergirding their reasons for rescuing the survivors of
Earth’s (presumably nuclear) apocalypse, is a desire/drive to “trade” genetic information with
other species. Thus, throughout Lilith’s Brood most of the mating groups we see consist of five
members: human male, human female, Oankali male, Oankali female, and the ooloi who
oversees the mixing of their disparate genetic material; the result of such unions are
Oankali/human hybrids called “constructs” which are further distinguished as being born in an
Oankali or a human woman. Genetics becomes both a tool for the betterment of human lives and
praxis with an unfortunate telos of its own. Hence the appropriateness of Butler’s final title, with
its implications of both perfection (or at least, full maturity) and a developmental end of the line.
In part, this dead end is a function of the environments which the Oankali painstakingly
build. The Oankali paradise which the massive ship seems to represent is barely hospitable to an
unaltered human, and they lack any sort of biodiversity. The cells where the humans are kept
when the first emerge, for instance, are constructed from the same stuff as the rest of the Oankali
ship: a specialized sort of biological material with a limited intelligence. The material can be
shaped by anyone with the ability to interact with it, but the method of interaction is as alien as
the Oankali:
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“Can you show me how to make it open?” She asked.
The [Oankali] child hesitated, then took one of her [Lilith’s] hands and
brushed it over the forest of its long head tentacles, leaving the hand slightly wet.
Then it touched her fingers to the wall, and the wall began to open.
More programmed reaction to chemical stimuli. No special areas to press, no
special series of pressures. Just a chemical the Oankali manufactured within their
bodies. She would go on being a prisoner, forced to stay wherever they chose to
leave her. She would not be permitted even the illusion of freedom. (56)
Thus, at least in the beginning, the humans are consigned to an environment where they are
literally incapable of exerting any sort of control. For Lilith this control is soon granted once the
Oankali are sufficiently convinced she can handle the responsibility – though it is worth noting
that she considers these “rights” to be long overdue. Oankali biological omnipotence is not
matched by an equivalent omniscience: they do make mistakes, especially when it comes to
handling the humans.
For one, there is a startling lack of diversity within the Oankali holding cells (from a
human perspective anyway): the uniform “light-colored—white or gray, perhaps” (1) color of the
floors, walls, and various structures; the functional but bland food; outside communications are
frustratingly monotonous. For Lilith and the other humans, this monotony is psychologically
destructive. 17 The food she’s given is as nutritious as it is bland. Even when Lilith is allowed to

17

Lilith is actually chosen to be the human ambassador for the first few groups of humans returned to Earth
specifically because she does not attempt suicide during her confinement. For the Oankali, this admirable selfrestraint suggests that Lilith is less beholden to the human’s self-destructive tendencies. For the reader (at least, this
reader) it is indicative of the psychologically torturous conditions of the humans’ confinement.
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leave her cell, she is unable to open or otherwise manipulate any of the surfaces on an Oankali
ship, and thus is utterly dependant on Oankali help to move about the ship.
Also, the inability of humans to usefully interact with their environment represents a
profound loss of control. This in turn suggests the resulting enforced passivity is a potential
consequence of living in an entirely artificial biological environment (i.e., living with but not as
the Oankali). Although the ship’s environment is in principle more flexible than any human
space habitation has ever been, control is only open to those who are at least partially Oankali.
As Lilith discovers during her early captivity, all surfaces in the Oankali rooms are effectively
indestructible. Even her attempts to leave some sort of mark fail: “She had beaten it [the wall],
kicked it, clawed it, tried to bite it. It had been smooth, tough, impenetrable, but slightly giving
like the bed and table” (30). In a severely controlled earth-based environment, like a maximum
security prison or a hospital ward, a person can exert some level of influence, even if it is merely
decorative or destructive. So although the Oankali did save Lilith from almost certain death, their
subsequent heavy-handed treatment of her makes them seem less like saviors and more like
slavers.
Cathy Peppers discusses this tension in an article which probes the way that Butler’s
story works as a sort of “origin story”: “Lilith’s perception of her situation echoes the discourses
of both the slave narrative and sociobiology. Her ‘awakening’ to discover that she has been taken
from Earth to be kept captive on an alien ship orbiting beyond the moon reconstructs the African
slave’s Middle Passage. Like the African slaves in America, she is (at first) denied access to
reading or writing materials” (51). By locating in Lilith’s story overtones of a slave origin story,
Peppers captures the ambiguous nature of the Oankali’s relationship with humans. For this study,
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the slavery metaphor is appropriate, but requires some extra contextualization. Specifically,
while Butler deals unflinchingly with issues of race in many of her works, Lilith’s Brood
included, race does not play a part with regards to genetic engineering, even though the concept
of slavery does. The “slave” in this sense is the uninitiated or unenlightened human – the human
who has not been granted access by the Oankali. Of course, the only way to grant a person such
access is to alter them in much the same way that Lilith was granted increased strength and
stamina: by making one less human, and more Oankali, in some small way. We can read the
Oankali as an embodiment of a mature genetic engineering praxis. If we do so, then Lilith and
the other humans operate as embodiments of contemporary humans (and contemporary
humanism). They are faced with a decision between implicit enslavement by the Oankali and a
sort of willing self-mutilating at the hands of the Oankali. To stay human, they (and by
extension, we) must be willing to live at the mercy of those who do not – those who have
allowed themselves to be changed by genetic engineering.
The Oankali’s environmental monotony also reflects a lack of diversity in the Oankali in
general. Since the Oankali are such masters of genetic engineering, they can control all aspects
of the nature/nurture relationship: the environment is entirely of their own making, as are they
themselves. But, as Lilith soon comes to realize, to live in an Oankali environment, one must
become more like the Oankali. The relationship between a species’ environment and their body
exerts a sort of pressure, shifting their bodies (and behaviors) to best fit the environment. This
pressure pushes both ways, however, leading those species with the requisite ability to also shift
their environment in ways which better suit their bodies. The Oankali appear to have near-perfect
control over both body and environment. Thus, they are able to achieve the perfect fit between
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body and environment. This, however, leads to Joan Slonczewski’s point quoted above: the
Oankali are too good at genetic engineering, and lacking any sort of outside influences they are
in danger of engineering themselves into a corner.
For life on Earth, genetic dead-ends are usually discouraged by the sheer variety of
hostile environments. Imagine a bird which thrives when it is in some specific region; it has
evolved to fit the environment perfectly. But there are other regions where the bird may not
thrive at all. Thanks to genetic drift, some of the bird’s descendants will be different. This
difference may make them less perfectly suited to the original environment, but perhaps better
suited to other environments. Thus the bird’s descendants can evolve to survive in different
regions. This becomes important when we realize that the environment itself is constantly in
flux. Eventually, the original environment will change, and those species which cannot adapt to
the changes will die out. For the Oankali, with their carefully controlled evolution and their
perfectly controlled environments, there is no “Other” environment to which they need adapt.
Over a long enough time line, the lack of pressure to change would result in a genetic conformity
which, while perfectly suited to the life they live at the moment, is precariously sensitive to any
outside shock. This is why the Oankali are compelled to “trade” their genetic material with other
species, and it give Octavia Butler “a biologically plausible explanation for why the Oankali
need to interbreed with humans” (Slonczewski, “Biologist’s Response”). But wandering from
inhabited system to inhabited system seems like a fairly extreme solution, compared to the
possibility of simply consigning oneself to one part of a given biosysem and allowing the system
to unfold without intervention. Every few million years there would be whole new ecosystems to
sample. Even if the drive to search is insurmountable, the Oankali solution still seems extreme,
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since they insist on “trades” rather than something less invasive (and permanent) like extractions
or surveys. As it is, their compulsion to “trade” ultimately leads to the destruction (via breeding
or feeding) of not just entire species but entire ecosystems. 18
Thus the trilogy is bookended by parallel destructions of Earth: the premise of the entire
series is the destruction of the earth via nuclear holocaust, and the inevitable postscript is
destruction via resource mining. In the case of nuclear holocaust, at least some of the biosphere
would have survived the fallout, even if it were only Twinkies, cockroaches, and generals in
bunkers. The world as we know it would be done for, but life would go on. However, as we
discover almost in passing, the Oankali represent an even more extreme telos. The land based
Oankali settlement will eventually consume all the useful bio-matter on Earth before peeling off
to become a new interstellar ship like the one Lilith wakes up in. Jodahs, the budding ooloi
construct in Imago, explains as much:
We would not be here—the Earth he knew would not be here—for more than a
few centuries. We, Oankali and construct, were a space-going people, as curious
about other life and as acquisitive of it as Humans were hierarchical. Eventually
we would begin the long, long search for a new species to combine with to
construct new lifeforms. Much of Oankali existence was spent in such searches.
We would leave this solar system in perhaps three centuries. I would live to see
the leave-taking myself. And when we broke and scattered, we would leave
behind a lump of stripped rock more like the moon than this blue Earth. He [a
18

I am reminded of my favorite Doctor Who villain/monster, the Weeping Angels. The Angels can only move when
no one is watching them (they look like statues when they are being watched), and they kill their prey by sending
them back in time to, as the Doctor says, “live to death” – that is, live out their normal lifespan but in the past, so
that they are effectively dead by the time the Angels encounter them. They remind me of the Oankali because, while
killers, they do seem to be almost kind about it.

72

human talking to Jodahs] would never know it. To tell him would be a cruelty.
(531)
The irony of this destruction seems lost on the Oankali and their construct descendants: a
healthy, verdant Earth would be home to endless biodiversity, especially over time. Given the
Oankali obsession with “tasting” new form of life, this move seems as self-destructive as the
humans’ nuclear war. If anything, this consumption will mean a more complete annihilation than
the mere extinction-level nuclear winter. For all the salvific overtones of the Oankali, they
actually represent the same thing as humanity: a drive which results in the destruction of Earth.
In terms of genetic engineering, even in the hands of the enlightened engineers, it represents
destruction every bit as significant as that of nuclear weapons.
Notably, Butler introduces this concept in her final book, the only one written in first
person. As I mentioned above, each book in the trilogy is written from a different perspective:
Dawn is in third-person limited omniscient, centered on Lilith’s human female perspective;
Adulthood Rites is similarly limited omniscient, but is told from the perspective of Lilith’s hybrid
human/Oankali son Akin; Imago is written from the doubly hybrid human/Oankali ooloi
perspective of Jodahs, and it is the only book of the trilogy which is narrated in the voice of the
protagonist – an ooloi perspective that Peppers describes as “a cyborg identity which breaks
down the boundaries between human/nonhuman, male/female, and natural/ technological” (60).
Butler’s choice to write the third novel from the perspective of the most alien character but to
narrate it in the most personal form is striking. In doing so she emphasizes the shift from human
to alien, from a humanist ethic to a posthuman one, from a world where genetic engineering is
grotesquely Other to one where it is emphatically Self.
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Shifting focus onto the role of gender in each book, it becomes clear that the whole of
Lilith’s Brood is working towards dramatizing the shift from an origin as human/female to full
cyborg. And, as Slonczewski notes, “[l]ike the slaves and their descendents, Lilith and her
children feel enormous ambivalence about her choice . . . the choice of ‘trading’ with the Oankali
to produce half-human children, or having no family at all” (“Biologist’s Response”). She is torn
between the choices of staying human – even if it means an earlier death, even if it inevitably
leads to apocalypse, even if it entails embracing a “flaw” – or allowing herself and (especially)
her descendants to become something biologically superior but frighteningly unfamiliar. The
second option is presented by the Oankali as an obviously superior one, though Slonczewski
correctly notes the ironic overtones of their offer: “The Oankali lecture her about the superiority
of their egalitarian, nonviolent lifestyle . . . just as Americans told their African slaves they were
fortunate to be rescued from barbarism by their ‘democratic’ masters” (“Biologist’s Response”).
In terms of the discourse on genetic engineering, the choice may be largely the same: embrace
the frighteningly unfamiliar life of genetic modification or perish. What Butler does in Lilith’s
Brood is to shake the foundations of this choice a bit and explore with greater clarity what our
options really are.
This exploration starts in the first book, Dawn. When we are introduced to Lilith she is in
a situation of powerlessness – she awakes, not for the first time, alone in a blank and unfamiliar
room, with no explanation. Her captors/interrogators are frustratingly impossible to read or
manipulate, and Lilith rebels against their restrictions, albeit futilely. In short, she inhabits a
decidedly disadvantaged position, reminiscent of what she may have inhabited as a woman of
color back on Earth, before the apocalypse. Her position is also reminiscent of the position of a
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child: powerless in the face of incomprehensible forces who claim to want what is best for her
(and everyone else) but so different that their authority is never entirely embraced. This reading
is supported by the section’s title: Womb.
Throughout the first book there is a tension between Lilith’s role as a woman and the
change brought about by her existence in a profoundly alien world. True to Haraway’s cyborg
dream, the impending hybridization implied throughout Dawn has an impact on the old gender
roles, although the impact remains slight for the duration of the first book. For instance, after her
release and a period of naturalization, Lilith is introduced to a human male who stays with
another Oankali family (though one is just as tempted to say he is “owned” in the manner of a
pet). The two are left together and ostensibly alone and the man forces himself onto Lilith. For
her, this experience is doubly disturbing; first, of course, there is the shock of sexual aggression,
but there is also the shock of an “old world” problem reappearing.
He stared at her for several seconds and she feared him and pitied him and
longed to be away from him. The first human being she had seen in years and all
she could do was long to be away from him.
Yet it would do no good to fight him physically. She was tall, had always
thought of herself as strong, but he was much bigger—six-four, six-five, and
stocky. (95)
From her initial awakening to this point, Lilith has had no need to fear sexual aggression nor, for
that matter, any male aggression whatsoever. She is relatively helpless to combat the Oankali,
but so are men. Besides that, she has already started to grow accustomed to living in a world
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without men, and (given what happens when she first encounters a man on the Oankali ship) this
situation seems to be clearly superior to the alternative.
In her own way Octavia Butler is painting males (and those aggressive, violent drives for
dominance which are typically associated with masculinity) with the same brush as Slonczewski.
Both even offer an outside force which to menace the masculine and feminine in equal measure –
the Malachite in A Door Into Ocean and the Oankali in Dawn. But Butler complicates the picture
a bit, because her menacing outside authority is the same force which creates the limited utopia
(for Lilith) in the first place. Later, as Lilith is prepared to act as ambassador to newly revived
humans, the Oankali enhance her strength, speed, and ability to heal. In doing this, they render
her physically superior to any normal human (especially including any men) she may encounter.
With this comparatively small change, the Oankali help Lilith take a big step towards
transcending the gender dichotomy. The cost of this change is high, however. Lilith’s first step
toward hybridity – humanity’s first step – renders her disturbingly Other to the newly awoken
humans. Her enhanced strength and constitution render her unfeminine as well as suspiciously
alien. And these humans are not wrong: in altering Lilith’s abilities, the Oankali have taken
Lilith away from her “natural” human state and made her something else.
Throughout the series, humans are placed in a feminized position, whether as the
prisoner, the colonized, the endangered minority, or the sexually controlled. Much of humanity’s
story is premised on a sort of double-apocalypse: first there is the nuclear event on Earth from
which the Oankali rescue the surviving humans; then there is the Oankali decision to strictly
control the fertility of their wards. They declare no humans will be born outside their proscribed
ménage a cinq. It is not clear what form this infertility takes: whether all humans are infertile or
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if only the men or only the women are. It amounts to much the same thing. The only way to
reproduce is to make alien babies – “‘But they won’t be human’ Lilith said, ‘That’s what matters.
You can’t understand, but that is what matters’” (248) – and the result of that would eventually
be the extinction of humans as we know them: “‘You should have known,’ Lilith said. ‘You’ve
had plenty of time to study us. What did you think would happen when you told us you were
going to extinguish us as a species by tampering genetically with our children?” (231). While the
humans do rebel, individually and in groups, their protests are ultimately ineffective. Humans
only regain their reproductive abilities when Akin, an Oankali constructed male, decides to plead
on humanity’s behalf. That is, even though the Oankali do eventually acquiesce to the human
desire for unmediated reproduction (and thus, the potential to carry on humanity in an
unmediated form), they reserved the right to make this decision without input directly from the
humans.
If we believe Foucault that sex “appears as an especially dense transfer point for relations
of power” (103), then the Oankali decision to forcibly limit human reproduction, and thus stake a
claim in controlling human sexuality, plays out like an especially coercive power grab. For
Butler, the power relations surrounding her Oankali are largely tied to their genetic engineering
prowess, and so we once again have a direct link between the literary deployment of genetic
engineering and the complex nexus of power which sexuality represents. From their introduction,
the Oankali are incapable of staying out of humanity’s sexual politics. In Dawn, they coercively
induce humans to experience the ooloi mediated version of sex. In Dawn and Adulthood Rites
humanity is left to its own devices, but unable to reproduce; the Oankali have reserved that right
for themselves, even to the point of denying the human opinion in the matter until Akin – Lilith’s
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son and the focus of Adulthood Rites – comes along. In Imago the arguments are ultimately
rendered moot, as the ooloi narrator, Jodhas, and its sibling develop pheromones which override
the resisting humans’ desire for self-determination. These movements map onto genetic
engineering as a possible course for the praxis: some people (children/babies) are subjected to
genetic manipulation by their parents, 19 and soon the only way to compete in a world of
enhanced abilities is to have your own (or your offspring’s) enhanced. Those who resist this are
increasingly consigned to history, and before long the only way forward will be as genetic posthumans.
Since the Oankali indiscriminately control human reproduction, there would not seem to
be much call for specifically gendered response. Yet, throughout Lilith’s Brood the burden seems
to fall disproportionately on men; at least, men are disproportionally affected by their new place
in the universe. This manifests early on, when some men in Lilith’s group are violently resistant
to Oankali advances. Even when they are seduced, as the first round of survivors is, the
experience maps as especially traumatic for the men. One explanation offered by Lilith is that the
men are unaccustomed to being “taken” – that is, in their sexual encounters with Oankali they
are invariably passive, as are the females, but since this is a new, un-masculine position for the
men, the passivity registers as particularly revolting. As the series progresses, especially in the
second book, we see the issue of infertility become a specific source of aggression in the men.
The Oankali do not render men strictly impotent – there is ample suggestion of a robust
world of sexual encounters across the novels – but what they have done amounts to the same
19

This is what happens, to an extent, in Mawer’s novel when Dr. Lambert selects his offspring. It happens more
explicitly in Oryx and Crake, when Jimmy’s father and step-mother plan on enhancing his prospective sibling. It
also serves as the excuse for Crake’s Paradice project, the project where he engineers the “floor models” of his
genetic posthumans, the Crakers whom he intends to repopulate his devastated world. They are supposedly built as
examples of how sufficiently wealthy humans could enhance their offspring.
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thing. It is a slower, reversible sort of castration (a term I use with Freudian/Lacanian overtones
in mind), but a castration nonetheless. The violent reaction against this is seen clearly in the
men’s rejection of Lilith and her close relationship with the ooloi Nikanj. The humans – unable
to match the wary and enhanced Lilith – kill her lover, Joseph, and severely injure Nikanj
instead. Joseph is lost, and Nikanj is only saved thanks to Lilith’s intervention. Akin, the voice of
Adulthood Rites, is abducted by a group of men in part because he looks “as human as any I’ve
seen since before the war” (308), and there is a suggestion that such abductions are a common
approach to surrogacy in the infertile Oankali world. This practice only ends because Akin, upon
maturity, convinces the Oankali to allow humans a colony on Mars where they can live, die, and
reproduce free from Oankali interference.
Mapping this dynamic back onto our discussion of the ooloi as symbols for genetic
engineering at large, there is a sense here that in submitting to the force of genetic engineering –
however seductive it may be – one must give up yet another aspect of their understanding of the
world, or more specifically, one’s place in that world. In other words, not only does the world of
genetic engineering seem grotesque to the uninitiated, it also places its users in the position of
object – something which is acted upon. This gendering of the science seems to contrast with
what we see in A Door Into Ocean, where biological sciences are explicitly related to the
feminine Sharers and contrasted with the masculine inorganic sciences. However, in
Slonczewski’s novel the genetic engineering allows the inhabitants of Shora to evolve beyond
men in some crucial sense by taking the place of men on Shora – positively in the sense that the
females can still reproduce, negatively in the sense that the Sharers can potentially commit
massively violent acts. But in A Door Into Ocean, the “masculine” potential of genetic
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engineering is deployed by and in service of the women of Shora, and so the negative aspects of
masculinity are somewhat neutered. Margaret Atwood, in her MaddAddam series, takes a
slightly different track with regards to genetics, and aligns it specifically with the forces of the
colonizer, the oppressor, the corporation, and (ultimately) the mad scientist, male wunderkind
Crake. As I will argue in Chapter 5, Atwood envisions genetic engineering (and more
specifically, cloning) as an unwelcome invasion by the masculine forces of science on the
feminine realm of reproduction, thus completing the marginalization of women altogether. In
Lilith’s Brood, genetic engineering (metonymically represented by the ooloi Oankali) has a
similarly masculine flavor, but it is deployed by a third party, a third gender. The effect is to
“feminize” all humans; the implication is that, in the face of such a powerfully disruptive
technology, humans could lose their agency, and that this loss will not go uncontested.
So it makes sense that men tend to have the most violent reactions to their situation in
Lilith’s Brood: they have the most to lose. Lilith, though she feels conflicted about her role,
ultimately aligns with the alien forces. In part this may be because she so embodies what we
could call a classic Western Other role; that is, she is a woman of color, a widow, a mother
without a child, fairly tall and bulky. Put another way, she is a woman who is does not fit well
into any idealized (Western) models of femininity even before she became so closely aligned
with the Oankali. Even though she functions as a sort of ambassador for newly awoken humans –
helping them become acclimated to their new surroundings, training them to survive on a
reconstructed Earth without the aid of modern civilization, and generally answering their
questions – she is treated with hostility and suspicion. Lilith’s first lover Joseph is killed because
of his closeness with Lilith, and thus implicitly because of Lilith’s closeness to the ooloi Nikanj.
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The other humans assume that Lilith and Joseph will soon “betray” their humanity and consent
to the Oankali’s indecent proposal. Of course they have misread Lilith’s own position: as their
guide and ambassador, she does appear to possess a closer relationship with the Oankali, but she
also harbors doubts about the Oankali’s plans. The other humans’ plan backfires, and by killing
Joseph they force the Oankali’s hand.
In the wake of Joseph’s death, Nikanj decides to impregnate Lilith with a child without
asking her consent: “‘You’ll have a daughter,’ it said. ‘And you are ready to be her mother. You
could never have said so. Just as Joseph could never have invited me into his bed—no matter
how much he wanted me there. Nothing about you but your words reject this child’” (246). Here
Nikanj is essentially claiming that Lilith is mistaken in her free will, that biologically she was
giving consent, even if she would never do so intellectually. Nikanj’s claim that “nothing about
you but your words reject this child” serves as a quintessential example of Butler’s “deploy[ment
of] unsettling visions of biological determinism, especially in regard to race and sex” (StickgoldSarah 441). On the one hand, it is difficult to separate what Nikanj does from rape: Lilith was
impregnated without her consent and against her (conscious) will; moreover, it was done at a
moment when she was emotionally venerable. On the other hand, we have Nikanj’s word as to
Lilith’s body’s desire, and of course the alien separation between Oankali and human can at least
somewhat mitigate the violence. For ooloi, genetics and biology speak as forcefully as any words
– they “manipulate DNA as naturally as we manipulate pencils and paintbrushes (167) – and if
they don’t have the same respect for what we consider our free will, neither do humans have
much respect for what their biology tells them.
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Lilith’s reaction to this violation is one of understandable ambivalence. She is angry that
the choice was made for her, and she is uncomfortable with the idea of her children being not
entirely human. But she acts the loving mother nonetheless, eventually birthing a large
contingent of human/Oankali hybrids, including the first male and the first ooloi of the new
hybrid species – the protagonists of the second and third books. This ambivalence sometimes
manifests in the other novels as wanderings and discontent which confuses her children but does
not seem to bother the Oankali:
Lilith had these flares of bitterness sometimes. They never seemed to affect her
behavior, though often they frightened people. Margit had said, “It’s as though
there’s something in her trying to get out. Something terrible.” Whenever the
something seemed on the verge of surfacing, Lilith went alone into the forest and
stayed away for several days. Akin’s oldest sisters said they used to worry that
she would leave and not come back. (274)
The tension between what she has done – or what has been done to her – and her discomfort with
where it will all lead persists through the series. On the one hand, her impregnation all but forces
her to side with the Oankali. By impregnating Lilith, Nikanj has essentially aligned the role of
mother with the role of Other. On the other hand, she never does completely reconcile herself
with the Oankali. Unlike Tino, a new visitor to the Oankali enclave, Lilith “never had a chance to
run off and pine for the good old days!” (273).
It is important that Lilith never really makes the decision to align with the Oankali: from
the beginning she plans escape, and the hope that she will eventually be able to leave the clutches
of the Oankali drives much of her action in the first book. Her closeness to Nikanj in Dawn has
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as much to do with Stockholm Syndrome and pheromones as with an actual meeting of the
minds: “It released her [Lilith], but was not completely focused on her. It had felt her body’s leap
of response to its wordless suggestion—or its chemical suggestion” (187-88). Even after Lilith
has had many children and chosen to live in an Oankali habitation on Earth, she is conflicted.
She only really seems to resolve herself to the life she has once her son Akin ensures that
humanity’s encounter with the Oankali will not mean extinction.
Nikanj does appear to care deeply for Lilith, but this is colored by a deep attraction,
described in somewhat sexual terms. The sexual undertone is made explicit in Adulthood Rites,
when Nikanj encounters Tino:
“Slow,” she [Lilith] whispered. “Give him a moment. Give me a moment.
Don’t defeat your purpose by hurrying.”
For a moment, Nikanj’s lumps looked worse—like some grotesque disease.
Then the lumps resolved themselves again into slender gray body tentacles no
more grotesque than usual. Nakanj drew its sensory arm from Lilith’s hands, then
stood up and went to a far corner of the room. There it sat down and seemed
almost to turn itself off. Like something carved from gray marble, it became
utterly still. Even its head and body tentacles ceased to move.
“What was all that?” Tino demanded.
Lilith smiled broadly. “For the first time in my life, I had to tell it to be
patient. If it were Human, I would say it was infatuated with you.”
“You’re joking!”
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“I am,” she said. “This is worse than infatuation. I’m glad you feel something
for it, too, even though you don’t yet know what.” (293)
Although the Oankali are distant and alien through much of the first book, and although they
assume an air of superiority based, in part, on their superior understanding of biology (thanks to
genetics), their project is ultimately colored by the very unscientific emotions of lust. Like Lilith,
Tino is predisposed to cancer, and cancer is apparently a novel condition which the Oankali had
never encountered before. It is thanks to the “example” of Lilith’s cancer that Nikanj is able to
reattach its injured tentacles near the end of Dawn. Because the ooloi experience much of the
biological universe through “tastes” of molecular structures, people like Lilith register as
extremely attractive. Lilith understands this herself, and she tries to describe it to Tino:
“So that’s it. That’s why Nikanj is so attracted to you. Cancer killed three close
relatives of mine, including my mother. I’m told it would have killed me if the
Oankali hadn’t done some work on me. It’s a filthy disease to us, but to the
Oankali it’s the tool they’ve been looking for for generations.”
“What will it do to me that has to do with cancer?”
“Nothing. It just finds you a lot more attractive than it does most Humans.
What can you do with a beautiful woman that you can’t do with an ugly one?
Nothing. It’s just a matter of preference. Nikanj and every other Oankali already
have all the information they need to use what they’ve learned from us. Even the
constructs can use it once they’re mature. But people like you and me are still
attractive to them.”
“I don’t understand that.”
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“Don’t worry about it. I’m told our children will understand them, but we
won’t.” (294-95)
Note that Tino is being approached and appraised much in the same way as objectified women
often are: his value to the ooloi is very much tied to his physical (well, molecular) attractiveness
and his reproductive potential. Since he was raised mostly post-apocalypse, Tino does not seem
unduly put off by the gender implications. But this does serve as further evidence that, at least in
terms of contemporary gender roles, all humans are placed in a feminized position, with the
third-gendered ooloi mostly occupying masculine positions.
Butler does not make the ooloi explicitly masculine, however. Kahguyaht, the ooloi of
Lilith’s adoptive Oankali family, and parent of Nikanj, notes that, originally: “I didn’t want to
accept you, Lilith. Not for Nikanj or for the work you’ll do. I believed that because of the way
human genetics were expressed in culture, a human male should be chosen to parent the first
group. I think now that I was wrong” (111). Or as Jessie Stickgold-Sarah puts it: “A woman, in
short, is closer to the Oankali ideal of a parent. Lilith's ultimate success in working with the
group indicates, narratively, that this is the right choice” (422), thus the Oankali and ooloi ideals
are implicitly aligned with femininity. The Oankali are also wary of human males. Adulthood
Rites takes place some thirty years after Dawn, and its protagonist Akin is the first human-born
hybrid-Oankali male to be attempted. “Be content, Lilith. One group of us believed it would be
best to dispense with Human-born males altogether. We could construct female children for
Human females and male children for Oankali females. We’ve done that until now” (259). The
shift, from Kahguyaht’s belief in the superiority of males to the Oankali reluctance to construct
any human-born males represents a subtle commentary on both the fundamental nature of males
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and the place of men in contemporary society. The human flaw is suggested to be a trickier fix in
males than in females. This seems to have given men a cultural advantage, until they blew
everything up.
This may relate back to the nature of the “human contraction”: the first of the two
incompatible traits is described as intelligence – “That’s the newer of the two characteristics, and
the one you might have put to work to save yourselves. You are potentially one of the most
intelligent species we’ve found, though your focus is different from ours. Still, you had a good
start in the life sciences, and even in genetics” (39). The second of these traits is described thus:
“You are hierarchical. That’s the older and more entrenched characteristic. We saw it in your
closest animal relatives and in your most distant ones. It’s a terrestrial characteristic. When
human intelligent served it instead of guiding it, when human intelligence did not even
acknowledge it as a problem, but took pride in it or did not notice it at all. . . . That was like
ignoring cancer. I think your people did not realize what a dangerous thing they were doing”
(39). There is an implicit suggestion that men are closer to this contradiction than women; not
that they are more intelligent, but more hierarchical, more likely to embrace the destructive side
of the equation. Indeed, Akin in specifically described as: “less Human than your daughters”
(254), which, it is suggested, is how the Oankali “solved” the problem of the human-born
males. 20
This reluctance to engage with the male aspects of humanity is reflected in A Door Into
Ocean’s all female society which, though not apparently bigoted towards men, bred them out of
20

There is some suggestion in the text that children born to humans are more human, children born to Oankali are
more Oankali, although at maturity they would more or less converge. The challenge with Akin is, apparently,
making a human male who is human enough for Lilith to bear but not so human as to inherit the destructive
humanness which males seem to possess in greater abundance.
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existence millennia ago. It is also noted in Mawer’s Mendel’s Dwarf that the single biggest factor
in committing crime is the possession of “a Y chromosome. Not the possession of an extra
chromosome, but the possession of just one. It is the simple fact of being male” (144), an ironic
view that is nevertheless scientifically valid – though a modern scholar would probably note that
testosterone, rather than sex or gender in general, is the more likely culprit. 21 Regardless, the
reluctance of Oankali to attempt creating male constructs suggests that there is something
particularly troublesome about the Y-chromosome. And, ironically, for all the uncertainty
surrounding Akin, he is born looking more human than any construct before him. He is
kidnapped and ultimately raised by humans in a Resister colony in large part because he looks so
much like the human child which they have been denied. Eventually he acts as a force for
reconciliation, negotiating for a human colony on Mars free from the Oankali-induced infertility.
Of all the characters in the series, Akin probably does the most unambiguous good, restoring to
the flawed humans a sense of agency and futurity, and thus ending the violent human resistance.
This irony is intentional, because it dramatically highlights the limitations of genetic
engineering to solve all problems in an ethical manner. Though the male construct may be the
least desirable from the Oankali perspective, it is also the one which ultimately helps humanity to
reach some sort of recovery point, some level of freedom. The ooloi are one of Butler’s cleverer
creations because they give a separate and profoundly alien face to genetic engineering praxis
while nevertheless emphasizing the fundamentally embodied nature of the praxis. She shows
21

Indeed, according to Paul Zak in his TED talk (www.ted.com/talks/paul_zak_trust_morality_and_oxytocin.html),
testosterone is associated with aggression and a desire to be hierarchically on top, while oxytocin seems to be
associated with a sense of well being and empathy (leading Dr. Zak to call it the “moral molecule”). Both hormones
can be found in abundance in the members of successful sports teams; they are aggressive enough to win but
cohesive enough to function as a good team. Since men generally have more in the way of testosterone production, it
may be that testosterone is the key to apparent behavioral manifestations of sexual dimorphism, more than any
fundamental element of genetic destiny.
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that, like all technology, genetic engineering is not so much a force for good or ill as it is just a
force; and it perhaps overstates the case to say the Lilith’s Brood is focusing on the limitations of
genetic engineering: it focuses on the limitations of genetic engineers to use the technology for
good. Throughout Dawn, Butler emphasizes the frustrating aspects of being saved by a truly
alien species, from the merely annoying (bad food, inability to open doors) to the far more
troubling (seizure of reproductive rights, forced impregnation). Akin represents a challenge to
the Oankali in part because the “human contraction” – the way humans often place intelligence
in the service of hierarchy – seems to manifest more strongly in male humans. And yet, nowhere
in the novels is there a truly comprehensive account as to why hierarchy is such a bad thing. The
canny premise, the nuclear “humanicide,” as Butler calls it, seems to give the truth of Oankali
claims without the need for more rigorous defense. And yet the whole raison d’être of the
Oankali is to spread forth and diversify – genetically and culturally. Not only is their superiority
questionable, the Oankali know it. Certainly, much of the Oankali groping in the beginning
sounds torturous, even if this was not the Oankali’s intention; their unwillingness to respond to
Lilith elevate her sense of confinement and hopelessness, while in their mind no response was
appropriate. For all their understanding of human physiology, the Oankali lack a fundamental
understanding of human psychology. So while the denial of a human future is done on the basis
of an Oankali certainty that humans are hopelessly flawed and ultimately self-destructive, it is
nevertheless cruel. And, whatever the Oankali’s reputed intelligence, it clearly functions in thrall
to their biological need to “trade” with foreign species – a need which seems to be of a type with
humanity’s need to establish hierarchies. The result of the Oankali drive is, ultimately, identical
to the human drive: the end of humanity. It simply takes longer. So there is an implicit warning
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in the Oankali: do not presume your technological advances are necessarily matched by
equivalent ethical ones.
By embodying the technology in an alien species – an alien gender of an alien species, at
that – Butler emphasizes both that genetic engineering is an embodied (and embodying)
technology, and that it is fundamentally strange. Throughout the series, but especially in Dawn,
the forces of genetic engineering are explicitly alien. The reaction of humans to the profoundly
alien Oankali is initially one of revulsion. This despite the fact that the Oankali have manipulated
themselves to better resemble anthropods; if anything, the uncanny closeness of these aliens to
human forms serves to heighten the disgust: “‘You should notice,’ he said, ‘that what you
probably see as hair isn’t hair at all. I have no hair. The reality seems to bother humans’”
(Lilith’s Brood 13). The disgust described is almost instinctual: “‘Relax from your unnatural
position and let’s see what happens.’ He hesitated, then let his tentacles flow free. The grotesque
sea-slug appearance resumed and she could not stop herself from stumbling away from him in
panic and revulsion” (26). Even when the alien creatures are accepted, or at least, cease to
provoke outright disgust, Lilith finds the genetic-modifying sensory arms of the ooloi offputting. This disgust is balanced against the tremendous gains offered by the Oankali: no pain,
no cancer, improved strength and healing capabilities, longer life, better memory (the merits of
this one are debatable – forgetfulness can be a valuable tool as well), and so on. Yet the Oankali
are nonetheless rejected by many humans—especially men.
In the second book, Akin wonders at one of the sick humans who abducted him: “Why
didn’t they find an ooloi? How could they just let their friend bleed? He might bleed too much
and die” (326). In Imago, the third and final book, Jodahs encounters an isolated enclave of
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humans who discovered early on that some of their number could reproduce. The cause of this
“miracle” is a subtle genetic defect the Oankali chose not to alter, which manifests as a terrible
recessive disease in the later generations – recessive but ubiquitous because of the constant
(unavoidable) inbreeding. Jodahs is able to instantly fix all of the disease’s ravages, and Jodahs’
older and more experienced ooloi ancestors would have been even more capable; but the short,
painful, disfiguring lives were considered a small cost compared to mating with the Oankali.
These are conflicted moments, by any measure. Certainly most readers feel the tragedy of the
situation, the closeness of relief pitted against the injustice of the Oankali’s (benevolent)
oppression. For Akin, the experience is instructive, and it informs his later decision to press for a
separate human enclave: the disgust some humans feel at the prospect of sharing the Oankali
plan is stronger than a fear of pain or even death. This, he sees, invalidates the Oankali dogma
(deeply felt though it may be, even by the construct Akin) that the humans are fatally flawed and
that the only moral option is to ‘trade’ with them all.
It is not just the genetic engineers who are grotesque. Those who are genetically modified
become increasingly alien as well. Lilith starts the trend, giving up some small part of her
humanity in exchange for superior strength and longevity. She suffers for this decision, even if
she was by most accounts a perfect candidate already. Her offspring continue the trend. Though
Akin is extremely human looking as a child, he is not completely “normal”: his eidetic memory
and inhuman cognition mean he remembers his time in the womb with clarity, and can
communicate with his adult abductors with adult-like fluency, something which they find very
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disconcerting; 22 he has light-sensitive spots around his body which will eventually become the
eye-like tentacles which feature so prominently on Oankali; and his tongue serves as his Oankali
genetic sensory organ for “tasting” cellular structures. However, like all construct children, he
experiences a significant physical change upon reaching maturity which leaves him looking
much more Oankali than he did previously. During his time with the human abductors, Akin
meets two sibling constructs who are more obviously constructs – they have tentacles on their
bodies and head – and he has to talk his captors out of attempting to surgically “fix” them. Even
with his warning of the children’s lethal sting reflex and the ethical pleas of some of the captors,
a contingent is determined to amputate.
The disgust that the humans feel is emblematic of typical real-world reactions to the
implementation of genetic engineering. Look, for instance, at Margaret Atwood’s grotesque
description of the headless “Chickie-Nob” creatures, or the public outcry in America to the idea
of genetically modified animals. The Oankali are initially disgusting to humans at a level beneath
cognition; it takes a tremendous force of will for most humans to even bear the presence of an
Oankali at first, much less touch one. Eventually, though, many humans do overcome their
disgust and learn to live with the Oankali, even if they never quite embrace them. In terms of
genetic engineering, this suggests what seems to have been a very accurate representation of
people’s reaction to genetic engineering potentially leaving the laboratory and entering their lives
22

Akin find this fact hard to understand at first, but he soon realizes that “Human beings talked to trees and rivers
and boats and insects the way they talked to babies” (327). He soon remembers some advice which Lilith gave him:
“Humans fear difference. . . . Oankali crave difference. Humans persecute their different ones, yet they need them to
give themselves definition and status. Oankali seek difference and collect it. They need it to keep themselves from
stagnation and overspecialization” (329). This leads him to strike a deal with the kidnapper: “I will be valuable to
you . . . All I have to do is be quiet. Then you can be rid of me and I can be rid of you” (329). These two tendencies
–the human and the Oankali – reflect the dual nature of genetic engineering: it enables the creation of tremendous
(unnatural) differences by reducing the origins of this difference down to one common language: DNA. It
universalizes and disrupts in the same movement.
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(and pantries): a gut-level rejection, without apparent recourse to rationality. In part, this could
be due to the disruption of previously settled notions of what is “natural” and what is not. Having
structured our concepts of “self” and “Other” along the lines of “culture” and “nature,” the
merging of what we once considered nature with the intentionality of our rational culture casts so
much in doubt that it is easier to just reject the change.
The way this dynamic unfolds in Lilith’s Brood could suggest that while the fruits of
genetic engineering may initially seem difficult to accept, the benefits will eventually outweigh
the creepiness and we will slowly learn to embrace the new technology. However, Butler
complicates this in a few ways. First, as noted above, none among the humans – ideal candidate
Lilith included – ever really embrace their brave new world. Those who throw in with the
Oankali seem as much consigned to it as anything else, and large numbers never join up. Second,
the acceptance of these alien Others does not necessarily come from (or only from) a place of
growing understanding and acceptance. Rather, (or concurrently), the Oankali are capable of
inducing tremendous pleasure in their partners, and bonds are formed through pheromones which
cast some doubt as to the free-will and self-aware judgment of any who choose to accept the
Oankali lifestyle. The relationship between human and Oankali (especially human and ooloi)
resembles nothing so much as a drug addiction, something Lilith’s first lover, Joseph, brings up:
“Is it . . . like a drug?” (170). Lilith denies this, but she and the other awoken humans are
nonetheless easily sated or aroused by the ooloi. At first, this addiction is fairly unsophisticated:
Lilith feels a bond with her ooloi, but she is troubled nonetheless. Resisting humans can be
pacified, but doing so requires direct contact and a constant flow of chemicals. By the end of the
third book, this all reaches ambiguous new levels.
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Jodahs, another of Lilith’s children and protagonist of Imago, unexpectedly matures as an
ooloi, becoming even less human than its older siblings. In the process, Jodahs becomes the first
construct to fully merge a human ancestry with the heights of Oankali genetic understanding and
manipulation. A descendant of Lilith, Jodahs has the cancer “talent” which, in its capable ooloi
construct hands, translates to an unparalleled ability to shape shift. But this ability comes at a
cost: Jodahs’ sibling Aaor also matures as an ooloi but unlike Jodahs does not meet some
humans when it does so. As a result, its shape shifting leads it almost to a complete selfdissolution: it needs to bond with some humans. When it finally does, it can solidify its shape
easily. Thus Aaor, Jodahs, and the painfully disfigured human siblings Tomás and Jesusa track
back to the isolated human village to find new mates for Aaor. These humans, living for more
than a century on the belief that Oankali were evil and revolting (they did not know of the human
colonies on Mars) are initially hostile but quickly come around, in many cases as if against their
own will:
“You’ve done this to me,” he said. “I would have gone to Mars.”
I said nothing.
“I can’t even hate you,” he whispered. “My god, if there had been people like
you around a hundred years ago, I couldn’t have become a resister. I think there
would be no resisters.” He stared at me a moment longer. “Damn you,” he said
slowly, sadly. “Goddamn you.” He walked past me and went to Ahajas and the
waiting Oankali family. (740).
Butler makes clear that the cause of the miraculous change of heart is pheromonal: “As you said
once, pheromones” (740). One particularly violent village member seems unpersuaded by their
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arguments, mainly (they realize) because his nose is broken and so he is immune to their
pheromones. Once they repair his nose, he falls into line. Representing the ultimate union of
human and Oankali – humanity and genetic engineering – Jodahs and Aaor overcome the
humans’ disgust, reluctance, and (apparently) free will.
To return to our guiding questions, Lilith’s Brood suggests that living in an environment
entirely of our own creation is part paradise, part purgatory. The Oankali’s living ships are
peaceful, abundant, and eminently changeable to suit the whims of their inhabitants – a veritable
clean, well-lighted place for a civilization to exist. But humans in the Oankali habitations must
compromise some small part of their humanity or be utterly incapable of exerting any influence
on their environment. Thus, control comes with a price of conformity. And, of course, it comes
at the cost of challenge in general; too much comfort may ultimately be as bad for a civilization
as too little. To live in such a totally mediated environment we just give up something of the
challenge which helps shape us all as human. But that is not all: since the ships are both
biological and ravenous, they require something like the Oankali to exist, and come at the cost of
our natural planet and all its biodiversity.
Ultimately, Lilith’s Brood suggests that genetic engineering comes at the cost of nothing
less than our humanity, and possibly our free will. ‘Possibly’ because those who lose their choice
only lose it in one regard, the ability to resist the siren cyborg’s song of Oankali hybridization,
and there is plenty of reason to think that their post-human children will retain it. Certainly,
Lilith’s children (her Brood) have maintained their free will, with some (Akin, for instance)
going so far as to buck conventional wisdom and shape a new world. As Jessie Stickgold-Sarah
suggest, these texts are often seen in terms of biological determinism. This is appropriate given
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both the human pension for self-destruction and the Oankali pension for Borg-like assimilation
of others. But it also seems besides the point; if we are biologically determined to apocalypse,
then, Butler seems to suggest, we will just have to change our biology. The gains are the same as
what Haraway identifies in her manifesto: permanently partial identities ending ages of
oppression and the “hierarchies” which the Oankali find so disturbing. An end to suffering seems
possible, too. But the cost is extreme.
What this means for Butler’s position on genetic engineering is not clear. So when Jessie
Stickgold-Sarah declares this vision a “pessimistic utopia,” the epithet fits. At the end a sort of
utopia is achieved, a world where no one will ever have to suffer from human ailments ever
again. But before reaching that point humanity self-destructs; all along the path to that point is
violent and (largely) pointless resistance; finally reaching that point entails nothing short of the
elimination of human free-will; and the consequences of such a utopia is, ultimately, the end of
humanity as we know it. But I do not think Lilith’s Brood is best described as utopian. Its ending
recalls the end of Haraway’s famous manifesto: “I’d rather be a cyborg than a goddess” (181).
From the beginning the destruction of humanity is a foregone conclusion: nuclear apocalypse (or
if not that, something else, inevitably) leads to “humanicide” and the Oankali are torn on whether
to interfere or let us just go crazy and die. They decide to interfere, and all along the way
humanity’s demons flourish, resulting in plenty of kidnapping and death. The only way forward
for a fatally flawed humanity is a conditional extinction: we must give up the goddess; we must
embrace hybridity even if it is not as human as we all might wish to be. So while “pessimist
utopia” fits, it is also a bit of a misreading. Lilith’s Brood is no utopia: it is a tale of the end of
the world, and the end of humankind as we know it. And for all of that it is not relentlessly grim.
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There is a note of hope in her story. If humanity is doomed to destruction, at least there is
something after. So, with apologies to Ms. Stickgold-Sarah, I would call these books an
Optimistic Apocalypse.
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CHAPTER 4: MENDEL’S DWARF: GENETIC PATERNITY AND THE
REAL WORLD
Understanding the distinction between what counts as science fiction and what does not
is important for understanding how Mawer’s novel differs from the others in my thesis, and thus
how his deployment of the literary tropes of genetic engineering differ. From the early “scientific
romances” and “scientific fantasies” of H. G. Wells to the contemporary disavowals of Margaret
Atwood’s preferred appellation “speculative fiction,” the genre broadly called “Science Fiction”
has a history of being difficult to define. This definitional instability is not unique to science
fiction – as Atwood says “it’s like every other form of literature: genres may look hard and fast
from a distance, but up close it’s nailing jelly to a wall” (“Aliens” 513). But it does seem to get
more play in sf scholarship than in studies of other genres. Take, for instance, Jonathon Lethem’s
Village Voice article “Close Encounters: The Squandered Promise of Science Fiction” where he
imagines a contrafactual world where Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow had won the 1973
nebula instead of Arthur C. Clarke’s Rendezvous With Rama. This moment, Lethem (an author
of both sf and mainstream novels himself) contends, was an inflection point in the polarization of
“science fiction” and “literary fiction” which could have heralded a literary mainstreaming of the
genre, but instead stands as a “tombstone marking the death of the hope that science fiction was
about to merge with the mainstream” (Lethem, quoted in Kelly 7). 23 This distinction between

23

The quote I use can be found in James Kelly’s wonderful collection The Secret History of Science Fiction. This
collection contends that Lethem is generally correct, except, “at the same time that, on one side of the genre divide,
sf was being written at the highest levels of ambition, on the other side, writers came to use the materials of sf for
their own purposes, writing fiction that is clearly science fiction, but not identified by that name” (8). I find this
thesis persuasive.
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science fiction and mainstream fiction persists, both as a marketing reality and a structuring
decision of this thesis.
This chapter stands as something of an aberration in my thesis as a whole: it is not a
science fiction text, not even in the broadest sense. It also represents a significant jump in time
from the first two works I study. Mawer is writing in the mid-1990s, and while some of what he
describes may have read as rank sf in the mid-1980s, by the time he was writing it was all
science fact. I chose this novel because it offers an interesting counter reading to the more solidly
sf works: since he is working with ideas drawn from contemporary science and technology,
Mawer is crafting a much less speculative text. Yet he nevertheless focuses on many of the same
issues which drive Slonczewski, Butler, and Atwood. Genetic engineering ultimately leads
Mawer to dwell on many of the same ethical questions that we find (examined or otherwise) in
more fantastic texts; he simply casts them in a more mundane or microcosmic light. The actual
existence of genetic engineering (versus its mere possibility or the idea that it may someday be
possible) ironically makes genetics less of an issue in and of itself; rather, it becomes yet another
vector to discuss other, more timeless issues: nature vs. nurture; self vs. Other; disability vs.
normativity; adultery, faithlessness, love; and the illusion of control.
Up to now this thesis has focused on science fiction texts. Both Slonczewski and Butler
are considered fully sf authors, with Butler standing out as one of the field’s most notable
figures. In this chapter we move to Simon Mawer’s Mendel’s Dwarf and into a new genre, one
that can be found under “Literature” at the local bookstore. In the next chapter we look at
Margaret Atwood’s first two MaddAddam books which are similarly filed under literature,
despite their strongly sf themes. But, beyond bookstore designations (and the marketing tactics
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they represent) it is not immediately clear why Mawer’s book would be classified differently.
Many definitions of science fiction fit Mawer’s story as well as they fit a given episode of Star
Trek. His story of geneticist and achondroplastic dwarf Benedict Lambert is centrally concerned
with “scientific or technological change” (Gunn, The Road to Science Fiction 1). The story is
both about science and centrally concerned with the implications of scientific developments.
Like A Door Into Ocean and Lilith’s Brood, genetics plays a central role in the plot, conflict, and
resolution. Like Slonczewski and Butler, Mawer makes use of genetics to craft a tale of ethical
exploration. Even more so that the sf authors, Mawer’s ethical dilemma is a direct product of the
science and technology of genetics. So why is Mendel’s Dwarf not science fiction? It is fiction,
and science plays a critical role in the story.
Perhaps one of the most common themes is the sub-literary status of sf in the eyes of
many readers – evidenced by sf’s banishment to a special, shared Science Fiction/Fantasy ghetto
in most book outlets. The denigrating association of the terms goes back at least to originators
like H. G. Wells, who “makes them [Wells’ ‘scientific fantasies’] out to be slighter in substance
or more tendentious in tone than the serious reader coming upon them now would find them”
(Philmus 530). The shift to literary fiction represents a mainstreaming of genetic engineering
compared to its place a decade before; it is becoming a valid theme for books set in our mundane
world. For all of science fiction’s marginalization, though, there is considerably less scholarship
on Mawer than on either Slonczewski or Butler (and Atwood seems to have a veritable
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exegetical industry built up around her work), suggesting that genetic engineering in mundane
plots may be less academically respectable than the same issues in sf novels. 24
Of course, defining sf is a tricky proposition; the range of definitions is considerable.
Joanna Russ, for instance, categorizes the genre thus: “Science fiction is What If literature. All
sorts of definitions have been proposed by people in the field, but they all contain both The What
If and The Serious Explanation; that is science fiction shows things not as they characteristically
or habitually are but as they might be, and for this ‘might be’ the author must offer a rational,
serious, consistent explanation, one that does not (in Samuel Delany’s phrase) offend against
what is known to be known” (32). Other famous sf authors too have variously defined their
genre in terms of materialism – “Materialistic cause and effect; the universe conceived as
comprehensible object of exploration and exploitation; multiculturalism; multispeciesism;
evolutionism; entropy; technology conceived as intensive industrial development, permanently
developing in the direction of complexity, novelty, and importance; the idea of gender, race,
behavior, belief as culturally constructed; the consideration of mind, person, personality, and
body as objects of investigation and manipulation; such fundamental assumptions of various
sciences or of the engineering mind underlie and inform the imagery and the discourse of science
fiction” (Le Guin 23) – or discourse communities – “[W]e must think of literature and science
fiction not as two different sets of labeled texts, but as two different sets of values, two different
24

This marginalization of science fiction may very well be decreasing, as respected writers like Atwood – in The
Handmaid’s Tale as well as her MaddAddam books – Cormac McCarthy with The Road, Nick Harkaway with The
Gone-Away World, Jeanette Winterson with Stone Gods, Kazuo Ishiguro with Never Let Me Go, and others who
come from a literary background find fertile grounds in those themes, topics, and forms which were once mostly
associated with sf genre-fiction. It may also decrease as canonical figures (e.g., Kurt Vonnegut, Thomas Pynchon)
who straddle that boundary are incorporated into the academic sf canon. Evidence of this marginalization may also
be evident in the fact that these authors are nonetheless marketed as literary authors, regardless of whether their
work could count as sf, and many of them actively decry any attempt to label their work as sf. With Atwood, this
distinction is particularly interesting; more on that in Chapter Five.
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ways of response, two different ways of making texts make sense, two different ways of
reading—or what one academic tradition would call two different discourses (and the meaning of
discourse here is not simply explanation, but rather a range of understanding that involves
certain characteristic utterances: the larger process that allows explanations to be and be a part
of). The encounter, then, is between two discourses, science fiction and literature, and it is won
or lost through pleasure and use” (Delany 102). Thus, to answer the question posed above in
terms of Delany’s discourse community, Mendel’s Dwarf is not science fiction because it is
neither presented nor received as science fiction.
But the shift from sf to literary is perhaps best captured by Darko Suvin’s definition of sf
as “a literary genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the presence and interaction of
estrangement and cognition, and whose main formal device is an imaginative framework
alternative to the author’s empirical environment” (8-9). Perhaps what distinguishes Mendel’s
Dwarf from sf, what elevates it out of the sf ghetto, is that the plot is constructed as a character
study revolving around the ethical implications of one man’s use of genetic information. In this
sense, while the science is central to Mawer’s story, it is less central to the ethical questions than
the many choices of Benedict Lambert. And indeed, while genetics enables Dr. Lambert to do
some of the things he does, the plot is propelled by an adulterous relationship and an ironically
symmetrical family history as much as any scientific advancements. And, of course, the science
which Mawer uses all actually exists. First published in 1997, Mawer fictionally reimagines a
1994 discovery of the FGFR3 gene’s link to dwarfism by Dr. John J. Wasmuth. The selection of
fertilized eggs, while deeply unethical, would have also been within the realm of a reality where
in vitro fertilization is standard practice.
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I bring up this whole issue of generic definition now because these definitional
distinctions are, in fact, critically important to any study of genetics and genetic engineering in
literature. Slonczewski and Butler were writing in the mid-1980s, a good four decades after the
discovery of the structure of DNA, in a time when genetic sequencing was just starting to be
well-developed enough that it could yield clinical results, but before any serious applications of
genetic engineering had been accomplished. Mawer, working not much more than a decade later,
was writing in a context of significant genetic discoveries (such as the genetic causes of
dwarfism) and accomplishments (such as Dolly, the first successfully cloned mammal). In fact,
Mawer explicitly experienced this while writing the book: “As I began to research the book, and
as my dwarf protagonist made his first acerbic observations on life, I learned that reality was
catching up with me: the gene for achondroplasia had just been located on the short arm of
chromosome 4, and the precise detail of the mutation revealed” (“Gestation”). In this period
genetic engineering was making the subtle but crucial shift from “on the horizon” to “here,” and
its place in literature shifted accordingly. Or as Veronica Hollinger puts it: “The story goes like
this: many of us who live in technoculture have come to experience the present as a kind of
future at which we've inadvertently arrived, one of the many futures imagined by science fiction.
We apprehend a version of the future in the features of the contemporary science-fictional
moment. . . . There is not much distance anymore between the facticity of realism and the
subjunctivity of science fiction” (452). Put another way, the science in Mendel’s Dwarf is not
fiction; genetics has come of age.
It is appropriate, then, that Mendel’s Dwarf is structured partly as an historical novel. The
great-great-great nephew of the father of genetics, Georg Mendel, main character Dr. Benedict
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Lambert suffers from achondroplasia, a genetic condition which leads to dwarfism. The novel
presents two parallel stories: Mendel’s discovery of the fundamentals of genetics and Lambert’s
quest to find the genetic causes of his condition. The title is a sort of double entendre referring
to: (1) the dwarf pea plants which Mendel cultivated, and whose lineages and proportions were a
key factor in helping Mendel unlock the secrets of genetic inheritance; and (2) intellectual and
biological Mendel descendant Dr. Lambert, whose own dwarfism operates according to the same
genetic rules as Mendel’s original pea plants. The parallel stories appropriately reflect the course
of many scientific achievements, from origins in clever, dedicated observation to their
embodiment in real-world applications, and real life anxiety about what it all means.
More broadly, these two storylines encapsulate the shift of genetics from a passive (if
growing) body of knowledge to an active form of knowledge. One of my favorite axioms in the
story, which I noted in the introduction, comes apocryphally from Ernest Rutherford: “Science is
physics; or it is stamp collecting” (222). I suggested that science of the first kind (what cheeky
Mr. Rutherford calls “physics”) is defined by its rigorous rationality, which is to say math, and
indeed I do believe that is what Rutherford is suggesting. But in the context of modern science
this comes up a bit short: there are no branches which are immune to mathematical methods, and
yet the distinction does still hold somewhat. For instance, the structure of DNA as determined by
Watson and Crick was determined by analyzing the two-dimensional shadow which DNA cast.
The method which generated the shadow was an achievement in itself, and was the closest
science could then come to visualizing object at that scale. It took an act of creativity and math to
determine the three dimensional structure which could cast such a shadow. But this advancement
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did not lead in any direct way to actionable knowledge. There were still decades of passive datacollection before more active knowledge could be obtained.
In quoting Ernest Rutherford, Dr. Lambert sardonically suggests that his work is little
more than stamp collecting: he may use tremendously sophisticated techniques to find his
“stamps” but he is nevertheless simply collecting and sorting information. His self-deprecation
has an edge: as an achondroplasic dwarf he is, in essence, studying himself. But identifying the
culpable gene does not allow Dr. Lambert to change anything about himself; for him that
knowledge is fundamentally passive. Perhaps, after decades accruing this sort of knowledge,
coupled with decades of bio-engineering advances, some praxis may emerge which would enable
some meaningful therapy. Even then, assuming Dr. Lambert is still alive and healthy enough for
massive medical intervention, it is hard to fathom the consequences of changing something so
fundamental after early childhood development. More likely such therapy would only be
effective for fetuses and young children.
Like Mendel’s first realization of the genetic nature of inheritance, Dr. Lambert’s
discovery can help only future generations. For most research scientists this is simply the cost of
doing business, and the knowledge is valuable/desirable in its own right. But for Dr. Lambert
there is a sense of futility in all of this. His interest in genetics arose from his condition, as well
as his interest in his famous great-great-great uncle. Such a motivation is eminently
understandable, as if he models his life’s work off the Greek aphorism “know thyself.” But the
knowledge is too specific, too basic to have any effect on Benedict Lambert. There is something
poetic in this premise: the futility of self-knowledge, the emotional sacrifice of basic research;
and a faith in the scientific endeavor that such work will someday help change the world. But, of
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course, there is more to the premise of Mendel’s Dwarf: the first chapter opens with Dr. Lambert
speaking to a crowd at the Mendel Symposium, and closes with him talking on the phone with a
woman who is about to deliver his child.
Thus the sardonic edge to Dr. Lambert’s assertion: his work may not affect his condition
much, but it has given him the opportunity to do something he had previously not thought
possible; namely, father a child. To be clear, he is not incapable of having children, but any
natural born child of his would have a fifty percent change of carrying the mutant gene and thus
suffering from achondroplasia. His appearance also makes life difficult for him socially. As a
child he was often singled out. Girls were never interested in him, or at least that is how he sees
it: “Let me tell you a joke. He who has sides to split, prepare to split them now. When I was still
an undergraduate, I thought a girl had fallen in love with me. A normal girl, I mean” (47). His
prospects for children already socially limited, the heritability of Dr. Lambert’s condition
effectively renders fatherhood a near-impossibility, at least in his own eyes. 25 But more than that,
he is marked by his appearance, his stature, and proportions as Other, or as he would put it,
phenotypically abnormal.
This physical marking is significant, and it shows up in each of the novels I survey. In
Slonczewski’s A Door Into Ocean the Sharers all have a bluish hue to their skin, a hue which is a
result of genetically engineered bacteria, and thus a mark of their genetic engineering as a whole.
For the Valans – characters which are essentially identical to Earth humans in their appearance
25

There are many counterexamples about the social stigma of dwarfism documented on the Little People of
America’s website, to name just one place. For Dr. Benedict being a dwarf is identical to being unlovable. I must
admit that upon first reading the novel dwarfism seemed like a terrible fate, and thus the conflicted ethics of
selecting against dwarfism seemed a bit more straight-forward. It is only in the course of researching dwarfism and
reading positive testimonials that I realized the case was hardly so straight forward. Chalk it up to persuasive writing
on Mawer’s part, or my own phenotypically-normal bias; I am not sure which is culpable. Suffice it to say, dwarfism
may not be a lamentable life, but for Dr. Lambert, being a dwarf is a terrible fate indeed.
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and many of their manners – this hue marks the Sharers as Other. For the Sharers, this hue marks
them as human, and the lack of it signals Otherness. In both cases visible identity cues are
directly associated with genetic engineering (or the lack thereof). In Butler’s Lilith’s Brood
genetic engineering is similarly associated with Otherness, with the grotesque appearance of the
Oankali aliens, their profoundly unfamiliar (de-familiar?) third sexed ooloi, and the visibly
different “construct” human/Oankali hybrids which populate the later books. In other words, she
explicitly and consistently associates genetic engineering with some readily recognizable visible
distinction. Atwood, too, associates genetic engineering with visually grotesque hybrids: her
genetic engineers may be “normal” looking people; the semi-fantastical chimeras they produced
are decidedly not. So it is fitting that in Mawer’s novel genetic engineering is similarly marked
by a visible Otherness even though this distinction is not necessary in any practical sense. The
lead scientist of the real-world team that identified the FGFR3 gene mutation was an average
looking man. Most scientists, whether they work in cutting edge genetics or high energy particle
physics or Cetacean biology, are not visibly marked as Other, except perhaps by questionable
fashion decisions. 26
So it is especially notable that Mawer chose to center the modern-day portion of his
genetic tale on a figure who is visibly Othered. It suggests that even in non-sf tales genetics, or
rather the potential of genetic engineering, occupies the same cultural space as physical
deformity, visual alterity, and the grotesque. In other words, it is tied up with issues of
normativity, which makes sense if it is also tied to Cyborg theory. This may help explain why sf
authors like Slonczewski and Butler chose to construct their Other cultures around the

26

And then what’s to distinguish them from art historians or philosophers or English scholars?
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technologies of genetic engineering. They each use this genetic Otherness in different ways:
Slonczewski to ground her benevolent utopia and draw a stark distinction between it and her
(our) contemporary reality; Butler to dramatize issues of gender, race, and xenophobia. But their
uses are united in that they depict aliens who are much more human (and humans who seem
much more alien) because the alterity is grounded in genetic technologies. They both blur the
line between normative and not.
Mendel’s Dwarf moves this issue from the fantastic realms of science fiction to the
mundane (in the literal Latin sense, from mundus, the world; mankind). Instead of aliens
manipulating genetic information, for good or for ill, we have an otherwise mundane human who
studies genetic information in part because it has marked him out as Other. The Otherness of
genetics is double in Dr. Benedict Lambert. First, he has a mutated gene which has marked him
with dwarfism, so genetics is an agent of alterity. Second, the Othered Dr. Lambert, marked by
his physical deformity, essentially exists in another space from most other people, a facet one
television director noted: “‘I want it to be your story, from your viewpoint. Literally, as well.’ He
crouched down, just to make it clear. ‘Lots of low camera angles. The world according to Ben’”
(250). It is from this space that he engages with the world; it is his social exclusion which leads
him to study genetics in the first place; it is his condition which necessitates his ethical quandary;
and (Mawer implies) Dr. Lambert’s outsider position is at least partially responsible for his
unethical behavior. While genetics has transformed into reality in Mawer’s novel, it is no less
associated with the forces of alterity. These forces are simply now mundane: instead of aliens
and epic adventures we have the dwarf, the unethical genius, the unfaithful wife, the unwilling

107

sex. Benedict Lambert, marked from birth as an Other, fulfills his place in the world and with the
help of the burgeoning science of genetics he plays the monster.
I hear overtones of Richard III here in the marked figure of Dr. Lambert. He is charming
even while “evil,” sympathetic even while committing unethical acts. Some of Dr. Lambert’s
problems do seem to be a function of his personality and his choices more than his condition: for
instance, he meets other achondroplasic dwarves who live seemingly fulfilling lives of their own.
Jean stands as a possible love interest when they first meet, and they become friends soon
enough when they meet again as adults. If he were nicer, if he were as charming to certain
women as he is to the reader, his condition may not stand as such a social impediment. The
origin of his Otherness is clearly a genetic mutation, but his continued exclusion may in some
part be due to his inability to rise above his circumstances. Indeed (like Richard III) Lambert
wields his condition like a weapon, using it for great rhetorical effect: “The Klosterplatz was the
place where fairs were held . . . It was also the place of freak shows, the kind of place where
monsters were put on display, the kind of place where people with deformities were exhibited for
all the world to gaze at in horror and revulsion and amusement. . . . And you, ladies and
gentleman, would have gone to stare. At people like me” (2-3). So while his nature marks him as
different, he does not really try to escape from this fate: if anything, he embraces it; he chases it.
The question of Dr. Lambert’s ethics relates back to a much older question of Nature vs.
Nurture. Is the story’s climax predetermined by Benedict’s condition? Was his choice of research
determined? Certainly his dwarfism seems to condition other peoples’ responses to him, and thus
his responses to other people. For instance, the ethical crux of the story centers around his
paramour Jean’s indecent proposal that Dr. Lambert use his sperm for her in vitro procedure
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instead of her husband’s, and that he make sure the embryo she gets will grow into a healthy
(meaning non-achondroplasic) baby. Dr. Lambert agrees, but demands that Jean sleep with him
one last time in exchange for his help in fathering her child: “Did understanding dawn a moment
before I made it explicit? Did she realize? It seems reasonable, doesn’t it? More than reasonable:
logical. Isn’t that how babies are made?” (207). The ugliness of his demand – and of what he
does with it – reflects the ugliness of the situation as a whole: he is more fit than the “normal” if
occasionally violent husband to provide semen for the in vitro procedure, but not fit enough to be
Jean’s husband, or boyfriend, or even acknowledged lover. His progress in genetic engineering
does little to change what he sees as his genetically determined situation in life.
There is a cruelty to all of Jean’s relationship with Benedict: for her, Dr. Lambert – the
dwarf, the geneticist, the friend – never quite registers as a man. She is in an unhappy
relationship with her husband, from which she flees to Dr. Lambert, but she does not leave her
husband. Her relationship with Benedict is, for the most part, frustratingly platonic (for Benedict,
anyway) because Jean does not see Benedict in the same terms she sees her husband. Even when
they do start sleeping together the arrangement is largely predicated on a denial of his difference:
“I didn’t move into the bedroom with her. I suppose I wanted to spare her the fright of seeing me
as I was; and as she never suggested that I should, I guess that she was happy to be spared. So it
was in all-forgiving and all-absorbing darkness that we actually coupled” (175). As he makes a
point of noting, his genitals are normative, and hence, in the dark of a bedroom he is hardly a
dwarf at all. Jean’s tacit daylight denial of Benedict contrasts with her long suffering acceptance
of her husband.
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The denial extends to Benedict’s paternity in general. Benedict accidently gets Jean
pregnant during their affair, before they make plans to swap in vitro samples. She decides to
abort the pregnancy, confessing: “The child might be like you. And I wouldn’t want that” (179).
She gets this abortion with Benedict’s aid: as he explains to the abortion counselor, “'I’m the
father. Not Of Jean Piercey,’ I added with a smile. ‘Of her child. . . . That makes it pretty
incontrovertible, doesn’t it? The argument for abortion, I mean. No adequate prenatal test. Fiftyfifty chance of ending up like me. Who’d bet a lifetime on the toss of a coin?’” (181). This
equation of dwarfism with serious handicap, and thus an ethically permissible cause for abortion,
is problematic, as the Little People of America attests: “LPA believes strongly that prospective
parents who become familiar with the full, productive lives led by little people will not likely
choose termination” (“Frequently Asked Questions”). Jean only conditionally accepts a sexual
relationship with Benedict, and she ends it quickly to return to her husband. In her decision to
abort her pregnancy with Benedict’s child, she is implicitly rejecting Benedict himself. In his
decision to support her, he does the same. Even when she does accept him as a potential
biological father, she does so with every intention of fooling her husband into thinking that he’s
the father, denying Benedict full masculinity in denying him full paternity. The prowess of his
genetic knowledge does not change his fundamental condition, not in his own eyes, and not in
his society’s eyes.
Ironically, Jean’s husband Hugo also denies Benedict’s masculinity, failing to perceive
him for the threat that he is, even calling him for advice on getting his wife back:
He settled into one of the armchairs—“nice little place you’ve got here,
convenient”—and it was clear from the way he spoke that he had no idea what
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had happened between us [Benedict and Jean] . . . Presumably it was something
he would not have believed even if he had been told outright. I have the perfect
alibi, don’t I?
“I want her back” he said.
“Well I haven’t got her.”
He seemed amused at this idea. (187).
The condescension Benedict perceives here is identical to what he gets from Jean; it is based
solely on his genetic condition, and not mitigated in the least by his success with genetic science.
In short, Dr. Lambert is used by both parties because he is perceived as safely impotent (in the
physical sense of “without power”; but also therefore sexually). It is an unfair perception, one
against which he understandably chafes. And yet, chafed or not, he seems to stands for it, at least
when it comes from Jean. He enables the perception that he is not a threat, perhaps even
encourages it, since this allows him to become closer to Jean. The question is, then: was the
nature of this relationship – its evolution from casual friendliness to mutual exploitation to the
violent climax – somehow predetermined? How much does his appearance shape his role in the
world (thus making him somehow genetically determined to be an adulterous cynic) and how
much is the result of his own decisions? In short: nature or nurture?
There’s another layer to the question of how much Jean and Benedict’s relationship was
determined by his genetics: her main (stated) reservation seems to be the potential that their
children could be born dwarves like him. Whether Benedict could have ever found love as a
dwarf with the somewhat small-minded Jean is rendered something of a moot point by his
research. His ability to pinpoint the cause of his genetic mutation and (more importantly) to
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identify it simply in very early stage embryos – along with his status as a scientist above
suspicion – gives him a level of unnatural control over the previously “natural” course of
pregnancy. His interference changes the course of nature, and as such, he becomes like a force of
nature himself. As Lefebvre says, “To say natural is to say spontaneous” (70). He research
allows for the spontaneous division of DNA, the purely statistical chance of Benedict passing on
his achondroplasia, to be brought under the control of the scientist. So, over-determined by his
situation or simply the result of a poor exercise in free will, Dr. Lambert’s decision to demand
sex from Jean is only possible because he has conquered nature, albeit only in a small way.
That Benedict’s demand carries strong overtones of prostitution and rape – two facets of
sexuality strongly coded as unethical – associates these sexual codes with the in vitro procedure.
Genetics becomes like a new sort of sexuality, in the same sense that Foucault mentions in his
History of Sexuality: “as an especially dense transfer point for relations of power” (103); it
becomes politically charged like the Child in Lee Edelman’s No Future: “political insofar as the
fantasy subtending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political
itself might be thought” (2). Genetic engineering represents a mastery over nature, a new focal
point for exercises of power; it also becomes a new way to write the biological future, and thus a
position of structural significance.
The microcosm of Benedict Lambert reflects the macro shift that genetics promises. Dr.
Lambert is in a position to choose for or against one genetic trait. Just one trait, note; the ethical
implications become even more complicated when you consider that “on average every one of us
carries about four harmful recessive mutations. Sometimes, if you are unlucky like me, you carry
a dominant one” (252). Even this one decision throws him (and us) into a situation of difficult
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decisions and ethical confusion. Although many of Dr. Lambert’s actions clearly lack a strong
ethical grounding – should one really demand sex as payment? should one enable adultery? –
others are more ambiguous. Dr. Lambert is struck, in his moment of decision, with the eugenic
implications of choosing one embryo over another on the basis of a genetic trait. There would
appear to be a material difference between selecting embryos prepared for an in vitro procedure
and “euthanizing” grown humans. But just what that difference is, and where it ceases to be
meaningful, is a contentious issue. Is Dr. Lambert’s intervention really so different from what the
Nazi’s did to people like him? Is it really so different than the infanticide which is so common in
some countries, where babies are left out in the elements to die because they are not the desired
gender? Is it really so different from an abortion performed once a fetus has developed enough
for ultrasound to identify the deformity? This progression from murdering a grown person to
“preventing” life from occurring represents a complex continuity which exists in pre-genetics
debates over abortion and family planning. Genetics maps into this debate quite well, because on
the one hand, it extends the possible range of human intervention – intervention which may be
wise or foolish, ethical or monstrous; and in any case which operates in a different ethical space
than mere chance. On the other hand, genetics can potentially provide much more information to
inform our choices, though too much information is not always a good thing.
For Benedict Lambert, the decision has other implications as well: is his decision to have
a “normal” son really so different from the sexually shunning he has experienced as an
achondroplasic dwarf? In choosing against his own genetic condition, Benedict performs an act
of self-destruction, one mirroring (at some level) every rejection he has ever experienced. He
considers “[Option] 2. select the four achondroplastics, the four stunted little beings, the four
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children of Ben, and send them over instead, and curse the whole bloody world and all its
machinations and injustices” (239) which would in effect mean giving Jean a dwarf simply to
punish her and her husband. Condemning a child to live a life he has repeatedly bemoaned
simply for the sake of poetic justice would be cruel, from his perspective if not necessarily from
society’s at large (cf. Little People of America). But in acknowledging this potential cruelty, Dr.
Lambert also acknowledges his life as one he would not wish on a child. He implicitly decries a
central facet of his own life. It is unclear whether he chooses against the achondroplasic embryos
for the sake of the child (his child) or for Jean’s sake. The capriciousness with which Benedict
makes his decision is chilling – surprisingly so considering that the alternative: random genetic
drift, which exhibits no consciousness at all and thus no conscience either. We have forever lived
in a world where such events were entirely up to fate. In that moment of decision Mawer
dramatizes the shift from “spontaneous” to “choice”; from the adirectionality of the genetic drift
to the complex intentionality of human intervention; from random and meaningless to ethically
charged.
The moment of genetic decision is the moment achondroplasic dwarfism exits nature and
becomes a social condition. There is the very real possibility that, through the wide-spread
adoption of screening and selection processes, dwarfism would become a thing of the past. The
actual scientist who discovered the gene, and consequently discovered the relative ease with
which it could be identified in fetuses recommended against testing in most situations,
specifically to avoid this ethical quandary; he only recommended testing in cases where two
copies of the achondroplasic gene could be present (so a union between two achondroplasic
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dwarves), because fetuses with two never survive childbirth (Wasmuth, quoted in Emmons). The
Little People of America address the ethics of this extensively on the website:
Some members were excited about the developments that led to the understanding
of the cause of their conditions, along with the possibility of not having to endure
a pregnancy resulting in the infant's death. Others reacted with fear that the
knowledge from genetic tests such as these will be used to terminate affected
pregnancies and therefore take the opportunity for life away from children such as
ourselves and our children. The common thread throughout the discussions was
that we as short statured individuals are productive members of society who must
inform the world that, though we face challenges, most of them are environmental
(as with people with other disabilities), and we value the opportunity to contribute
a unique perspective to the diversity of our society. (“Frequently Asked
Questions”)
Dwarfism has long been associated with freak-shows and, in the age of scientific stamp
collecting, has long been categorized as a disability. The little people community has made great
strides in normalizing perceptions of the condition, yet the ability to choose, for the first time, for
or against achondroplastic mutation threatens to restart a serious debate about whether such a
condition is “normal” or a disability. In a larger sense, there is the danger that we, like Octavia
Butler’s Oankali, may engineer ourselves into mono-cultures. The eugenic implications of Dr.
Lambert’s fictional decision (and Dr. Wasmuth’s real life research) are fraught and far reaching,
and they only concern one specific genetic trait which affects around 1 in 20,000 people. What
about those two traits that each affects 1 in 2 people?
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I have been focusing on the genetic implications of Dr. Lambert’s decision, but he did
more than just select the against his dwarfism trait. He also implies that he selected the gender of
his child: “I do know he’s a boy. I do know he’s a boy and I do know he will be tall. I didn’t play
God, Jean. Unlike God, I chose . . . with something approaching love” (248, italics original).
Gender selection has been a reality for humans since the late 1970s, albeit with only about a 70%
success rate, or 20% more than leaving it random (Beernick et. al.). The method which allows
Benedict to check for dwarfism would also allow him to check the embryo’s eventual sex. The
questionable ethics of selecting for/against dwarfism are compounded and drastically expanded
when applied to checking and choosing the sex of a child. To the extent that Benedict and Jean
perceive dwarfism to be an undesirable disability, they have some moral ground to stand on
when it comes to selecting against this trait (whether their perception is correct is another
matter). When the choice becomes one of sex selection, the ethics would appear to become
clearer: the lives of boy and girls have, in principle, equal potential for full and fulfilling lives,
thus there is no rational basis for making such selections. For all of human history, all of cultural
history, the sex of a child has been randomly determined, and thus often taken to be an essential
identity characteristic. A society cannot produce more boys just because it needs to fight a war
soon; all a society can do is encourage the production of more children, half of which will be of
each gender. Put another way, even if a culture valued one sex over another, there has previously
been no way, absent abortion or infanticide, to act on any bias at the level of birth rates. The
ability to control this previously untouchable facet brings sex-selection into the same morally
conflicted framework which governs the rest of life.
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But the ethics of sex selection are no more arbitrary than the ethics of selecting for any
trait. As the LPA attest, many Little People live happy and fulfilling lives; Dr. Wasmuth even
noted “a case in which a dwarf wanted his pregnant wife to be tested. If the child was not going
to be a dwarf, the father wanted an abortion” (Emmons). His reasoning was directly contrary to
Benedict and Jean’s: “‘He wanted a “normal” child, and to him, a dwarf is normal,’ Wasmuth
says. ‘This is just the other side of the coin. These are not simple issues’” (Emmons). At its heart,
this modern-day eugenics brings to stark light our understanding of just what “normal” means. In
terms of the sex of new-born children, it has been normal for them to be either male or female, in
roughly equal proportion. (Intersexed children present a problem to this model, and were until
recently labeled – socially and medically – as abnormal, leaving them to be socially shunned or
medically altered until they better fit one of the two accepted categories.) As a society we have
long assumed that it is normal to be either man or woman. I make this claim in acknowledgement
that, until the civil rights and feminist movements, a certain race of a certain gender was favored,
set up as the “standard” against which all Other (women, minorities, foreigners, etc.) were
understood. But I do not believe that this amounts to considering non-white, non-males as
abnormal. Rather, with apologies to Orwell, white men were simply more normal than everyone
else; it was completely “normal” for non-white, non-males to be inferior. Imagine, then, what
would have happened if the Victorians (for instance) 27 had the ability to choose or alter the
genetic gender and/or racial destiny of embryos. Thankfully, they did not have this technology;
but we do. The central thesis of Mandel’s Dwarf, in so far as it is a tale of genetic woe, is
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We could also say “The Nazis” or “The Harvard Professors in 1930” or any number of other pre-Civil Rights
designations. I say Victorian specifically with Foucault’s chapter “We ‘Other Victorians’” in mind.
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surprising similar to one I identified in Butler’s Lilith’s Brood: do not assume that your genetic
advancement means you have also made similar ethical advancements.
Now, a small digression: If every family wants a daughter, and keeps having children
until they have a daughter and then stop, what would the gender ratio be? (Assume each
pregnancy has a 50% chance of being a daughter and a 50% chance of being a son.) The answer
is: 1 to 1. That is, if you have 20 couples trying to have a daughter, half will have daughters, and
half will have son (10 daughters, 10 sons). Now those who had a son try again, and again, half
have daughters and half have sons (10 + 5 daughters, 10 + 5 sons). Expanding this
mathematically (since we can’t actually have half of a male or female in this scenario), we would
get an infinite set of 10 + 5 + 2.5 + 1.25 + . . . for both daughters and sons; infinite sets which
converge on the same value and thus, an equal ratio. Of course in real life there may be some
temporary discrepancy, with some small favoring for females, but taken over a large population
it would be negligible. Thus gender preference could not meaningfully manifest in birth rates
even in sex-biased societies. As Mawer dramatically implies, genetic engineering changes the
math. Of the first 20 couples, 20 would have daughters and that would be the end of it: the end of
sons. There are unacknowledged overtones of this in Slonczewski’s A Door Into Ocean. The allfemale Sharers have, by their own admission, long since bred men out of their society. Although
they are presented as utopian, simultaneously more natural and more advanced than the familiar
Valans, there are troubling implications to this apparently uncontested decision.
This is an unusual theme which runs through the sampling of genetic-oriented texts: with
genetic engineering comes a new and generally negative appraisal of men/masculinity/maleness.
Butler alludes to this in Lilith’s Brood with the Oankali reluctance to breed new males – though
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it is worth noting that the Oankali are even more resistant to the idea of ooloi constructs,
suggesting that maleness, while more volatile than femaleness, is nonetheless safer than
unmediated genetic engineering. Slonczewski goes further and suggests maleness is frankly
undesirable, so long as there are reproductive alternatives. Only Atwood avoids addressing this
issue directly, although her bleakly anti-feminine society suggests many of the same things about
the relative places of men and women in the world. Mawer, the lone male writer in my thesis,
gives perhaps the most robust explanation of the genetic reason one would want to eliminate
men:
I feel obliged to report that in the course of my own research, I, Benedict
Lambert of the Royal Institute for Genetics, have discovered an inherited factor
that is a certain causative agent in criminal behavior. . . . Perhaps this one ought
to be the Benny factor. . .
Ninety-five percent of the total British prison population possess the Benny
factor; the proportion goes up to ninety-seven percent when you consider violent
crime. With sex crime the correlation between the Benny factor and the crime is
virtually total, complete, one hundred percent. . . .
You’ve guessed it, haven’t you? The Benny factor is the Y chromosome. Not
the possession of an extra chromosome, but the possession of just one. It is the
simple fact of being male. Whenever the biological determinists, the eugenicists,
the E. B. Fords of this world, start mouthing their rubbish, remember that: lock up
all the males and violence will disappear from the streets. (143-44)
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The numbers he cites are similar in those in the US, 28 and they reflect an unpleasant truth about
crime and gender. For Benedict (and presumably Mawer as well, since he is the writer putting
these words in Benedict’s figurative mouth) the statistics are proof positive that claims of
eugenics are inherently problematic, since that logic must inevitably lead to the erasure of men
altogether, and (he rhetorically asks) who would want that? The irony in this statement is that
Benedict does; at least, he willingly participates in a moment of eugenic decision. Perhaps his
choice of a male child functions as an attempt to minimize the self-negating impulses of his
decision, to put a limit on the uses of eugenics: “fixing” deformity (or more properly,
normalizing anti-normativity), is a good reason for cleansing; limiting violence is not a good
reason. The eugenic impulse is common throughout my selected works: Atwood’s Crake
attempts to cleanse the entire human population save one friend and a race of genetic
posthumans; though to be fair he is a mad scientist. The Oankali are explicitly concerned with
crafting a new, superior species; though to be fair they are earnestly working under what they
strongly consider a moral imperative. Slonczewski’s Sharers have bred out males entirely;
though to be fair the payoff is a genetically developed utopia which just happens to be a model of
eugenic cleanliness, menaced by the very thing which it silently purged untold generations ago.
And anyway, to be fair to all, genetics does give an apparently strong scientific grounding for the
desire to eugenically “write out” men.
I should note that the literary genetic praxis is not explicitly feminine or anti-masculine,
either in its implications or in its cultural treatments. Rather, it seems to be strongly associated
with Cyborg theory, which was principally a meditation on the future of feminism. Thus, most
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serious deployments are interested in deploying it to help interrogate and resolve contemporary
feminist discourses. But there is more than one way to resolve a discourse. Heather Schell, for
instance, offers a nice counterbalance in her study “The Big Bad Wolf: Masculinity and Genetics
in Popular Culture.” She notes the preponderance of aggressive male figures in ostensibly female
fiction. Of romance novels, she notes:
Because masculine behavior is biologically, that is, genetically based, it doesn't
reflect poorly on the hero's attitudes; similarly, in cases in which biological
compulsion drives the hero to inflict physical harm on the heroine, we can forgive
her for forgiving him. The genetic origin of the alpha male's drive for mastery
allows the novels to circumvent the traditional feminist criticism of the genre's
seeming validation of battery and other abuse. Resolution finally arrives when the
hero accepts that the heroine has a right to basic human liberties (although he does
not like them), while the heroine recognizes that her poor mate is helplessly hardwired to try to dominate her. Their route to compromise is, moreover, facilitated
by terrific sex. (119)
She goes on to suggest that this “genetically based” drive to dominate becomes embodied in
werewolf figures throughout the 1990s and 2000s, in a sort of mainstreaming of the romance
novel solution to feminism: he’s a good guy, except that his blood makes him go crazy whenever
the moon is full. 29 The genetic issues here are identical to the ones that Mawer notes (and with
which Butler and Slonczewski play) albeit treated in a more facile way. Faced with a choice to
either purge or accept these helplessly domineering men, the women in the romance novels
29

We can all agree, for the time being, to ignore the irony of linking these explicitly male mood swings to lunar
cycles.
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accept them. The choice is not explicitly anti-feminist – as Schell notes, the inevitability of the
aggression ostensibly excuses the “validation of batter and other abuse” by men. That is, the
novels cannot validate the violence on its own terms, because to do so would violate some hard
won rules which feminism set down about civil, equitable, humane conduct; but that does not
mean such men are therefore censured: a third way is offered, a genetic excuse. Such devices are
not anti-woman, but neither are they conceivably feminist. So rather than suggesting that genetic
engineering would necessarily lead one to fantasies of male-less societies, I would say rather that
it facilitates such fantasies in explicitly feminist texts, like Slonczewski’s. Butler and Atwood,
while also feminist in general orientation, treat the issue more complexly, and seem to decide
that women are equally doomed in our new genetically engineered world. In terms of a literary
genetic praxis, the use is the same throughout: to help resolve feminist issues. They are simply
many ways to do this.
Lest we think that gender-scrubbed worlds are purely the purview of feminist science
fiction, Mawer helpfully notes that we have achieved small pockets of such in our own time,
albeit for capitalist purposes:
In trout hatcheries you don’t want males. Males are inconvenient. Quite apart
from the fact that they don’t produce babies, they mature earlier than females and
once mature they show aggressive tendencies . . . So, just as with humans, fifty
percent of trout are male and fifty percent are female. And your next generation
has fifty percent nonproducers, fifty percent that are nothing more than bags of
sperm, fifty percent with criminal tendencies.
It’s that damned Y chromosome again.
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So this, in trout hatcheries at least, is how it’s done.
You rear some female trout (XX, of course), but you dose them with male sex
hormone. This turns them into males of a kind. They produce sperm, for example.
But genetically they remain XX, and so every sperm cell produced carries an X
chromosome. Using these “males” as a source of sperm, every fertilization will be
by an X sperm and an X egg. Every baby trout that these “males” father (if you’ll
forgive the expression) will turn out female. (149)
Mawer’s example offers a good explanation of how males could be effectively bred out. For the
fish, this process is fundamentally hormonal, since androgen is what induces sperm production.
Such a method is possible in fish because while “[i]n numerous species of fish, sex is determined
principally genetically. . . . For most fish species the differentation of the gonad into a testis or an
ovary can be strongly influenced by hormonal, environmental or social factors” (Maybank). That
is, the genetic process (altering the genetics of a fish population so that all gender-linked
chromosomes come out XX) is predicated on a hormonal process (dousing the “father” fish with
androgen to stimulate sperm production). This is a blunt sort of genetic engineering, to say the
least. It is not far removed from mere selective breeding, which itself functions thanks to changes
in the genetic makeup of the creature. This long description of primitive genetic manipulation, so
closely following Dr. Lambert’s discourse on males’ genetic tendency towards aggression, elicits
perhaps the perfect response from Jean: “‘I think that’s disgusting,’ Miss Piercey said, but it
didn’t stop her eating the fish” (149).
Margaret Atwood’s treatment of genetics in her MaddAddam books hits a similar note,
although the disgusting aspect is more prominent. Jean’s reaction is perfect because it mirrors the
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contradictions of our emerging genetic engineering. Genetic Engineering is fictionally drawn out
and envisioned as a fully formed technology in Butler and Slonczewski. Atwood claims her
depictions of genetic engineering to be closely rooted in reality, having only projected it out a
small bit, and indeed, her novel contains reference to many real-life genetic experiments and
products. But, her protestations of Speculative aside, she also fictionally projects genetic
engineering out into the future and in the process, like Butler and Slonczewski, projects on to
genetic engineering as well. Mawer speaks from a sort of middle ground: the praxis he describes
actually exists, so his projections are more firmly rooted in contemporary discussions rooted in
the reality of genetic engineering. Central to these contemporary discussions are exclamations of
disgust coupled with robust consumption. Genetically modified organisms, when created via
breeding, are perfectly normal; when created via hormonal baths, they are disgusting but
delicious; when created in a lab, they are deeply troubling.
With reference to the claim I made in my introduction, that we are now living in a postnatural world (28), “natural” works as a perfect synonym for “normal” in this case. The
divergent perceptions seem to come down to pace of change: the countless hundreds of
generations separating wolves from poodles reflect a far more gradual, though no less
intentional, change than the one generation between Alba (the glowing green rabbit from my
introduction) and her biological parents. One is hardly noticed while the other spawns protest
novels. One is normal, the other is unnatural. 30 Genetics brings the ambiguity of our lines
between nature and culture into uncomfortable focus. For Atwood, such focus is a harbinger of
30
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with the desired (selected for) traits.
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the apocalypse; for Butler, no less a harbinger, though it also functions to interrogate issues of
femininity, race, motherhood, descent, control, and free will, all themselves issues with fuzzy
and contested boundaries; for Slonczewski the focus helps to blur the lines together, suggesting
that her postulated utopia has grown out of this very conflation of nature and culture. In all three
cases, sexuality is implicated, though never quite so directly as in Mawer.
Benedict demands one last night together with Jean as his price for practicing eugenics on
his own progeny. This encounter contrasts with the “normal” intercourse Jean and Benedict
shared during their liaison—intercourse which resulted, as such things sometimes do, in
pregnancy. The first pregnancy, commenced under the usual course of things, is deemed too
risky (both for Jean’s fraught relationship with her husband and for the 50% potential for
dwarfism) and thus terminated. The intercourse which “results” in her artificial impregnation by
a specially chosen non-dwarf, male embryo is explicitly not “normal” – that is, it is anal instead
of vaginal:
But it was that. While she buried her face in the pillow and made muffled
mouse-sounds of pain, it was that. . . .
Afterwards it was soft tears and gentle recriminations and apologies. I
couldn’t help myself, I pleaded. You must understand. To possess you as no other
ever has or ever will. Very poetic. To take a virginity from you that will never
belong to anyone else. Surely you must understand. And she claimed that she did,
more or less, although it didn’t seem right, that’s all. Not natural.
But what is natural? Nature is what nature does. Am I natural? Is
superovulation followed by transvaginal ultrasound-guided oocyte retrieval
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natural? Is in vitro fertilization and the growth of multiple embryos in culture, is
all that natural? Two months later, in a lab in the Hewison Clinic for Human
Fertility, I watched shivering spermatozoa clustering around eggs, my
spermatozoa clustering around her eggs. Consummation beneath the microscope.
Is that natural?. . .
Nature is what nature does.
Was Great-great-great-uncle Gregor’s artificial pollination natural? (214-15)
Here Mawer hits on a confluence of themes: the instability of the definition for “natural”; the
collapsing connection between intercourse and reproduction; the gender associated with this new
(pro)creative science; and the violence associated with that new sort of (pro)creation, all wrapped
up in one grotesque scene. In their first liaison, Benedict sincerely could not prevent Jean’s
impregnation, not once their relationship had been consummated sans birth control. She could
not abide the natural product of that union, and so they artificially ended the pregnancy. His
actions were natural, hers unnatural. In this scene Benedict most certainly could prevent himself
from doing what he does; he chooses to do it does as revenge, as a poetic violation of Jean which
parallels the way that they are violating nature. Is this any more violent or unnatural that what
she had done? Or, rather, is it merely a reflection of the nature of their relationship? Mawer, in a
sense, inverses Slonczewski. In A Door Into Ocean genetics and femininity work together to link
the Sharers to nature; in Mendel’s Dwarf the two are opposed with an implied severance of
nature. With his final question, Dr. Lambert brings us to a central question for genetic
engineering and, indeed, science more broadly: science can study nature, but can it understand
nature? When nature is finally understood, is it still nature? I am drawn to Lefebre’s discussion
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of natural spaces – “To say natural is to say spontaneous” (70) – specifically because of these
questions. Nature is the origin of the geneticist’s work: Gregor Mendel carefully crossbred sweet
pea plants to test his theories about inheritance and to prove that evolution was not an
incremental gradient but a series of discrete changes. In doing so, he took the first major step
from passively recording nature (collecting stamps, in Rutherford’s sarcastic estimation) to
modeling nature, understanding at a more than intuitive level the mechanisms by which nature
worked. From this comes control.
Genetic engineering represents a sort of final frontier in the realm of control over nature.
As material sciences have progressed, we have been able to construct ever-more durable
habitations and transportations. As the electrical power and digital information become evermore pervasive, we are able to exert much more control over the objects in our life. It is possible
to spend most of one’s life without stepping foot in non-temperature controlled environments for
more than a few minutes. With genetic engineering, we can begin to extend this sort of influence
to the realms of internal environments as well; that is, we can begin to extend the control we are
able to exert over the places we live and work to the body which does the living and working.
Mendel’s Dwarf explicitly plays with this idea, but ultimately settles on an ironic negation: for
all his and Jean’s cleverness in tricking Jean’s husband, for all the sophistication Dr. Lambert
exhibits in his eugenic experiment on his own progeny, they are given away by a stray genetic
marker: “I’ve done my homework, Ben. I know about all this Mendel stuff. And I know that I’ve
got blue eyes and Jean’s got blue eyes—well, one of them’s green, but you explained about that,
didn’t you?—and the baby’s got brown eyes. That just not possible is it?” (283). For all the work
that went into playing God, into specially selecting his own offspring, Dr. Lambert is unable to
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control everything. Jean suffers from complications after her pregnancy and goes into a coma.
Her son has brown eyes. Hugo, the cuckolded husband, finds out everything and walks into the
hospital room and does . . . something, something unpleasant. Mawer never says, beyond hints
that it was prosecuted and possibly “premeditated” (291). So while genetics does offer the
possibility of significantly greater control, Mawer seems to be suggesting that there are limits
even to this. Contra Butler, Mawer seems to be suggesting that no amount of genetic insight will
change human nature. There is always a limit to control. And control always comes at a cost.

128

CHAPTER 5: MADDADDAM AND THE COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF
NATURE

“The function of science fiction is not always to predict the future but sometimes to prevent it.”
– Frank Herbert (apocryphal)

Margaret Atwood’s first two MaddAddam novels, Oryx and Crake and The Year of The
Flood, form the ending point of the literary spectrum I am considering for this thesis. Together
they offer a bleak vision of our future if genetic engineering is allowed to run its course, although
like Slonczewski she seems to be suggesting that this future is as much the fault of capitalism run
amok as anything else – that is, that while the technology is central to the story she wants to tell,
its failures are very much tied to the social system rather than innate features of genetic
engineering itself. Like Mawer, Atwood’s novel is not considered science fiction by those who
sell books, although, unlike Mawer, this generic distinction is ambiguous and contested. Atwood
uses genetic engineering in Oryx and Crake as a means to dramatize the worst excesses of
capitalism. She participates in many of the same conversations as we see in the previous texts,
including the role of gender in a genetically altered world, the role of parenting, and of the future
of the environment in a genetically altered world. And her books go further than any of my other
texts in exploring the ethics of using genetic engineering in a world where definitions of self,
Other, and nature have been compromised. In a sense, the very existence of genetic engineering
renders old (liberal humanist) boundaries always-already compromised: the cultural systems out
of which emerged a practical genetic engineering were themselves built on liberal humanist
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understandings of the boundaries between self and other, a humanist conception of the
relationship between nature and culture and control; yet these very boundaries are rendered moot
by the existence of genetic engineering. A strict division between different species of (for
instance) pea plants leads to a complex classification system for these plants and their traits.
These classifications of difference lead to theorizations about the origins of the difference, and
later of the mechanism for passing on such traits. This theorizing leads to a better understanding
of the mechanisms by which the distinct differences are transmitted. But in understanding the
mechanisms, we see that visually obvious differences are not so fundamental to (pea plant)
identity after all, compromising the mission of clear and distinct classification in the first place.
Thus the system for classifying as a means of identity creation leads to its own destruction. For
Atwood, the implications of genetic engineering are grim. Instead of collapsing the old
boundaries of violent, capitalistic, patriarchal societies, the hybridity of genetic engineering
simply allows all these forms to achieve a sort of total victory, followed soon after by a total
collapse.
Atwood uses the apocalyptic form in a way that is at once similar to and different from
Butler’s in Lilith’s Brood. Like Butler, Atwood situates her story after a global level apocalypse.
They do so for similar structural reasons: for Butler the apocalypse lends authority of the Oankali
assertions that humanity is fatally flawed; for Atwood it lends a sort of implicit authority to her
dystopian glimpses of the world before the apocalypse. That is, the apocalypse essentially
confirms that things which seem grim and dystopian in the flashback portions of the plot are, in
fact, as bad as they seem, because they ultimately lead to the end of the world. And, for Atwood
as for Butler, this initial authority eventually becomes questionable: just as the Oankali
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eventually admit that they deserve to let humanity make its own decisions (even if they continue
to feel at a gut-level that it is cruel to do so), so too does the astute reader start to wonder how
much of the apocalypse was inevitable and how much was simply the work of an isolated mad
man.
Sorting this question out is made somewhat more difficult by the fact that Atwood
rewrote her world’s story six years after it first came out. As Atwood describes her novels, “I
would say The Year of the Flood is not a prequel, not a sequel, but a ‘simultaneal’ to Oryx and
Crake” (“On The Year of the Flood”). The actions of the two novels take place in the same world
and generally during the same time. The perspective of both novels are at once deepened and
complicated by the story told in the other. Oryx and Crake is told entirely from the viewpoint of
Snowman, a survivor of a genetically engineered JUVE virus which wipes out most of humanity.
The novel is split between Snowman’s travails in his post-apocalyptic world, and his memories
of being Jimmy, an upper class kid who grew up in the corporate owned (and secured)
Compounds. He is a childhood friend of Crake, the mad scientists and genetic savant who
engineers the apocalyptic plague as well as the posthumans who are intended to survive it (called
“Crakers”). Jimmy survives because Crake specifically inoculated him against the virus. The
Year of the Flood follows a few characters who also survive the virus (an event they call “the
Flood”). Toby is a poor woman who held, among other positions, a place as a senior member of
the God’s Gardeners, a religious cult who cultivate gardens on slum-roofs and generally oppose
the corporations. Ren, a peer of Jimmy’s who remembers him far more than he remembers her
(she is mentioned in passing in Oryx and Crake, and even then by a different name) is dragged
from a life with the God’s Gardeners to a life in the Compounds by her despondent mother. She
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ends up as a young sex-worker at the time of the Flood, which she survives by being inside her
club’s quarantine room. The two books overlap, especially at their respective ends, where Oryx
and Crake ends in a cliffhanger which is partially worked out at the end of The Year of The
Flood. Throughout both books, scenes of biological devastation mix with descriptions of a world
collapsing. My central interest is in the role that genetic engineering plays in Atwood’s
construction of a dystopian future.
Throughout, I will refer to these books collectively as the MaddAddam novels for three
reasons: one, in recognition of the possible third in the series which has not been published in
time for this thesis but should cast even more light on the world which the first two revealed;
two, because this mirrors the title which online speculation and apparently Atwood’s publishers
have given the two books and their long awaited companion; three, because the two books
currently available, published six year apart though they were, deal with an overlapping series of
narrative times and places, and since much of my discussion is concerned with the world Atwood
constructs and populates rather than the specifics of plot, it is convenient to have a term to refer
to the books in toto.
As I mentioned in the Chapter 1, Atwood’s two novels compare well with Slonczewski’s
A Door Into Ocean. Genetic engineering is central to both worlds, as is the ethical role of science
and scientists in shaping these worlds. Feminist concerns are prominent, as well as ecocritical
issues. These similar interests manifest, however, in profoundly different ways. Whereas
Slonczewski crafts a narrative about an ecofeminist utopia’s contact with – and conflict with – a
less enlightened (and more familiar) society, Atwood crafts the inverse: rather than embodying
an ecofeminist ideal, her world realizes all the fears of an ecofeminist critique; instead of an
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enlightened culture’s contact with a familiarly flawed culture, the enlightened and unenlightened
are both present –and both complicit – in a profoundly flawed culture; in short, instead of a
genetically enabled utopia, Atwood writes a genetically devastated dystopia.
In labeling Atwood’s MaddAddam novels “dystopian” I am in good company, as most
Atwood scholars refer to her MaddAddam novels as dystopian. 31 Prominently missing from this
list, however, is Ms. Atwood herself: “What about Oryx and Crake? I would argue that it is not a
classic dystopia. Though it has obvious dystopian elements, we don't really get an overview of
the structure of the society in it, like the one provided in the epilogue of The Handmaid's Tale.
We just see its central characters living their lives within small corners of that society, much as
we live ours . . . It's an adventure romance—that is, the hero goes on a quest—coupled with a
Menippean satire, the literary form that deals in intellectual obsession” (“Aliens” 517). For
Atwood this distinction is borne out of her understanding of the structure of “classic dystopias”
as being centrally concerned with the society’s (unpleasant) structure.
This distinction is partially valid, I think, because it acknowledges the history of the
utopian novel with its origins in Plato and Thomas Moore. The classic utopia would be a literary
world with a perfect social, legal, political, ethical, military, and/or education systems. Thus the
opposite, the dystopia, would share a focus on the systems of the culture and demonstrate their
failings. Atwood’s contention is seconded by Veronica Hollinger, who contends: “While Oryx
and Crake borrows freely from Orwellian-style dystopian fiction, it even more obviously plays
off Wellsian scientific romances” (457). Put another way, while Atwood does set the novels in a
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dystopian world, her novels are not concerned with the structures of the governing society, but
rather with the stories of specific characters who have the misfortune to live in this world. But
this distinction is reductionist as well. The “adventure-romance” aspect of Oryx and Crake
describes less than half of the novel: the plot is split between Snowman’s unfolding memories
and his struggle to survive in the post-apocalyptic world. For much of the first half of the novel,
Snowman does no adventuring whatsoever, he simply visits with the Crakers and hides out in a
tree. Although he does eventually go off on an adventure, this is still split between many scenes
from his memories. So far less than half of Oryx and Crake consists of anything which could
reasonably be called an adventure, while most of it consists of elements which fit easily into
classifications of dystopian and science fiction. The Year of the Flood follows the same general
progression: the “present” is marked by isolation and a lack of movement, broken up by
memories of the past. Eventually something happens which drives the protagonists into action, at
which point the appellation “scientific romance” may apply.
The genre of Atwood’s MaddAddam books is a source of contention in the literary world,
and settling this issue is strongly relevant to my discussion here. Margaret Atwood admits to
starting a bit of a row because she “liked to make a distinction between science fiction proper . . .
and speculative fiction,” a distinction made “not out of meanness, but out of a wish to avoid false
advertising: I didn’t want to raise people’s hopes. I did not wish to promise, for instance, the
talking squid of Saturn if I couldn’t deliver them” (“Aliens” 513). It is this very suggestion—that
to be science fiction a story must needs resort to fantastical beasts in space—which so offended
fans of the genre. In part, it offends because it essentially equates science fiction with the
cheapest, least respectable sf stories, as though the genre never left the 1940s serials. It also
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implicitly denies that a work which is engaged with the literary canon or ethos can also be
rightfully marketed as science fiction. This is probably true. Certainly, many of my favorite sf
authors, figures like Atwood, Thomas Pynchon, Jorge Luis Borges, and Kurt Vonnegut, are
marketed as literature rather than science fiction. What separates them from authors like Octavia
Butler, Ursula Le Guin, Neal Stephenson or William Gibson – writers with big ideas,
scientifically informed narratives, and novels which are as engaged with issues in contemporary
society as anything produced under the banner “literature” – is far from clear.
But the marketing distinctions are a matter for publishers and bookstores. Atwood’s
insistence that what she writes in not science fiction is curious, since she seems to be defending
her work from charges of science fiction on grounds of reception theory: “My aim is to avoid
false advertising. I’m a child who in youth was disappointed by cereal boxes because it said
‘Amazing Magic Decoder Inside!’ and you would open it up and there’d be this little piece of
plastic crap. [laughs] So I don’t want people thinking they’re going to get Martians and galaxies
far far away and purchase the book and open it up and there aren’t any of those in it” (“On The
Year of the Flood”). Setting aside her apparently reductionist assumptions of what science fiction
is, it is notable that many fans of Atwood’s novels are the very people leveling charges of
science fiction. She writes literature which reads like science fiction; if you believe (as I do) that
literature and science fiction are not mutually exclusive, then it is a small step to simply admit
that the MaddAddam books (as well as The Handmaid’s Tale) are science fiction literature.
I belabor this point, brought up in the last chapter as well, to emphasize the literary
dimension which genetic engineering has achieved by the dawn of the twenty-first century, and
thus to underline the shift in our own perceptions of genetic engineering. This also, I think,
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highlights the broader relevance of Cyborg Theory to our contemporary culture, not just as a
fruitful theoretical perspective but as a legitimate guide for identity construction. Genetic
engineering has become mainstream (or mundane) enough that it can be deployed heavily in a
novel, even in a speculative manner, and that novel can still maintain a reasonable claim against
science fiction. The conflict over defining Atwood’s novels also emphasizes the fact that culture
at large seems resistant to accepting genetic engineering as mundane. In a way, this confirms the
anxieties central to Atwood’s novel about the increasingly central role genetic engineering seems
to be playing in everyday life. 32 That many people are unwilling to accept such a plot as merely
speculative (rather than full-on science fictional) suggests that these people are unwilling to
accept (or acknowledge) how much genetic praxis is present today, or how much more
pervasive it will likely be tomorrow.
At one level the distinction between “science fiction” and “speculative fiction” which
Atwood insists on making is just a matter of semantics (as suggested by the accepted scholarly
designation of sf, which works equally well for both terms, conveniently sidestepping the
argument). At another level, though, the distinction is important for what it says about the state
of literature (writ large) today. Veronica Hollinger writes specifically about this in her essay
“Stories about the Future: From Patterns of Expectation to Pattern Recognition”:
[T]he sheer extravagance of contemporary technoscience leads to the implosion of
science fiction and science fact – only the future is rich enough to provide us with
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the image bank through which to interpret the present. But what does it mean to
name the present after a narrative genre devoted to the imaginative creation of
future worlds? And what about the genre in question? Science fiction is ‘the
literature of change,’ but change is exactly what now defines the present. It no
longer guarantees the future as the site of meaningful difference. (453)
So Atwood’s MaddAddam books are situated in between a realist/literary drive to show the
world how it is today and the connotations that such a drive now carries. Namely, our world
today, the world which Atwood dramatizes, is so marked by rapid and accelerating technological
change that her realist impulses read as science fiction.
The fact that fans of Atwood’s novels (at least those who are also fans of science fiction)
continually label them as science fiction—and that scholars who write about The Handmaid’s
Tale, Oryx and Crake, and The Year of the Flood uniformly label all three as dystopian—
suggests that for all of Atwood’s attention to the realism underlying her use of science, the
novels still read as science fiction and dystopia, regardless of her intentions. Many of the
dystopian elements do exist in our contemporary world (the environmental degradation, the
corrupt security apparatus, the extreme inequality and profound poverty, the sexual exploitation
and its internet enablers, just to name a handful). Linking these to apparent neo-conservative
corporate consolidations (Atwood is writing in the immediate shadow of 9/11) does not require
any tremendous imaginative leap. The extent of environmental change depicted in her novels is
extreme (given the apparent proximity of Atwood’s plot to the contemporary world), but it is not
outside current projections of the earth two or three generations from now. Nevertheless, the
MaddAddam novels read as science fiction dystopia, and the reason why, I suspect, is the
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centrality of genetic engineering to the plot. Genetic engineering, however close to mundane
reality it may be, is still in the literary category of science fiction.
The relationship between Atwood’s MaddAddam novels and dystopia is very much like
the relationship between the novels and science fiction. In an interview posted on YouTube,
Atwood delineates why her books would not qualify as dystopias: “I see these books [The
Handmaid’s Tale and Oryx and Crake] being referred to as dystopias, ok, that’s a whole other
term. Dystopia can be one that exists on our planet, it can be one that really does exist today, like
for instance North Korea, or it can be on another planet; it just means ‘a very unpleasant planned
society,’ different from a complete breakdown, in my opinion” (“On The Year of the Flood”).
This is a useful distinction – first because it locates the dystopia in a separate generic space from
sf, and second, because it offers an easy definition which would seem to exclude the
MaddAddam novels from traditional dystopia. In part, it is difficult to classify the MaddAddam
novels as dystopian because, contra-Orwell, Huxley, or even Atwood herself in The Handmaid’s
Tale, we see little of the world beyond our central characters.
Our broader understanding of the world-system in which Jimmy, Ren, and Toby live is
compromised because, as Atwood notes: “We just see its central characters living their lives
within small corners of that society, much as we live ours. What they can grasp of the rest of the
world comes to them through television and the Internet, and is thus suspect, because edited”
(Atwood, “Aliens” 517). However, I believe that the society we see through the cracks is a valid
example of a dystopia: the novels suggests that the structure of the society is marked by the
unsteady fragmentation we see. Veronica Hollinger again: “Much of the action in the novel takes
place in memory, through a series of flashbacks to Snowman's lost life as Jimmy. In these
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memories Atwood also outlines the shape of her near-future dystopia. Jimmy has grown up in a
society of corporate control and grotesque simulacra” (456). We have no particular need to see
the inner machinations of the government because it is hardly clear that there is a government.
Presumably some central bank exists to enable commerce between the semi-hermetic
Compounds where Science Is Done and the Pleeblands where, as Crake memorably tells Jimmy,
“our stuff turns to gold” (Oryx 288). But it matters not. Our current society has such mechanisms
in place, and in lieu of any textual hints, we can safely assume the mechanisms of Atwood’s
“speculative fiction” are functionally unchanged.
As I said above, I do think Atwood’s distinction between “classic dystopia” and Oryx and
Crake is valid. As she suggests here, classic dystopias are inverted utopias, they are planned
societies which go terribly wrong; and, as she suggests, the MaddAddam books largely detail the
collapse of society altogether, rather than the unpleasant results of a planned society. Can we call
the novels dystopian if they do not have any coherent system leading to the “very unpleasant
planned society”? I would say yes, because classifying the MaddAddam world merely as an
unplanned collapse fails to take into account our own society’s relationship with the utopian
vision of Francis Bacon, particular as noted in New Atlantis. I described this utopian vision more
fully in Chapter 2 (cf. 33-34), where I suggest that Slonczewski rewrites Bacon’s vision for a
more peaceful, feminist world. Atwood, in contrast, presents a society where the Baconian
centrality of a university-style education system has gone too far. Rather than a college which
collects and disseminates knowledge for the betterment of its society, Atwood shows this system
transforming into something monstrous: a corporate-owned, profit-driven, ethically-blind
knowledge economy. The collection and distribution of knowledge is still central to her
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(collapsing) society, but it has been perverted into a corporate interest rather than (as in Bacon) a
public one.
So when Atwood suggests a complete breakdown would better describe her work, I
suspect she is referring: first to the breakdown of nature (signified by apparent climate change
and the grotesque hybrid animals); then to the breakdown of government (signified by the
corporation’s undue power over non-corporate interest); then to the breakdown of society
(signified first by Oryx’s movement from an oppressed periphery to a corporate center, then by
the actual apocalyptic virus); and finally the collapse of culture altogether (signified by
Snowman’s loss of identity as Jimmy, by his obsession with losing words; also embodied by the
members of the God’s Gardeners). These collapses are fundamentally predicated on what I see
as a complete breakdown of the boundaries defining (and separating) nature and culture, a
breakdown whose proximate cause is uncritical genetic engineering, and whose ultimate cause is
the failure of the research model of society, a failure of Baconian utopia.
So, with all due respect to Atwood’s distinction, for the purposes of this thesis I will
rhetorically side with the legions of published scholars who favor the dystopian appellation. For
while the plot is certainly more concerned with the movements of individuals than society at
large, the society we do see (especially in Oryx and Crake) is explicitly built around a
corporatized research model. The hole in Bacon’s ideal world is in its more extreme applications:
research is done for its own sake, knowledge is pursued as its own end, but this knowledge and
research is eventually meant to affect the world in some way. In fetishizing the pursuit of
knowledge, the ethics of such a pursuit can be lost; one thinks of early scientists who vivisected
animals with the aim of better understanding how bodies work. Modern universities have ethics
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boards, and advanced countries have regulations and concerned citizens to make a ruckus, but
none of this is necessary to the Baconian method. The collapse against which Atwood sets her
stories is one of governance, accountability, and ethics in the face of a relentless pursuit of
(genetic) knowledge and (genetic) technology. Oryx and Crake, and, I would argue by extension,
The Year of the Flood, do quality as dystopian because they are depict an unpleasant version of
Bacon’s planned society – one where the central authority is in thrall of the pursuit of
knowledge, but without the corrective moral system of Christianity (which Bacon includes) or
government, art, even simple human morality (which Atwood depicts as notably disempowered).
As I noted in chapter 2, Joan Slonczewski’s A Door Into Ocean also fits the Baconian
model, except that hers represents a world where the relationship between the “Solomon House”
(the scientific endeavor / the college central to the society’s structure) and the society at large has
stabilized around the genetic engineering prowess of the Sharers. Slonczewski’s cyborg-women
are hybrid posthumans who largely fulfill the goals of Haraway’s manifesto. For Atwood,
hybridity functions differently: chimeras abound, and they function in ways that disrupt previous
distinctions between nature and culture. In part, the chimeras are abhorrent because they are
created so casually: “create-an-animal was so much fun, said the guys doing it; it made you feel
like God. A number of experiments were destroyed because they were too dangerous to have
around” (Atwood Oryx 51). Those which are destroyed – like the “snats” which are a hybrid
snake and rat – do not do much to harm local ecosystems.
Some hybrids, however, do manage to stick around: Rakunks, a hybrid of Racoons and
Skunks which “caught on as pets” (Oryx 51); Wolvogs, a hybrid of Wolf and dog which “still
look like dogs, still behave like dogs, pricking up their ears, making playful puppy leaps and
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bounces, wagging their tails. They’ll sucker you in, then go for you” (Oryx 108); bobkittens,
which “were supposed to eliminate feral cats, thus improving the almost non-existent songbird
population. . . . All of which came true, except that the bobkittens soon got out of control in their
turn. Small dogs went missing from backyards, babies from prams; short joggers were mauled”
(Oryx 164); the luminous rabbits discussed in Chapter 1. The surviving transgenic animals are
uniformly more aggressive and/or invasive than natural species, and thus quickly take over the
ecosystem. The not-so-subtle implication of these hybrids reflects the theme and tone of the
MaddAddam series in general: the products of human ingenuity, let loose without proper
oversight, will destroy the world. The sense of global, catastrophic-level climate change also
plays into this as well, as it suggests that even proir to the virulent apocalypse the effects of
human activity had not just marked its environment, but done so in ways that were unintended
and destructive. Similar themes apply to privatization, agriculture, public safety, and lifestyle:
“Remember when you could drive anywhere? Remember when everyone lived in the pleeblands?
Remember when you could fly anywhere in the world, without fear? Remember hamburger
chains, always real beef, remember hot-dog stands? Remember before New York was New New
York? Remember when voting mattered?” (Oryx 63, italics original). The world which Atwood
constructs is, over and over again, implicitly marked by some process run amok. Following
Atwood, it is clear that these processes were all well underway when she was writing: climate
change fears became mainstream, “superviruses” were being discovered (the result of antibiotic
mis/overuse), the American administration was preaching privatization, terrorism had drastically
changed the foreign policy landscape, etc.
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Atwood dedicates little narrative space to these real-world allusions, however. They form
the background of Jimmy’s life, and certainly the MaddAddam stories do function as satiric
commentary in that regard. But the focus of the narrative of Oryx and Crake is split between
Jimmy’s life growing up in the Compounds, where the future was being engineered, and
Snowman’s struggles to survive in the post-apocalyptic landscape Crake has wrought. And these
landscapes are marked by two very different genetic creations: the beautiful posthuman Crakers
and the most grotesque hybrid of all, the pigoons. These two creations form a convenient binary
opposite and, between them, nicely illuminate the position of genetic engineering in Atwood’s
novels. Unlike the various hybrids mentioned above which disturb the line between nature and
culture, the pigoons and Crakers disturb the line between nature and human. Both could qualify
as visions of posthumanity, as unwilling cyborgs.
The Crakers are Crake’s ultimate creations. Constructed as “floor-models” (Oryx 305),
they ostensibly show off the variety of possible human genetic modifications. The idea, as Crake
casually lays out to an incredulous Jimmy, is to sell these modifications to parents for their
children (305). The business idea is that the Crakers “represent the art of the possible” (305)
when it comes to human modification. The actual idea behind the floor models, as Crake
suggests to Jimmy in bits and pieces which only really come together after Armageddon, is for
the Crakers to seed the world with an enhanced version of humans. The Crakers are uniformly
beautiful, present in a variety of colors, and have been engineered by Crake to correct everything
he thinks is wrong with humanity. Like the hybrids in Butler’s Lilith’s Brood, the Crakers are
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putatively non-hierarchical. 33 As J. Brooks Bouson notes: “With their altered ancient primate
brains, the Crakers lack the destructive features of racism, hierarchy and territoriality” (“Game
Over” 150). The Crakers are, however, at least somewhat territorial: the males regularly urinate
in a circle around their habitation in order to ward off unwanted guests (pigoons, wolvogs, and
the like). So while they are not designed as territorial with respect to each other, they are
territorial with respect to the rest of the world. And since the Crakers are such a small group in
the beginning, it is unclear how far their lack of territoriality among themselves would extend as
their number increased. Also, there is no guarantee that the Crakers will grow up as designed, as
evidenced by their apparent idol of Snowman which shows up at the end of Oryx and Crake, as
well as their singing march which ends The Year of the Flood, both signs of culture which Crake
sought to eliminate.
The many “improvements” promised by the Crakers are achieved thanks to Crake’s hardminded approach to genetic engineering. He constructs the Crakers to be what he considers to be
the best possible model of humans. The costs of this project are hinted at occasionally, such as
when Snowman ruminates on the Crakers’ ability to purr. This ability, which Crake borrowed
from cat DNA after he “discovered that the cat family purred at the same frequency as the
ultrasound used on bone fractures and skin lesions” (Oryx 156) has some basis in reality – cats
do purr at frequencies shown to “improve bone density and promote healing” (Lyons). But
grafting this ability onto the Crakers was not a trivial enterprise; even Crake had to work “for
years on the purring” and along the way there were “quite a few botched experiments” (Oryx
33

Lilith notes, in Dawn, that for all their insistence on non-hierarchicalism, the ooloi seem to function as the centers
of households and the decision makers for the Oankali. Her contention is not entirely borne out by the rest of the
series, especially with regards to Akin and his negotiations on behalf of humanity, but the incredible control her
ooloi child Jodahs exhibits toward the end of Imago does seem to suggest much the same thing.
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156). What ultimately happened to these botched experiments, the “batch of kids [who] had
manifested a tendency to sprout long whiskers and scramble up curtains” or the “others [who]
had vocal expression impediments,” is never mentioned. But these imperfect models are
certainly not among the perfected Crakers.
And, of course, the Crakers’ new life comes at a tremendous cost. Crake kills nearly
everyone – for most of Oryx and Crake Snowman/Jimmy believes that he is the only human
survivor; in The Year of the Flood we follow the stories of more survivors who in turn encounter
still more survivors, but nevertheless the vast majority of people are dead. Crake’s reasons for
doing this are opaque, to say the least, but that he did it is not in doubt. He intentionally
inoculated Jimmy (before destroying the vaccine, cf. Oryx 346) and left him to take care of the
Crakers: “If anything happens to me, I’m depending on you to look after the Paradice Project.
Any time I’m away from here I want you to take charge. I’ve made it a standing order” (Oryx
320). Oryx makes a similar request: “Jimmy, I want you to promise me something. . . . If Crake
isn’t here, if he goes away somewhere, and if I’m not here either, I want to you take care of the
Crakers” (Oryx 322). Her level of awareness, whether she suspected what Crake was up to, is
never clear. Nor, for that matter, are Crake’s intentions ever clear. But the implication, drawn
from his continual comments about human flaws, the Crakers’ corrections to those flaws, his
insistence that Jimmy take care of the Crakers if/when Crake is gone, and his construction of the
JUVE virus all suggest that Crake ultimately decided to wipe out the destructive human race and
replace them with something genetically superior. In this, he is much like Butler’s Oankali,
although he works on a faster, crueler timescale.

145

Then there are pigoons, pigs built with the intention of “grow[ing] an assortment of
foolproof human-tissue organs in a transgenic knockout pig host – organs that would transplant
smoothly and avoid rejection” (Oryx 22). These creatures are as fanciful/fictional as the Crakers,
even though they are based in reality – the pigoons are based on real-life attempts to grow human
organs in pigs (an attempt which is still underway, still largely unsuccessful). But, as Coral Ann
Howells summarizes, there are factual issues with Atwood’s claim that these genetic creatures
are fully rooted in reality: “A Canadian geneticist has criticized Atwood's invented creatures like
the pigoons and the Crakers as literally impossible because scientists do not have the technology
to create them. To this Atwood's reply would surely be ‘Not yet’” (174, nt. 10). Whether the
pigoon is even a practical reality is largely beside the point, however, because Atwood takes her
transgenic animals one step further with the project Jimmie’s dad spends much of Jimmie’s
youth working on: “We now have genuine human neo-cortex tissue growing in a pigoon” (Oryx
56). The growth of human neo-cortex tissue – the same tissues involved with high-level
processes like language and critical thinking – transforms the pigoons into an almost humanlevel creature. Snowman is aware of this, noting it when confronted with a pack of pigoons: “A
brainy and omnivorous animal, the pigoon. Some of them may even have human neocortex
tissue growing in their crafty, wicked heads” (Oryx 235). Toby notes much the same thing when
she encounters the pigoons from a distance in The Year of the Flood: “‘Get away from there!’
Toby shouts at them. They peer up at her, dismiss her. . . . ‘I’m warning you!’ she yells.
Amazingly they seem to understand her. They must’ve seen a weapon before – a spraygun, a
stun gun. They squeal in alarm, then turn and run” (Year 18). The pigoons are clearly capable of
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some level of rational thought: they recognize that Toby is no threat when she is just shouting,
but when she gets a weapon they recognize that as well and flee from it.
The pigoons provide an interesting contrast for the Crakers. Both the product of genetic
engineering, both represent a hybridization of human and non-human. On the one hand, the
Crakers are built with genes pulled from throughout the animal kingdom, they are herbivores
whose sexual behavior is strongly regulated by pheromones, they can heal wounds with purrs
and fend off animals with distinctively scented urine. Their natural resistance to bugs and the
intense rays of the sun leaves them smelling like fruit. For all this, they still have language, and
while Crake works hard to eliminate all traces of art from their genome, they still build an idol.
The pigoons, on the other hand, are a patchwork of human organs and human brains, all grafted
piecemeal onto the genome of a pig. The closeness of pigs and humans has been commented
upon for ages – Polynesian cannibals used to call human flesh “long pig,” for instance. The
pigoons that both Jimmy and Toby encounter in their respective books operate with a level of
cooperation and intelligence which indicates that the practice of growing human brain tissue in
the pigs has yielded unintended consequences. Even before they are endowed with human brains,
the pigoons are associated more closely to humans than other animals: “Also, to set the queasy at
ease, it was claimed that none of the defunct pigoons would end up as bacon and sausages: no
one would want to eat an animal whose cells might be identical with at least some of their own”
(Oryx 23-24). Jimmy in particular identifies with the early pigoons: “‘Pigoon pie again,’ they
would say [jokingly] . . . This would upset Jimmy; he was confused about who should be
allowed to eat what. He didn’t want to eat a pigoon, because he thought of the pigoons as
creatures much like himself. Neither he nor they had a lot of say in what was going on” (Oryx
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24). The young Jimmy’s confusion of the boundary between himself and the pigoon is
representative of a larger confusion throughout Atwood’s world. In that final line, Atwood most
clearly expresses her novels’ central anxiety: most of us have very little say in what is going on
with regards to genetic engineering. Genetically modified plants are the norm for many
agricultural businesses, and cloned animals are sold in the US without any sort of differential
labeling (they are banned in Europe).
Two different visions of a genetic future are embodied in the hybrid figures of the
Crakers and the pigoons. The Crakers are intentional creations, and the virus which wipes out
humanity is similarly intentionally created. The implication is thus that the Baconian utopia will
collapse as a function of its own cleverness; or, inversely, that the ultimate result of the
tremendous self-knowledge genetics represents is willful self-destruction, as this knowledge both
highlight our flaws and provides an apparent solution. The pigoons with human neural tissue
(and the apparent ability to reason) represent a contrary vision, one where genetic engineering
has gruesome unintended consequences. The pigoons are the extreme case of the argument
suggested by the glowing green rabbits: playing god and being God are two different things.
Either way, the headlong rush towards ever greater genetic knowledge and genetic engineering
techniques is also rushing us towards a ghastly telos. Either genetics will enable willful
destruction or lead to accidental devastation, but the end result is the same. Like Mawer
ironically concludes, even with tremendous advances in genetic knowledge, there are limits to
our control. Regardless of whether our posthuman future comes from deliberate or incidental
changes, it will be something so different, so alien, as to exclude the human as we would
recognize it today: “The whole world is now one vast, uncontrolled experiment – the way it

148

always was, Crake would have said – and the doctrine of unintended consequences is in full
spate” (Oryx 228). 34 The cost of a post-genetic future is, for Atwood, frighteningly high.
This point is subtly emphasized by the way Atwood plays with gender roles/issues in her
novels. As I noted in the introduction and in Chapter 4, the technology of reproduction is
strongly tied to issues of genetic engineering. As I noted in the Chapter 1, there are feminist
arguments to be made against procedures like in vitro fertilization – “Currently scientific
achievements allow women to become mothers through in-vitro fertilization, to control when and
where motherhood occurs, to know the sex of their child in advance; in other words, it is possible
to give birth to a new life without involving emotions, empathy, and sociability” (Botta 251).
Slonczewski takes a contrary approach, and uses artificial reproduction technology as a way to
construct a utopia. Butler seems ambivalent, since Lilith does have a large and healthy family,
but she gets it in a way she did not choose. Mawer makes a point of showing the male-scientist’s
outsider role in the in vitro process by allowing Dr. Lambert to not only cuckold another man,
but to select for/against his own genetic heritage in the process. For Atwood, the scientific
encroachment into matters of reproduction is rendered grotesque. So long as science is a rational
and objective pursuit, she seems to suggest, such reproductive technologies will represent a
diminishment of the woman’s role in reproduction. Giuseppina Botta concurs: “If fertility can be
manipulated and monitored through technology and the female womb is only an incubator in
which ovules and gamete react, then the dehumanization of maternity is not a surprise, but a
product of the biotechnological era” (251).

34

This is the subject of Bill McKibben’s non-fiction book Eaarth, in which he describes possible ways of moving
forward in a world which has been suddenly and dramatically marked by massive environmental change – the
unintended consequences of 20th (and 21st) century industry.
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The most extreme and powerfully dramatized version comes from Oryx and Crake,
where Atwood simply draws the procedure out to its logical conclusion, allowing for the villain
Crake to create a whole human-like species without reference to any particular man or woman.
The origins of the Crakers are obscured beneath a mound of scientific intervention. Eggs and
sperm are presumably harvested from somewhere, or perhaps he simply confiscated embryos; or,
perhaps, the entire process is artificial. Regardless, while Crake hardly works alone on his
projects (he has a whole team, which he calls MaddAddam, kept under lockdown until his
projects are finished) he is the visionary and the lead designer, and accordingly, while the
Crakers are not Crake’s biological descendants, they are nonetheless characterized as “children
of Crake” (cf. Oryx 10, 95, 158). When the Crakers first ask who created them, Oryx, functioning
as a sort of mediator and enculturator, answers with “the truth. I told them it was Crake” (Oryx
311). The Crakers thus have no mother. The gender consequences are somewhat complicated, in
no small part because these distinctions are largely made by Snowman, one man doing the best
he can. And in the mythology Snowman spins for the Crakers after he leads them out of their
hermetic home, women are not written out: animals become the children of Oryx, thus
establishing Oryx’s place in the grand mythological scheme of things, not as a mother but as an
equal to Crake, just on the natural side of things; a familiar binary encoded onto a new world.
Also, while Crake’s project implicitly denies women’s role as a necessary reproductive
force, this does not necessarily mean that the Crakers are the product of a masculine process, or
that women as a force have been written out of Atwood’s world. Rather, the lack of a (present,
active, traditional) mother functions as a motif throughout the two novels, and this lack may be
as culpable as any explicit masculinity. Jimmy’s mom runs off (with the help of the God’s
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Gardeners) when Jimmy is young, taking his pet rakunk with her. His father remarries a woman
about whom Jimmy is, generally, ambivalent. Ren, in The Year of the Flood, is dragged around
by her mother from one radical lifestyle to another, accounting in part for her participation in the
world’s oldest profession when the world ends. And Crake, as Hilde Stael discusses, has
maternity issues of his own, which may account for his overly technocratic approach to the
world: “Crake, however, tries to conform to the masculine, technocratic world of the compounds,
and completely seals off his inner life. He expels the maternal body, which reminds him of his
own mortality and corporeality, to the other side. Thus, he witnesses the horrifying death, the
slow decay of his mother's body, yet refuses to be overwhelmed by irrational ‘unmanly’
emotions” (Steal 438). The point about maternity is well made: perhaps Crake’s desire to rewrite
humanity (in general) and human sexuality (specifically) is strongly shaped by the lack of
maternal guidance in his life, and a desire to fix that. But the equivalence between “masculine”
and “technocratic” is problematic, even if such equivalences are in good company. There is no
necessary connection between technocratic thinking and masculinity; certainly nothing in
Atwood’s novels suggests this: there are both men and women working in the Corporations
described in Oryx and Crake, and both men and women in the upper echelons of the resistance
movement explored in Year of the Flood. Carol Ann Howells makes a similarly unnecessary
connection between science and masculinity, even though she immediately notes how this
connection is complicated by Atwood: “Though Oryx and Crake, told in the third person and
focalized through a male narrator, is closer [than The Handmaid’s Tale] to dystopian masculine
discourse (and to the discourse of science), Atwood does manage to surprise the reader, not least
by telling her story for the first time from a male perspective and by switching the plot at the
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end” (264). I agree with her assertion that, for all its masculine features, Oryx and Crake does
not entirely follow the mode of a masculine discourse. Snowman is never in a position of power,
and Jimmy rarely is. Jimmy is a word man in a world which only values STEM students, and
throughout the literary is implicitly set up as a(n unheeded) counterweight to the relentlessly
Baconian pursuit of knowledge. Still, I am reluctant to equate the discourse of science with a
dystopian masculine discourse, or with a technocratic worldview.
Atwood complicates the gender politics of science by centering her narrative on a man
who witnessed everything but did little to participate. Jimmy is never terribly masculine, but
neither is he explicitly feminine. The technocratic society in which Crake excels is, apparently,
equal opportunity. For instance, while Jimmy is shunted to the marginalized art school Martha
Graham Academy (with their motto: “Our Students Graduate with Employable Skills” [Oryx
188]) – a school named after the famous female dancer – Crake goes to the prestigious WatsonCrick institute – a school named after the two men who uncovered the structure of DNA. In the
school names there is an implicit argument that the arts are feminine and the sciences masculine,
but Atwood leave such inferences lightly made. When Jimmy visits Crake at Watson-Crick, the
only man explicitly he meets there is Crake; the rest of his attention is spent unsuccessfully
chasing women. Similarly, while Jimmy certainly spends a lot of time with women at the Martha
Graham academy, he also rooms with a couple of guys and generally interacts with a diverse
group of students. The gender break-down of each institute (and each area of knowledge, or way
of life) is never clearly spelled out, and the textual clues suggest something like parity rules. And
if every major female character yet introduced in the series comes from an exceedingly
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disadvantaged position, there are plenty of minor female characters who are as successful as
Jimmy or Crake’s fathers.
For all his apparent technocratic compartmentalization, Crake seems to be highly aware
of sexual issues. He constructs his Crakers with sexual politics in mind, including one major
feature with no obvious marketable advantage to pre-apocalypse customers. That is, the Craker’s
regular mating cycles: “There’ll be the standard quintuplet, four men and the woman in heat. Her
condition will be obvious to all from the bright-blue colour of her buttocks and abdomen . . .
Since it’s only the blue tissue and pheromones released by it that stimulate the males, there’s no
more unrequited love these days, no thwarted lust” (Oryx 164-64). There is a pornographic edge
to this procedure, with its overtone of “gangbang” and a sense of being “an athletic
demonstration, a free-spirited romp” (Oryx 165). But the solution is elegant, in its own way.
Paternity is intentionally indeterminate, and sex is purely seasonal. If the sexual cycle reads as
pornographic to a modern human, Crake took steps to wipe out that perspective, and minus the
voyeuristic potential we are left with “[n]o more No means yes, anyways, thinks Snowman. No
more prostitution, no sexual abuse of children, no haggling over the price, no pimps, no sex
slaves. No more rape” (Oryx 165). This particular upside even seems a bit utopian, in the least
ironic sense. Much like the male-less society of the Sharers in A Door Into Ocean, Crake has
created a society (potentially) without sexual violence. 35 Like the Oankali in Lilith’s Brood, or
Dr. Lambert in Mendel’s Dwarf, Crake has utilized genetic engineering to forcefully correct the

35

I say potentially in part to reflect the question of how Crakers interact with humans. When Ren and Toby
encounter the Crakers, the Crakers become aroused because Ren “smells very blue” (“Flood” 410). Whatever
pheromone they are responding to is apparently made by non-Craker women, and its significance is different to
human women, a difference the Crakers may not appreciate. The long-term implications of this may be sexual
violence, intentional or not (or even understood as such, or not) which could very well undermine the utopian
overtones.
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ills of humanity. There is an implication here, at least from Snowman’s pessimistic perspective,
that the only solution to humanity’s problems is complete destruction. This perspective is
explicitly seconded (if less forcefully) by the Oankali in Lilith’s Brood and implicitly seconded
by the Sharers ancestors in A Door Into Ocean, which suggests that apocalyptic overtones are
somehow inherent in the literary idea of genetic engineering.
Those “natural” flaws which so much of human society attempts to regulate and correct
or condemn and eliminate are suddenly rendered mutable by the potential of genetic
engineering. 36 But since so much of our social order is currently built on policing the natural
body of the liberal human subject, this potential to go in and rewrite what was previously whole
and inviolate threatens the entire system. To the extent that such a system is flawed and unjust,
this upheaval can be construed as a positive development; and, indeed, that is the current in
Slonczewski’s A Door Into Ocean. But the construction of a new sort of human, as Atwood
bluntly dramatizes, is far from a lossless proposition. Rather, it represents nothing short of the
end of the world as we know it. This remains true even to the extent that we slowly rewrite our
place in the world through less drastic interventions – the animal projects which aim at
improving life for people, the energy production which fuels the modern world, the admirable
desire of parents who want the best possible life for their children. Even without blunt and (at
this date still) fantastical genetic engineering, Atwood envisions a grotesquely changed world.
Genetic engineering simply speeds the process up, and in this faster framework, patterns which
were previously so slow as to be hidden are rendered starkly obvious. To the extent that Oryx
36

Here I’m thinking specifically of Foucault’s discussion in The History of Sexuality, and the historical shifts
towards governance of the body, or what he calls “biopower” (140). This particular discourse is explored in depth by
Sheryl Vint, whom I quote in Chapter 2, and who has done much work on the intersection between biopower,
animal studies, and science fiction.
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and Crake represents one vision of a possible world which (as this chapter’s epigraph suggests)
Atwood would prefer we avoided, it offers a bleak diagnosis and little more. Jimmy is fully
implicated in the end of the world: he was close friends with the man who ended it all, and he did
nothing to stop him.
In The Year of the Flood, Atwood’s parallel story of life immediately before and after the
genetically engineered apocalypse, she moves beyond Oryx and Crake’s (admittedly compelling)
descriptions of ruin and decay and offers some possible alternatives. J. Brooks Bouson describes
one such alternative: “Drawing on the idea that environmentalism will not work if it does not
become a religion, Atwood mixes together science, religion and environmentalism as she
imagines the eco-religion of the pacifist and vegetarian God’s Gardeners” (“Using Up the Earth”
18). The God’s Gardeners are a good example of what I called “intentionalism” in the
introduction: they make use of nature as it is rather than attempt to exploit and control it.
However, while Atwood does create an eco-religion with the God’s Gardeners, it is not clear that
the Atwood does so because “environmentalism will not work if it does not become a religion”
as Bouson suggests. Adam One, the charismatic leader of the Gardeners, and his followers do
perform the environmentalism as a sort of religion, but in private it becomes clear that the
movement is far more pragmatic than orthodox. This reading is supported by the fact that we
mostly see the God’s Gardeners through the eyes of the agnostic Toby. She is drawn into the
Gardeners when their leader, Adam One, rescues her from her brutal boyfriend Blanco. She stays
because the Gardeners offer security, and she advances through the ranks of the organization
largely because she carves out a reliable life with the Gardeners. But, while the Gardner’s
teachings do enable Toby to survive the “waterless flood” of the JUVE virus, she has left the
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Gardeners by the time the flood strikes. 37 Her survival has at least as much to do with her own
cleverness and will as it does with her time in the Gardeners. Her triumph is, in other words, a
triumph of Toby the strong woman rather than Toby the environmentalist.
That the God’s Gardeners operate like a religion lends a useful spin to the option they
represent. Drawing the discussion explicitly back to genetic engineering, the God’s Gardeners
include many former scientists – Adam One was a corporate engineer much like Crake before he
decided to leave that world and start the Gardeners. He and his organization represent an explicit
rejection of genetic engineering praxis, but this rejection goes further than simply rejecting one
sort of science. Their movement can only cohere, Atwood seems to suggest, if it rejects the
purely rational discourses of science entirely. Adam One’s decision to create a religion suggests
that the way to combat the anxiety-inducing breakdown of nature caused by genetic engineering
is to publically reject the systems of thinking which led to genetic engineering in the first place. I
find this interesting for two reasons: first, because it implicates the entire scientific enterprise in
what is ostensibly a narrower problem. Second, because neither Adam One nor his closest
followers actually survive the Flood – they perish soon after gathering together in the aftermath
of the virus. Their failure to survive the Flood they predicted (and possible precipitated) suggests
that the Gardeners movement is not the most tenable solution. The radical environmentalism is
appealing from an aesthetic sense (their rooftop gardens are some of the few habitations in the
series which could be described as beautiful), but this is not enough. In rejecting all of science,
the Gardeners seem to be trying to put themselves into a sort of modern Eden, but they are also
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She doesn’t just up and leave; the Gardeners are targeted and disrupted because of their association with radical
environmentalists. But Toby nevertheless distances herself from the movement, choosing not to stick it out with
Adam One and the core of true believers, opting rather to take a job at a beauty salon.
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putting themselves at the mercy of those who have not joined them in their rejection. One
possible problem with the God’s Gardeners is that their leadership is not entirely forthright about
their relationship to technology – they still make use of cancer biopsies and have an internet
connected computer, for instance. They lack the ideological purity which the other paradisedwellers, the Crakers, have as a condition of their isolated upbringing. But I think there is also
something to be said for the Gardener’s naiveté, which mistakes a pre-human nature for a human
paradise. In ideologically giving up on science as a whole (and the various societal structures
which go along with it), the Gardeners valorize a return to a state of nature. But when they are
returned to such a state, they discover the truth of Hobbes’s “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, short.”
Against her description of an aesthetically appealing environmentalism, Atwood offers
another alternative, one apparently spearheaded by Zeb, the other powerful leader in the God’s
Gardeners. This option is embodied by a group of genetic engineers, apparently led by (or at
least, coordinated through) Zeb who actively resist the corporate world: they release asphalteating bacteria, to mess with transportation; they have dissidents working in the compounds to
help bring the system down from inside; and, most tellingly, they take as their name
MaddAddam, the same name ascribed to Crake’s elite team of bio-engineers. In their active
resistance, the MaddAddam group seems to embody the ideal of organized resistance. They
adhere (broadly) to the ideals of the Gardeners, but they do not deny themselves the weapons of
their foes. This option seems to be a bit more appealing, at least in terms of survival rate – we
meet a handful of MaddAddam survivors at the end, stationed and well equipped to ride out the
Flood. This option is not without its pitfalls either, though.
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For instance, Crake makes an early appearance among the God’s Gardeners – he
smuggles out a tissue sample for biopsy and we learn that his actual name is Glenn. His
connection to the Gardeners is opaque, to say the least. Certainly, Jimmy had no inkling of the
connection. It is not even clear how Crake manages to leave the tightly controlled Compounds,
and his appearance in The Year of the Flood is fleeting enough that it offers few clues. But it
appears that, for better or for worse, Crake was originally connected to the Gardeners, and it is
probable that his is also connected to the MaddAddam group and Zeb. 38 He certainly seems to
have plundered their numbers for his Paradice project which built the Crakers and, ultimately,
the JUVE virus which wipes out most of human-kind. There is some ambiguity here as to how
much the Gardeners had to do with MaddAddam, and how much they had to do with Crake, and
thus how much they had to do with the Flood and its consequences. Atwood refrains from
clarifying. The suggestion seems to be that, regardless of their intentions, these active resisters
turned into the agents of humanity’s destruction.
It is not clear how we are supposed to react to this development. I said earlier that
Atwood offers some alternatives, but perhaps it is more appropriate to say she imagines a couple
of alternatives; neither seems to receive much in the way of an endorsement from her.
Regardless, Atwood deploys genetic engineering for a familiar purpose: complete destruction.
Rather than using genetic engineering to explain the elimination of men or to affect the eventual
end of humanity, she uses it to enact a violent rupture between the human world of invasive
technology and the world returned to its natural state. Unlike the apocalyptic overtones in either
Slonczewski’s premise or Bulter’s conclusion, Crake (and thus, Atwood) has returned the world
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If there is a third novel, and Atwood has suggested that there will be, it will apparently focus on Zeb.
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to a natural state. Perhaps not natural in the sense of an untouched space: between the genetic
hybrids, the global climate change, and the millennia of human industry, the post-apocalypse
world is profoundly marked by human activity. But by removing humans from the equation, life
can return to a spontaneous course, the world can move on no longer marked by human
intervention. In this way, Atwood seems to be deploying Cyborg theory in a novel way: as a
pessimistic appraisal of the state of the post-second wave feminist world. Haraway puts the
Cyborg forward as a possible means of reconciliation between feminism and a budding
postmodernism. Atwood puts it forward as a sign of everything that is wrong in the world. In
giving up the cohesion and political power of a clearly defined “feminine” for the feminist
movement, Atwood seems to be suggesting that women will lose all their hard-won advances. To
the extent that the post-modern boundary disruption is inevitable, this loss is inevitable too. The
only really resolution, she seems to suggest, is to throw it all out and start over from nothing.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
“I could not persuade myself that the men and women I met were not also another Beast People,
animals half wrought into the outward image of human souls, and that they would presently
begin to revert.”
– H. G. Wells, The Island of Dr. Moreau (245)

I suggest, in Chapter 1, that “The trend across time for these stories is one from optimism
to dread” (17), and I stand by the assertion. This apparent movement is most obvious when
comparing Slonczewski to Atwood. Slonczewski’s deployment of genetic engineering is nothing
short of utopian, while Atwood’s deployment is starkly dystopian, and they are writing
approximately twenty years apart. In this time genetic engineering milestones were achieved,
such as the first successfully cloned mammal – the sheep Dolly (1996) – which was soon
followed by successful cloning of nearly every variety of farm animal; the human genome was
fully mapped (2003); genetic splicing of disparate animal became a reality. In short, over the
time period between the earliest text – A Door Into Ocean (1986) – and the latest – The Year of
the Flood (2009) – genetic engineering made the leap from theoretical to practical.
Concordantly, the literary deployment of genetic engineering seems to have shifted from utopian
optimism (Slonczewski) to utopian pessimism (Octavia Butler) to cynical realism (Simon
Mawer) and finally depressed dystopia (Margaret Atwood). But, while this trend does seem to be
unfolding over time, it is important to note that there are other potentially fruitful explanations
which account for this variation.
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For instance, as I emphasized in Chapters 4 and 5, there are also important generic
considerations at play – not even so much in the marketing of the texts as in the orientation of
their authors. Perhaps the apparent shift from optimism through ambivalence to pessimism has
less to do with time passing and more to do with generic expectations. The more “literary” and
respectable the author, the less positive their deployment of genetic engineering. Optimistic
approaches to the potential of scientific developments may be less a factor of time and more a
factor of genre: those who write of science’s potential as a positive are classified as science
fiction writers, while those who cast a skeptical eye to science’s potential are labeled literary.
This may account for the “science fiction” classification of Neal Stephenson when his first novel,
Snow Crash, is set (like Atwood’s MaddAddam books) in a bleak ultra-consumerist society
where (as in the MaddAddam books) the government has all but disappeared, and believable
extensions of contemporary technology dominate the plot (as in Atwood’s story). But his story is
not relentlessly bleak, it is barely even cynical; rather, it is ironic and humorous, and if the world
is dystopian, the plot is not.
There are also issues of scientific literacy to consider: Joan Slonczewski is a
microbiologist at Kenyon College, and has published numerous articles in biology journals. 39
Her perspective on genetics, what it can and can’t do, is thus strongly rooted in a scientific
perspective. When she describes the “lifeshaping” of her utopian Sharers, she avoids issues like
cloning, or massive modification. Rather, much of the lifeshaping occurs at the level of
microbes: the breathmicrobes which change their skin color, the eggs which must be modified
39

Her specialty is E. coli – Sherryl Vint notes: “In her research she [Slonczewski] explores the relationship between
humans and E. coli, asking how and why some strains enhance human digestion while other can cause illness and
death. In her fiction, Slonczewski similarly considers how communities can be formed among different subjects with
competing interests and needs, how the relationship between the environment and various subjects can be conceived
in terms beyond the metaphor of parasitism” (“Theorizing the Global”).

161

for fertilization, the seed which grow into life-rafts. Although the potential for such genetic
engineering to wreak havoc is still present, the spectrum of potential applications is apparently
limited, thus neutralizing the potential of genetics somewhat.
Atwood, contrarily, has no immediate scientific background, though she is the child of an
entomologist. When she “speculates” from current technology, her speculation is grounding in a
far different perspective than that of the scientist. 40 For instance, while there are real-world
attempts to use pigs for organ harvesting, these cutting edge attempts have more to do with
genetically modifying the pigs’ own organs to be more compatible with humans than simply
growing organs in pigs. This may still seem like a grotesque deployment of genetic engineering,
but it does not represent a significant shift in the literary value of genetic engineering. Atwood
deploys the metaphor to suggest that anything whatsoever can be grown or manipulated in any
arbitrary being; genetic engineering as a praxis which collapses nature and culture completely. A
scientist like Slonczewski would likely note that there is a significant and possibly
insurmountable distinction between small tweaks to the genetic code and wholesale alterations.
When Atwood projects out from a creature like Alba – the transgenic glowing rabbit from the
introduction – she does so without knowing whether this sort of modification was simple or
complex. The fact that it is where Kac and his artistic/scientific team started suggests that it was
low-hanging fruit.
40

I should note here, in response to a question in my thesis defense, that I am in fact a huge fan of Margaret
Atwood’s work. I was first introduced to her poetry in high school, I fell for her novels in college, and I like Oryx
and Crake so much I wrote an overlong thesis around it. If, at times, I seem overly critical of her relationship to
science (or science fiction) this is largely an artifact of my desire to have her legitimize the science fiction discourse.
A peripheral focus of this thesis is an attempt to claim Atwood for science fiction; although ideally she would claim
science fiction for Atwood. Her deployment of science in her novels is no more fanciful than the deployment of
another of my favorite authors, Octavia Butler. Since we are approaching a time where even literary heavyweights
are turning to science fiction themes for their work, I nurse a dream that these heavyweights will eventually
recognize some of the overlooked heavyweights (again, I say, Octavia Butler!) as one of their own. If I doth quibble
too much with Atwood, it is out of love.
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Mawer addresses this issue more obliquely: first, in the choice of eugenics as a related
metaphor, and second in his description of the project. Although genetic engineering may seem
fantastical and futuristic, Mawer, writing a contemporary story built from contemporary science,
links it backwards to older, problematic, and largely discredited discourses—namely, eugenics.
There is much room, I think, for an extended study of the connection between genetic
engineering (as deployed in literature and in film, specifically) and the eugenics movement of the
19th and first half of the 20th centuries. 41 Rather than representing a collapse of nature as we
know it, for Mawer, the genetic praxis serves to highlight how little progress we have really
made, at least if we don’t mind the lessons of the past. In this, he is more closely aligned with
Atwood than Slonczewski, because Atwood seems to link the genetic praxis with an ultimate
triumph of the old world order: genetic engineering may be doing something new, in Atwood’s
world, but it is nevertheless serving the old.
Mawer, however, restricts the scope of his commentary to one extraordinary man in
surprisingly ordinary circumstances. He highlights the potential (and often unacknowledged)
complexity of genetics in his description: dwarfism is caused by one mutated gene; moreover, it
is easy to detect very early in development because its manifestation is marked by a unique
chemical signature. This is the very definition of low hanging genetic fruit. He hints at the deeper
complexities when he notes the similarities between the Y-chromosome and the genetic disorder
which leads to dwarfism: both arise from an easily identifiable “mutation” and both are strongly
linked to some undesirable trait (dwarfism in one case, crime in another). However, just
41

Michael Rembis’s “(Re)Defining Disability in the ‘Genetic Age’: Behavioral Genetics, ‘New’ Eugenics and the
Future of Impairment” and Alys Eve Weinbaum’s “Racial Aura: Walter Benjamin and the Work Of Art in a
Biotechnological Age” are two good examples of this sort of study, although neither deals with Mawer specifically,
Mendel’s Dwarf would be a good fit in either study.
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identifying does not necessarily lead to sophisticated genetic solutions; if anything, it just creates
more problems. We can identify the gene responsible for dwarfism, or strongly associated with
violent crime, but thus far the only way to “fix” either is simply to select against them. This is
sort of like lowering lung cancer rates by shooting smokers. Or take the issue of intelligence,
which Dr. Lambert notes is associated with hundreds of genes and located in none of them.
When it comes to intelligence, there is no way to even select for or against the trait: the
complexity is too great. I don’t mean to suggest that Mawer is more genetically literate than
Atwood (they both seem to have done their homework) but by restricting himself to the present,
to actually realized technologies, he avoids making fantastical assumptions about genetic
engineering’s impact on our future. Perhaps not so coincidentally, his novel is much less grim
than Atwood’s; he writes a cynical and bitter vision of the world, but the tragedy is contained,
and does not play out over an apocalyptic scale.
Butler fits somewhere uncomfortably between the two extremes. She was not a scientist,
but she was a well-regarded science fiction writer. She spent most of her career working with the
praxic possibilities of scientific advancements. So if her deployment of genetic engineering was
not strictly believable based on current science, neither did it contradict this science. 42 This lack
of contradiction is probably the most important characteristic of science in good science fiction:
the science can be fantastic, but it must still somehow fit into what is currently known. So rather
than constructing a discourse around the science of genetic engineering, Butler builds from this
science a useful metaphorical system for telling a story about many things, just not genetic

42

We still have yet to make bodies just reabsorb cancer, for instance, although there is particular no reason this
could not happen.
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engineering. 43 Consequently, her use of genetic praxis is less bleak than either Mawer’s or
Atwood’s. Butler’s pessimism comes from the inherent flaws of the human condition, flaws
which can be fixed with genetic engineering if we are willing to pay the cost: that which makes
us human.
I think there is also something to be said for the distinction between scientific theories,
which exist as potentials for future implementation, and scientific praxis, which has been
implemented and embodied already. When looking at the potential of some new praxis, you are
free to choose from any of a variety of outcomes, and can thus be as optimistic as you please.
When dealing with an actual, enacted praxis, the variety of potential outcomes shrinks
considerably, and you are more pressed to account for the ways life has not become perfect as a
result of this new technology. I hasten to add that the purpose of this thesis has not been to
specifically track the changes in genetic engineering as a literary metaphor. I am also interested
in how this metaphor stays the same across perspectives, across authors, and across time. I have
attempted to chart the contours of genetic engineering as a metaphorical function in a variety of
texts. The issues of gender, sexuality and reproduction, the environment, and the ethics of freewill reoccur across the selected texts.
I start with gender, although “sex” would be more appropriate, because I am specifically
speaking of the division between male and female, rather than masculine and feminine. I use the
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This may seem like an odd claim, especially given how much space I’ve devoted to her work. I would say that
Butler, like Slonczewski, explicitly uses genetic engineering as a literary praxis, as an acknowledged metaphor, to
enable and flesh out her discussions of gender, race, environment, biological determinism, and free will. Atwood, by
contrast, comes close to claiming that the MaddAddam books are principally concerned with the real development of
a real scientific enterprise in a real society. Thus I would say Atwood does write specifically about genetic
engineering, as well as deploying it as a metaphor for her discussion of gender, capitalism, feminism, and such. The
two are not mutually exclusive, nor are they mutually dependant, although I would say you cannot have a literary
discussion of real genetic engineering without also encountering its (Cyborg/posthuman) theoretical roots.
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more culturally contingent term of gender because while the genetic issue is about a person’s
sex, the literary dimension is one of sex presentation, or the way that sex (that genetic category)
informs how one is in the world. 44 Put another way, sex at birth and gender presentation in
culture are directly linked in all these novels. So while the genetic issue is sex, the literary issue
could more easily be called gender, with the caveat that gender is, in this case, determined by
sex. We see the issue of gender in Slonczewski’s exclusion of men from her utopia’s history. 45
We see this in the Oankali hesitation in building a human-born male. We see this in Mawer’s
cynical discussion of the link between the Y-chromosome and crime, and implicitly in his gender
selection of his child. And finally, we see this in the starkly anti-feminist world Atwood
constructs from a speculative genetic engineering.
I also use the term gender to emphasize the distance between the sex of an individual and
the issues of sexuality and reproduction. Though ostensibly related, the latter two terms refer
specifically to the ways we produce children – both the physical act which is historically
responsible for reproduction, and the science which is (increasingly) actually responsible for
reproduction. Specifically, there is a distinct separation of sexuality and reproduction, one which
threatens a sort of theoretical rupture between sexuality as a location of control (a la Foucault)
44

Even though I am writing about distinctions between “gender” and “sex,” I am intentionally skirting the Queer
Theory discourse. These texts are largely operating independent of the Queer discourse because there is no distance
between one’s biological sex and one’s gender identification in any of the novels. The two are effectively one and
the same; a common understanding of gender prior to the work of Judith Butler, Eve Sedgwick, and others in the
Queer Theory community. I also skirt the issue because none of the novels include much discussion of homosexual
relationships, even (surprisingly) Slonczewski’s, where the homosexual component is apparently so obvious none of
the characters bother commenting on it, beyond some basic explanations of how reproduction can work in a singlesex society. None of the characters from Valedon mention homosexual relationship, and since there were no other
options on Shora, no one considers their apparent lesbianism to be indicative of any sexual alterity. Slonczweski gets
away with this in part because she is writing in the tradition of new-wave feminist sf where all-female societies are
something of a trope (e.g., Joanna Russ’s Female Man), obviating the need for an in-depth explanation.
45
Although, again, she does not permanently exclude them; Spinel is fully incorporated, and other men are on their
way to “self-namer” status by the novel’s conclusion. But the implicit exclusion of men from the idealized Sharer
society suggests that, all things being equal, men will disappear from the equation.
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and children as metonymic icons of our future (a la Edelman). There seems to be no necessary
conclusion on this count, at least across the works I survey; what is consistent is the rupture, not
its effects. Sexuality and reproduction are linked in both Slonczewski and Butler, even though
there is no technical reason for this. 46 Mawer plays with the distinction, having his characters
abort the pregnancy which occurred through intercourse and instead select a normal zygote for in
vitro. Atwood dramatizes the decoupling through dual elements of a scientific (and thus asexual)
creation of the Crakers, as well as through the trafficking of women for sex. This rupture
between sex and reproduction reflects the modern age, to some extent: birth control enables
essentially the same relationship, albeit in a negative way (that is, it can only prevent pregnancy).
With genetic engineering, the rupture is made positive, and thus completed.
Genetic engineering also seems to come with a built in environmental discourse, although
again the shape of this discourse is variable. The general geography of the discussion unfolds
around questions of the distinction between nature and not-nature, and in particular along the
lines of environmental devastation. Slonczewski explicitly links genetic engineering to her
Sharer’s enlightened and environmentally sensitive society, although the suspicious
compatibility of Shora’s life forms and humanity implicitly suggests that their environment may
not be so natural after all. In Butler this issue manifests in the form of a living spaceship, as well
as Earth-bound habitations which will someday grow into ships themselves, stripping the Earth
bare in the process. Mawer deals with this obliquely in his discussions of nature vs. nurture, but
the implication is the same: what was once natural is, thanks to the intervention of genetic
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Both have the technology to extract the necessary materials, mix them, and implant the fertilized zygote without
any sexual contact whatsoever. Nevertheless, reproduction is only shown occurring between sexually connected
people – a couple in A Door Into Ocean and a quintet in Lilith’s Brood.
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engineering, startling unnatural. Atwood takes this issue the furthest, depicting a near-future
Earth infested with genetic hybrids and devastated by overconsumption.
Finally, broadly tied into all the previous issues, there is what I’m calling the ethics of
free-will. I do not necessarily mean free-will in the grand philosophical sense (although Butler,
in particular, does go there). Rather, I mean something narrower: the ethics of extending the
range of (human) free-will into previously spontaneous situations. Slonczewski’s whole story is
predicated on the notion that the Sharers have survived when so many other Primes were
destroyed because they have found the proper ethics for extending human control into all parts of
existence: specifically, they predicate their whole culture on an innate sense of reciprocity, which
allows them to manage the potentially tremendous influence they could exert over their
environment and themselves. The horror and pessimism of Lilith’s Brood comes from the
Oankali’s lack of respect for what humans consider free-will – they read what humans
biologically “want” and this overrides any conscious decisions that the humans may make. For
Mawer, this issue is dramatized by Dr. Benedict’s dwarfism (a statistical, random condition) and
his scientific breakthrough which allows him to overwrite nature, at least when it comes to
dwarfism. Suffice it to say, the intrusion of conscious will into a previously spontaneous
situation does not turn out well. For Atwood, this issue resolves itself, in a way, by enabling the
creation of a species-ending virus.
I call genetic engineering a literary praxis to suggest that when authors make use of the
metaphorical idea of genetic engineering – as a premise for their story, as an element in their
narrative, as a concern for their characters, as a condition of their world – they are doing
something, enacting or inscribing theory into narrative. What this thesis suggests is that genetic
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engineering functions as literary praxis for Cyborg theory and the related discourses of
posthumanism. The recurring issues we see across the texts are united in their concern with those
boundaries we erect to define the self; more to the point, they are concerned with crossing,
confusing, and even collapsing these boundaries. The political reasons for which authors deploy
genetic engineering can vary. For Slonczewski, this boundary collapsing is distinctly related to
the mission laid out in Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto,” namely as a way to reconcile secondwave feminism with a post-modern, post-feminist world, and perhaps as a means of revitalizing a
disheartened movement. For Atwood, this boundary collapsing is symptomatic of a world gone
mad. But in both cases, the same metaphor is deployed to achieve the same hybridizing effect.
As a metaphor, genetic engineering is particularly well suited for the task of manifesting
Cyborg theory. I suspect that this is because genetic engineering is situated across so many
boundaries – gender (and thus sexuality), reproduction (and thus reproductive futurism),
nature/culture, and the role of free-will in a chaotic world. As this chapter’s epigraph suggests,
the self/Other, nature/culture, human/animal boundary confusion did not originate with the last
few decades of genetic research. But the boundary being tested in The Island of Doctor Moreau,
born from an imaginative take on vivisection, does not extend to questions of gender, sexuality,
or (put broadly) futurity. These question are more explicitly linked to recent discourses
surrounding genetic engineering and Cyborg theory.
This is not to suggest that genetic engineering can or must only be deployed as a means
of instantiating Cyborg theory into a text. Rather, I hope I have shown that this is how genetic
engineering has been used thus far. So long as the old boundaries are thrown into doubt by
genetic engineering, I suspect that this new technology will continue to be used as a literary
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means of testing, threatening, and even torpedoing these boundaries. To support this claim, I
offer a possible precedent: space. I offer this as a supporting example, one which could be
followed up on as possible confirmation for my broader claim.
The argument broadly goes thus: for thousands of years, the skies were a mystery, full of
stars and wanderers, signifying something. What they signified varied across time and cultures,
but these significations were united in a conception of the skies as generally flat and fairly close.
The Enlightenment began the process of destroying this view, but it wasn’t until the Victorian
age that the true vastness of space was both understood and this understanding broadly
disseminated. As a result, the metaphorical place which “space” once occupied was shifted, and
so the literary uses of space changed as well. This first came to my attention when I was reading
H.P. Lovecraft and noticed a connection to Thomas Hardy’s Two on a Tower. Although the two
may seem like odd bedfellows (they are), they both use descriptions of the vastness of space to
communicate a sense of unspeakable horror, the sense of losing oneself in the abyss. I postulated
in a conference paper that this concordance is due to the recently shifted image of space in the
public imagination. Today, the shift is meaningless to most people, because everyone alive today
was born after space was conceptualized as truly vast and mostly empty. Hence, space is not a
metaphor with the same horror-inducing currency. Similarly, I suspect that genetic engineering
will too someday run its course, and the old boundaries will be refortified or broken down and
rebuilt elsewhere, and the literary potential of a genetic engineering metaphor will fade, or at
least, change to signify something else.
In the meantime, there are numerous other places were an examination of genetic
engineering would be appropriate. There is a case to be made that Stephenson should have been

170

part of this thesis: his novel The Diamond Age is premised on the ubiquity of nanotechnology,
mechanical devices which are so small they can operate on the atomic level. This allows for
fantastic feats of technology, such as the mass production of diamonds, which replace glass and
crystal as the transparent building material of choice in Stephenson’s novel. The distinction
between mechanical nanomachines and genetically modified bio-organisms is subtle, and may
come down to whether the materials are sourced from mineral technologies or organic ones. But
at some level even this distinction breaks down: our cells, organic though they may be,
nevertheless make use of inorganic compounds in their regular functioning. The overlap between
nanomachines and genetically engineered organisms is significant enough as to merit further
study. I ultimately decided against The Diamond Age because the nanomachines did not function
as a literary praxis, at least not in the same way that genetic engineering did. So while the realworld or theoretical overlap between the two may be suggestive, thus far their literary connection
is vague.
I restricted myself to novels or series of novels, but this restriction was arbitrary. Many
computer games make significant use of genetic engineering as a ludic (game-play) element, as
well as a story element. The Bioshock series, in particular, comes to mind. In the realm of
comics, the Swamp Thing series written by Alan Moore in the 1980s offers a very interesting
proto-genetic posthuman take on the character, and this element has been maintained to some
extent in subsequent Swamp Thing issues. Films are perhaps the most studied medium I
neglected: 1997’s Gattaca would be an exemplary case. 47 James Cameron’s Avatar would work

47

And, indeed, it has been studied in this regard before: David Kirby’s “The New Eugenics in Cinema: Genetic
Determinism and Gene Therapy in Gattaca” and Alan Wood’s “Genes and Human Potential: Bergsonian Readings
of Gattaca and the Human Genome” are perhaps the most relevant examples.
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as well, although it is less concerned with genetic engineering per se and more with issues of
disability, ecology, and posthuman embodiment. Television series have broached this issue
frequently as well, especially the Borg in the various Star Trek series and the Cylons in the
Battlestar Galactic reboot. The transgenic artwork which created Alba, discussed in the
Introduction, has continued, both from Eduardo Kac’s group and others. The question of how
genetic engineering manifests in extra-literary creative productions is beyond the scope of this
thesis, but such a study could be fruitfully cross-referenced with this one to better understand
how the idea of genetic engineering operates in culture and the world at large.
One element which I have come to believe could fit within the scope of the study, were
there space, is the connection between language and genetic engineering. The nomenclature of
genetics is connected to the way we talk about literature: the genetic code is envisioned as a sort
of language, abnormal sections of the code are described as misspellings or typos, even the way
we encode the biological matter of a strand of DNA is fundamentally literary: as a series of
letters. There is a connection, I suspect, between this literary angle of genetics and the use of
genetics in literature. The idea of writing and rewriting, especially as it applies to identity, is
strikingly similar between the two practices. That is, the idea of re-writing or “writing back”
against the center as a way of establishing identity (cf. Edward Said, bell hooks, Gayatri Spivak,
etc.) offers a fruitful comparison for the writing and rewriting genetic codes as a way of
challenging identity.
An emphasis on language appears in each of the texts I study: the utopia of A Door Into
Ocean is built on a novel linguistic system which conflates subject and object, a conflation which
may have profound effects for the understanding of “lifeshaping” – which is to say, for the
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deployment of genetic engineering. Octavia Butler relates genetics not to language so much as
other senses, explicitly taste. This represents a challenge to idea that genetics functions like a
language. 48 However, there are still numerous connections to writing. Specifically, the scene
where Lilith is denied any tools for writing – the Oankali enhance her memory instead, so that
she has no need to inscribe words in order to remember them. For the Oankali, all information is
contained in memories, and their retrieval and manipulation of these memories is similar to the
way they (for instance) hold the group discussion to decide the fate of Akin’s request in
Adulthood Rites. These genetic memories and pheromonal exchanges are the language of the
Oankali, at least as much as any of their verbalizations. Although they enhance Lilith’s memory,
and thus enable her to somewhat experience their “language,” she is never integrated enough –
never “Oankali” enough – to fully participate in Oankali discourse. The distinction is thus
framed as one between literature (and the modes of thought associated with it) and Oankali
genetic language. Mendel’s Dwarf explicitly makes use of language-grounded terminology to
describe Dr. Lambert’s work, and the genetic project at large, specifically with references of
typos in the genetic code. Finally, Atwood dwells on language as an issue in her two currently
available MaddAddam books. 49 Snowman/Jimmy in Oryx and Crake and Ren in The Year of the
Flood are both associated with words and language – pre-apocalypse Jimmy had a perverse
fondness for antiquated words and studied the most literary major available (which is essentially
48

This, in case you were wondering, is why I did not pursue the linguistic line of inquiry: it does not fit with the
(otherwise) most perfectly situated of my selected texts. I felt that Butler’s implicit rejection of the notion that
genetic engineering is a language rendered the issue of language beyond the purview of my study; it was not an
issue which came up in each text, and so was not a part of the implicit literary praxis. For the reason detailed below,
I’ve come to change my mind.
49
Atwood has suggested that she will write a third book in this series, one which follows Zeb and the MaddAddam
members more closely. Unfortunately, she has not done so in time for this thesis, and so I must simply presume that
what is true for the first two novels with respect to genetic engineering will remain true for the third as well.
Consider it my testable hypothesis.
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advertising); post-apocalypse Snowman lingers on memories of words which (he assumes) will
be lost with him, words without any meaning in a destroyed world, words which don’t even wait
for his death before they leave; Ren’s passages in The Year of the Flood are written from her
perspective much like diary entries, an act which feels transgressive to her because it was
forbidden by the God’s Gardeners. Both characters are positioned as outsiders with respect to
genetic engineering, and both are strongly literary.
Ecocriticism is a theoretical paradigm which I address somewhat tangentially, mostly
when discussing the ethics and implication of rendering natural environments fully controllable.
I expected, at the start of this project, that ecocriticism would play a much larger role in the
literary genetic praxis, since it is (a) so central to my original reading of Atwood, as well as
clearly present in Slonczewski and Butler, and somewhat present in Mawer; and (b) a collapse of
the category “nature” would imply a collapse of the environment, thus implicating ecocritical
concerns. So I was surprised to find that ecocriticism does not seem to play much of a role in the
genetic engineering literary praxis. What I found instead was that while the ecocritical discussion
is certainly central to any reasonable, philosophical, real-life discussion of genetic engineering, it
does not seem to be central to literary deployments. Rather, the issue at hand seems to be the
deconstruction of the humanist subject. I would note that I do not push very far into what
genetics means for the modern green movement (of which Atwood is a notable supporter), nor
do I do much with the broader implications of genetic engineering on our understanding of
nature in general. The deconstruction of natural identity seems to be a means to an end (namely,
instituting Cyborg theory) rather than an end in and of itself.
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There is also room in related studies for a more prolonged meditation on issues directly
addressed in Animal Studies. I decided early on to mostly leave Animal Studies on the sideline,
largely because Sherryl Vint has done so much admirable work in this field. Also, while Animal
Studies is very relevant to Atwood and somewhat relevant to Slonczewski, I knew it was less
relevant to Butler and not at all addressed in Mawer. Although animals and the distinction
between animal and human are also certainly relevant to any philosophical discussion of the
ethics of genetic engineering (ethics which are directly addressed in Atwood’s novels), in terms
of the literary praxis of genetic engineering, this boundary (like the nature/human boundary) is
mostly important only insofar as it affects human identity. In my judgment, Animal Studies
necessitates an equally long look at animal identity. Thus I set the issue aside in favor of more
universal issues. 50 Both Animal Studies and Ecocriticism may become more important in the
genetic engineering praxis as time goes on, as these two discourses are relatively recent,
especially compared to the feminist and Marxist movements which Haraway’s “Cyborg
Manifesto” addresses. Given how central the “Manifesto” is to my reading of genetic
engineering in literature, I think it is reasonable to look to Haraway for an idea of where this
issue may go in the future, and as she stands as one of the founders of Animal Studies, this will
probably be fruitful territory for future scholarship.
There are some real-world developments which may also intrude on the genetic
engineering literary praxis: for instance, the growing study of epigenetics, which looks
specifically at gene expression. Epigenetics offers a more complex view of the biological
determinism implicit in a strictly genetic model. Some genes may give predispositions, but how
50

I use universal carefully here, to mean “common to all the texts I studied” and to suggest that they should show up
in other texts which fit into the same general category. I do not mean to claim more than that.
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the gene eventually manifests or “expresses” often heavily depends on environmental conditions:
the ultimate conflation of nature and nurture. This field is not new, but it is starting to get more
attention with respect to humans and genetic engineering. If epigenetics does have an impact on
popular understandings of genetic engineering, I suspect this will manifest as a greater
appreciation of the complexity of life. Dwarfism may be directly and causally related to one
altered gene, but psychopathy, for instance, is more likely triggered by certain environmental
conditions in conjunction with genetic quirks, and these quirks and conditions may not be stable
themselves. 51 A similar complexity has manifested in discussions of the animal kingdom, in
particular the metaphor of the tree of life. Evolution has long been visualized as a linear
sequence of changes, such that we can trace our genetic ancestry backwards and draw a line
(albeit a jagged one) from any given ancestor to us. However, this perspective misses the very
important fact that much of our day to day survival is dependent on microbes and bacteria (which
digest our food, for instance) and that these do not follow the same linear path as our genetic

51

Incidentally, this sort of development is why I insist on categorizing Atwood’s MaddAddam as science fiction. It
may seem like a reasonable jump from “glowing rabbit” to “wholly altered human beings,” so long as you hand
wave in a genius and a couple of decades, but the levels of complexity which separate the two are hard to overstate.
By way of analogy, in physics (which I ill-advisedly studied and even got a Bachelor’s degree in as an
undergraduate) it is fairly trivial to solve the equations for the motion of two masses interacting with each other;
someone who doesn’t know the math may then assume it will be equally trivial, or at least just a matter of time,
before the same can be said of systems with three masses. It’s only one more mass, after all, right? The problem is
that the Newtonian equations which behave so well with two bodies completely lose their mind when you have three
or more bodies, except in very specific situations. These specific situations are not nothing, and they can lead to lots
of spectacular science, but if you move beyond these specific instances at all the system becomes literally chaotic
and thus mathematically unsolvable (and again, I would direct the interested reader to James Gleik’s fabulous
Chaos: The Making of a New Science).
This is the sort of jump between importing one specially selected trait and rewriting an entire genome. What
makes Atwood’s two novels science fiction is that she imagines a fantastic creation (the Crakers) and explains it as
the product of science. If she’d explained the Crakers as “magic” it would be fantasy. This, by the way, is what
makes things like Star Wars science fiction in my book as well. Jumping between diverse locales and fighting epic
large scale space battles is not inherently science fictional, but explaining the fantastic elements of these things as
mechanically (and thus scientifically) feasible is what renders Star Wars science fiction. It is fiction built on a
fantastic deployment of the tropes, movements, and affects of science. (Okay, this is the last I’ll bring up Atwood
and sf, I promise. If I ever write an sf manifesto, I think I’ll call it “Margaret Atwood Writes Science Fiction.”)
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heritage but rather are common across vastly divergent species (Lima). If you manufacture a
human just from human DNA, you are missing hundreds of other critical organisms which are
both essential to and genetically distinct from human life. The centrality of these varied microbes
both shapes evolution and confounds it. A broader recognition of this could also complicate our
current understanding of the potential of genetic engineering.
I would like to end on a brief justification for this project, and for the study of science in
literature in general. What place does English have in discussions of science anyway? First,
literary scholars are uniquely qualified to study literary perspective of science. These
perspectives may not be identical to science, or the way the scientific discourse views itself (I’d
argue that they rarely are), but this does not mean they have no place in the scientific discourse.
Only a handful of people truly understand what is going on in any one particular subsection of
science, yet our society as a whole benefits (or suffers) from what science reaps. Our society as a
whole is also structured such that science can be done. Thus, although few people are scientists,
everybody is implicated in the scientific discourse in some small way. Literature is a more
broadly accessible discourse, even (or perhaps, especially, given the rabid readership)
disreputable forms like science fiction. Literature has as much potential power to shape scientific
discourses as scientific discourses have to shape literature. It is the job of literary scholars to try
and understand how literature functions. To the extent that literature and science are intertwined,
it is the job of some literary scholars to study science as it manifests in literature.
Second, science is made up of a tremendous number of theories, models, and (if I may be
a touch metaphorical) possible narratives. 52 Many if not most of these will be rendered obsolete

52

I must recommend Neal Stephenson’s Anathem for a brilliant meditation on this very point.
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as the field progresses, but some number will work well enough that they can become
instantiated in the real world, becoming scientific praxis. Because science often works with
profoundly new and tremendously bizarre ideas, the impact of the transition between science
theory and science praxis presents a number of unknown unknowns. Literature is an ideal
mechanism for exploring these sorts of unknowns and potentially working out some of the ethics
before the actual situation comes up. James Gunn suggests as much when he said: “Science
fiction readers are not susceptible to future shock; they were part of the space generation long
before anyone else” (Alternate Worlds 37). As the pace of technological advancement
accelerates, there may be less time than ever before to slowly try out changes, and thus insulation
from future shock is only one part of what science fiction (or, more generally, fictional
engagements with science) can do. That it is being used even by literary giants suggests that the
ethical (emotional, psychological, social) concerns which historically drive literary-minded
writers are starting to become best addressed with science fiction. This is a use of literature to not
just prepare us for the future, but to shape what our future should be.
Finally, literary studies can comment beyond the level of narrative. I asserted at the end
my introduction that “we are now living in a post-natural world” (28). While I stand by this
point, I do not think it is enough to simply note the instability which genetic engineering has
introduced to our previously convenient category “nature”; nor is it enough to append an easy
“post-” and call it a day. That is the beginning of my project. I would like to end with a minor
nomenclature suggestion which may offer some clarity in the decades ahead as we renegotiate
just what is meant by nature and natural, and thus how we construct ourselves. Rather than
calling the pig from the local factory-farm who is the latest progeny of a millennia-long project
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of selective breeding “natural” and the pig’s close cousin who has been genetically altered to
grown human-compatible organs “unnatural,” I would offer the term indigenous. Indigenous
animals are those which predate genetic intervention. Indigenous environments are environments
as they functioned prior to human intervention. (This intervention need not be intentional.) I
offer these terms because the boundary damage wrought by genetic engineering – and exploited
by literary deployments of the trope of genetic engineering – has already been done. A strict
adherence to the old categories may prove unhelpful. Thus, we should take a note from Messrs.
Lakhoff and Johnson, and search for new metaphors to help us create new understandings and, in
the process, a better reality.
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